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Abstract
This dissertation examines second order network formation on Indiaʼs large and rapidly 
expanding mobile phone networks. It does so by examining a particular second order 
network – the Indian Premier League (IPL) mobile network. Using a case study 
approach and a mix of ethnographic methods and textual analysis, I explore the history 
that preceded the IPL mobile network, the intentions of its creators, the processes by 
which users participate on the network, and the outcomes of network expansion and 
evolution. I deploy the space of flows concept of Manuel Castells, to draw attention to 
continuity  and change in Indian communication networks, and to highlight the new 
spatial dynamics at work in mass mobile telephony. This dissertation emphasizes the 
transformative nature of second order networks and identifies the ways that masses of 
users can disrupt and alter communication networks, especially  in contexts of informal 
economics and power structures.
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Mobile Networks in India and the Indian Premier League
Introduction
! On April 3, 2013, I walked into Kolkataʼs Eden Gardens, made my way through 
teeming crowds of purple-clad fans, found my seat, and waited for the start of play. This 
was the opening match of the sixth season of the Indian Premier League, a big-money 
cricket league that draws the worldʼs top  players to India for seven weeks of fast-paced 
two-hour matches. As the stadiumʼs video screens and the IPL mobile app counted 
down the minutes and seconds until the start of play, the crowd buzzed with excitement.
! Finally  the moment arrived. Brett Lee, a spiky-haired fast bowler for the Kolkata 
Knight Riders, took the ball and began his run toward the opening batsman, Unmukt 
Chand of the Delhi Daredevils. Leeʼs delivery bounced once, at perfect length, cut away 
from the flailing Chand, and sent his off-stump  cartwheeling backwards. The umpire 
raised his right index finger and 90 000 fans roared their approval. The home team had 
taken a wicket on the first ball of the match.1
! All around me, fans turned their attention to their phones. I asked a pair of men in 
their early 20s what was so interesting. Were they live-Tweeting the action? Were they 
uploading videos to Facebook? “No,” one said. “Weʼre betting on the match.” The other 
added: “With that wicket, the odds have changed.” They chatted excitedly in Bengali 
and continued tapping on their phones.
! So began my fieldwork researching mobile phone usage in the context of the 
Indian Premier League. I had chosen the IPL as a case study  because it had made such 
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a conspicuous display of communication technology in its branding, and because it is a 
useful context to study the dramatic expansion of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks. I came 
to India with a set of questions about hardware, mobile apps, social media, and mobile 
culture. In the matches and months to follow, I came away with a set of answers that 
surprised me. What I observed studying the IPL mobile network challenged my initial 
assumptions, pushed back on much of the literature on mass mobile phone adoption in 
India and developing countries, and deflated the techno-optimism of the IPL. I came to 
study spectacles and ended up learning about the dark side of networks.
Background
" In less than 20 years, India has experienced a dramatic transformation in 
telephone policy and usage. In the early 1990s, India had one of the lowest tele-density 2 
rates in the world, a small and weak telephone sector, and a set of regulations derived 
from 19th century legislation intended to administer the countryʼs telegraph networks. In 
2014, India has more than 900 million mobile subscribers, several indigenous telecom 
champions including one (Bharti Airtel) of the worldʼs giants, and a sophisticated 
regulatory regime that has kept mobile costs low for consumers and encouraged 
universal mobile connectivity. India now has the infrastructure and critical mass of users 
necessary for second order networks. By ʻsecond order networksʼ I refer to social 
networks of users that have grown on top of the physical network of infrastructure that 
now connects most of India. Via a physical network of towers, switches, cables, and 
phones, users now enjoy a range of services in health, education, banking, and other 
commercial services. These services depend not only on the material features of 
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networks, but also on the contributions of users, who have found ways to expand the 
options available to themselves and other users. Over time, these social add-ons 
become second order networks, with an architecture of hubs, nodes, and linkages. 
Importantly, second order networks are user-generated phenomena that develop 
irrespective of the intentions and interests of those who built the original network. After 
two decades of expansion of Indiaʼs infrastructure and hardware, second order 
networks are blossoming, often in ways that policymakers did not predict during the 
liberalization of the 1990s. 
" With these changes, the telephone has gained a new identity in India. For 
decades after independence, the Indian government treated telephones as luxury  items 
for a small subset of Indians, typically political and business elites. The government did 
not prioritize network expansion, and it proved more successful at keeping out good 
foreign-made technology  than in developing high-quality indigenous telephone 
hardware. Today, the Indian government treats telephony as an essential component in 
development (TRAI, 2012a and 2012b). From an ideational standpoint, the telephone is 
about more than connectivity; it is about Indiaʼs social and economic development, and 
its ability to compete internationally. Indeed, the mission statement of the Telecom 
Regulatory Agency of India (TRAI) aspires to:
...create and nurture conditions for growth of telecommunications in the country 
in a manner and at a pace which will enable India to play  a leading role in  the 
emerging global information society (TRAI, 2012a).
This aspiration reveals the continued importance of the state in a globalized world. The 
technology and satellites linking networks may not recognize borders, but the political 
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economy of telecom remains in many respects a statist project. From the policies that 
unleashed competition, to the construction of physical infrastructure, to the initiatives 
designed to bring telephony to disadvantaged groups and to remote corners of the 
country, the Indian state has played an indispensable role. Beyond its statist impulses, 
the TRAI mission statement also reveals the importance of telephony in the global 
political economy emerging in the early  decades of the 21st century. Today, the mobile 
telephone is a symbol of a new global connectivity; it is also a symbol – perhaps the 
most important symbol – of the ʻnew Indiaʼ: a confident, competitive, technologically 
savvy, and successful commercial player. The short and dramatic history of mobile 
phones in India provides a rich set of questions about policy development, technological 
transfer and adoption, and network development.
# In our efforts to make sense of the network society that is emerging, India should 
play an important role in our thinking. The scale and diversity of Indiaʼs population, the 
informal economics that persist throughout the country, and the rapid growth of its 
mobile phone networks, together make for a fascinating case study in mobile phone 
adoption. In this dissertation, by examining the history of communication networks in 
India, I find that networks are not new; instead, they are the fundamental human 
construct. My historical approach also shows the ways that historical communication 
networks created the hubs upon which more recent mobile networks have been built. 
Within India, I find that networks have played a long-term role in forming, reforming and 
undermining institutions. Internationally, by focusing on networks as my primary unit of 
analysis, I show the scale, complexity and global importance of Indian communities. As 
we strive to understand the network society, India offers an important national context. 
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There, I show the persistent roles of informal economics and network-based 
communication in information production and consumption. I also find complex 
relationships that exist among institutions and users, on a dynamic set of 
communication networks that now link most of the countryʼs people. 
" My interest in Indian mobile telephony also stems from the role mobile networks 
play in the countryʼs changing spatial dynamics. The networks that have formed in India 
in the past 20 years have challenged the traditional sense of space, and have offered a 
new sense of proximity based on flows of information and capital. In this sense we see 
both the historical antecedents to contemporary mobile networks, and the ways that 
these new networks are changing the spatial dynamics of the country.
Challenging the Networks Literature
" In this dissertation I explore the intended and unintended effects of Indiaʼs mobile 
phone networks. I do so with a sense of the conventional wisdom on Indiaʼs experience 
as a latecomer to mobile telephony. A significant literature (see Chapter 2, Part I) takes 
for granted that the story begins in the 1990s with the liberalization of Indiaʼs telephone 
sector and the major reforms of 1994 and 1999. In the literature on Indian mobile 
telephony, there is widespread agreement that Indiaʼs policy reforms were belated, 
initially chaotic, and ultimately successful. In Indian mobile telephony, ʻsuccessʼ means 
promoting a competitive mobile service market, encouraging mass mobile telephone 
usage, and using mobile networks to integrate India into the information society. Among 
economics and Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) 
scholars, there is a common belief that mobile phones have created economic 
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efficiencies, political accountability, and (to a lesser extent) social mobility. There is also 
a common assumption that second order networks have been positive in India and will 
continue to be positive in the future.
! This dissertation challenges and exposes limitations in this conventional wisdom. 
My analysis of Indiaʼs contemporary mobile telephony includes a significant historical 
component. I see this as a necessary  corrective. Analyses of contemporary Indian 
telephony often begin with the policy  reforms of the 1990s. By starting so late, this 
literature misses out on a long history  of network development and second order 
network formation. Few scholars of contemporary mobile telephony in India consider the 
ways that Indiaʼs shipping, telegraph, and railroad lines can teach us about network 
effects. By studying the historical antecedents to Indiaʼs contemporary mobile phone 
networks, I identify the origins of todayʼs network architecture and the ways that 
historical actions can shed light on the present. As Chapter 4 will show, the lesson of 
Indiaʼs colonial networks is that large-scale communication networks are difficult to 
control, that users will find ways to deploy those networks for their own purposes, and 
that the shift from elite to mass usage allows second order networks to form. The same 
ʻtools of empireʼ that British colonial administrators used to link and govern British India 
became tools of resistance in Indiaʼs independence movement. Over time, the level of 
access changed and more people were able to use the telegraph and railroad networks; 
more importantly, the social meaning of those networks changed as they  became 
features of Indian life.
! This unpredictability  of networks is an important (and understudied) theme in 
communications. In this dissertation, I treat Indiaʼs colonial communication networks as 
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prologue to the mobile phone networks that have developed since the 1990s. As my 
case study chapters will show, large-scale networks today are just as difficult to control 
as colonial communication networks were in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Especially in Chapter 7 (which focuses on the ways mobile networks allow for illegal 
gambling and corruption), I emphasize the ways that large-scale networks, especially 
those that cross jurisdictional boundaries, allow for powerful new sub-state actors and 
significant flows of capital. In this sense, the history of Indiaʼs colonial networks is 
instructive: institutions create networks for their own benefit, but the ʻsuccessʼ of those 
networks may undermine the institutions that created them.
# This dissertation also attempts to provoke debate about how best to theorize 
mobile phone networks in India and other developing countries. To date, there have 
been surprisingly few efforts to theorize Indian mobile networks in terms of network 
theory and the information society. In this dissertation, I use the theory of Manuel 
Castells to explore Indian mobile networks as components of the information society 
(see Chapter 3). I do this because I see value in Castellsʼ concept of the ʻspace of flowsʼ 
in which certain individuals and institutions exist less in terms of physical space and 
more in terms of their ʻplaceʼ in new, global flows of information. The space of flows 
includes three layers: circuits, hubs and nodes, and spatial distribution of elites. 
Castells was far from the first to propose a three-layer analysis of networks. For 
example, in their book, The Network Nation, information systems theorists Murray Turoff 
and Starr Roxanne Hiltz (1993) identify three layers of networks. These layers 
correspond with carriers, services, and information, and reflect a systems design 
perspective. Castells takes builds on this tradition of multi-level network analysis by 
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adding a social science perspective that emphasizes socio-economic change. He uses 
his three-layer analysis to explain the new spatial dynamics that have developed since 
the 1970s, with networks supplanting states and other institutions as the creators and 
movers of information. In my historical analysis, I use this same three-level analysis to 
show the mix of continuity and change that has characterized Indiaʼs communications 
networks since the colonial period.
" Using the theory of the space of flows, I analyze the formation of second order 
networks. On top of first order networks (which include material components such as 
lines, towers, and switches), we can identify second order networks, which are social in 
nature and take advantage of the material possibilities offered by first order networks. In 
this sense, second order networks are software add-ons to the hardware of first order 
networks. In this dissertation, I study how second order networks have formed on Indian 
communication networks. In my historical analysis, I use Indiaʼs colonial networks 
(primarily the railroad and telegraph) to show how the shift from elite to mass usage 
creates the conditions for second order network formation. I treat this as prologue for 
my case study (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), which is a study of contemporary second order 
network formation. In my case study, I show the ways that a different, larger, and more 
rapid technological expansion – the proliferation of mobile phones since the late 1990s 
– has generated a different type of second order network. By using the concepts of the 
space of flows and the second order network in an empirical case study, I test these 
theoretical concepts and add to the literature on the information society.
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A Study in Network Formation and Communication Flows
! To explore second order networks in Indian mobile telephony, this dissertation 
explores three questions: First, historically, what second order networks resulted from 
the development of Indiaʼs communication networks and the shift from elite to mass 
usage? Second, in the context of a contemporary national case study (the second order 
network that has developed around the Indian Premier League), what have been the 
intentions, processes, and outcomes of mass mobile phone adoption? And finally, what 
does the case of the Indian Premier League reveal about the second order networks 
that have resulted from mass mobile phone usage in contemporary India?
! To answer these questions, this dissertation deploys the network theory of 
Castells. In doing so, it pursues two goals. The first is to examine a major case study in 
contemporary mobile communications by  focusing on a network as my unit of analysis. I 
have constructed a study that examines the components of the network and highlights 
important shifts that are taking place in flows of information and capital. My second goal 
is to test the network theory of Castells for its applicability in a distinctly  non-Western 
economic, cultural and technological context. The space of flows offers an explanation 
of the new spatial dynamics at work in the network society. For Castells, these are 
global changes with implications that cross borders and cultural boundaries. Indiaʼs 
rapid development of national mobile phone networks is taking place in a different 
economic, social and technological context than that of industrialized countries.
! This dissertation studies the phenomenon of second order network effects via a 
case study in national mobile telephone usage. I use cricket (Indiaʼs most popular 
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sport), specifically  the Indian Premier League (IPL) (the richest, most popular, and most 
mobile phone-oriented league in the country) as a context in which to study the 
intentions, processes and outcomes of a second order network. To understand the 
mobile network that has grown around the IPL, I use a mixed-methods approach that 
prioritizes the perspectives of users. I go to the hubs of the IPL mobile network and 
observe, survey, and interview users. My case study reveals the leagueʼs ambitions and 
the mobile culture the league has attempted to foster, the processes by  which users 
access and contribute to the IPL mobile network, and the unexpected outcomes of the 
IPL mobile network.
Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to my inquiry. This includes studies of the 
mobile phone in developing countries, with special attention to India, and ethnographic 
studies of telephone use in India. The literature I review overlaps in several ways. 
Temporally, they deal with contemporary cases of mass mobile phone adoption. 
Geographically, their focus is the Indian subcontinent and other parts of Asia. And socio-
economically, these studies emphasize developing countries, which are characterized 
by informal exchange and informal structures of governance.
Chapter 3 develops my theoretical framework and explains the methodology I use in 
my study. Mine is a study in networks or, more precisely, a second order network that 
has developed on top of Indiaʼs mobile network infrastructure. I show how the network 
theory of Castells illuminates certain features of the IPLʼs second order mobile network 
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These features include the new flows of information and capital that have developed. I 
also discuss the mixed methods approach I take and the goals these methods serve.
Chapter 4 provides a history of communication networks in India. To situate 
contemporary mobile developments in Indiaʼs long history of communication networks, 
the chapter explores three periods (colonial, post-independence, and post-1990). I 
examine the intertwined nature of colonial networks (the telegraph, telephone, and rail) 
developed by the British in India. I also note how the expansion and democratization of 
communication networks undermined the intentions of the British government and 
became critical tools in Indiaʼs independence movement. The chapter also explores the 
post-independence history of Indiaʼs telephone network, noting the governmentʼs shift 
from statist inaction to ʻtechno-optimismʼ to externally-induced liberalization. These 
shifting priorities act as prologue for the commonly-told story  of Indiaʼs policy shift in the 
1990s and the subsequent growth of Indiaʼs mobile networks.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 offer a case study of a contemporary second order network of 
mobile users. In this three-part case study, I show the hubs and features of the mobile 
network that has grown in relation to the IPL. I also show the ways that large-scale 
networks (such as Indiaʼs national mobile network) are increasingly  difficult to control as 
they grow from elite to mass usage.
Chapter 5 explores the intentions of the Indian Premier League in creating a ʻmobile 
worldʼ for users. It examines the hubs and nodes in the network, the means by which 
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the league has integrated mobile phones into the leagueʼs brand and fansʼ experience. 
This chapter is based on analysis of mobile applications, social media and websites, 
and on interviews with senior figures in the IPL and in Indian telephony.
Chapter 6 goes to the hubs of the network to understand the processes by which users 
interact with IPL-related content and with each other. In this chapter I discuss mobile 
usersʼ activity at IPL matches and on major IPL-related mobile platforms (apps, social 
media and websites). Drawing on participant observation, surveys and interviews with 
users, I identify the performativity and practices of communication that have developed 
in relation to the IPL mobile network.
Chapter 7 examines two interrelated outcomes of the IPL mobile network. As a result of 
the rapid expansion of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks and the integration of mobile 
phones into the IPL fan experience, gambling and corruption have become worryingly 
large problems in India. In this chapter I explore how the structure of cricket, the 
functionality of mobile phones and the features of Indian mobile networks have created 
an environment ideal for gambling and corruption to develop. In the space of flows, 
mobile networks allow for not just new types of transactions (at a distance via a mobile 
network), but also new types of organizations based on flows of information and capital 
over the network. I argue that these outcomes show the potential for negative network 
effects, and for unimagined consequences of network expansion.
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The Conclusion discusses the dissertationʼs empirical and theoretical contributions, 
identifies several limitations and unanswered questions, and suggests opportunities for 
future research that would build on this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
! In 2007, Castells et al. wrote that “mobile telephony has moved from being the 
technology of a privileged few to an essentially  mainstream technology” (2007: 1). That 
statement, perhaps ahead of its time in 2007, is undeniably  true today. In the global 
adoption of mobile phones, the developing world is taking center stage. Developing 
countries contain the largest and fastest-growing share of the worldʼs population; they 
also contain the largest and fastest-growing share of mobile phone users. With weaker 
formalized structures than their industrialized, developed counterparts, developing 
countries are sites for transformative structural and social change as a result of the 
mass adoption of mobile phones. In a foresighted report ten years ago, the International 
Telecommunications Union (2003) wrote:
The greatest impact of mobile communications on access to communication 
services—in other words, increasing the number of people who are in reach of a 
telephone connection of any  kind—can be seen in developing countries. In 
countries where mobile communications constitute the primary  form of access, 
increased exchange of information on trade or health services is contributing to 
development goals; in countries where people commonly  use both fixed- line and 
mobile communications, the personalized traits of the mobile phone are changing 
social interaction.
The importance of mobile phones in developing countries is reinforced by the fact that 
while Internet penetration remains spotty, mobile phone now include a majority  of the 
population and all but the poorest urban residents. As Ling and Donner (2009) point out, 
the mobile phone is the primary means of communication in the developing world. 
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Chapter three (theory and methodology) explains in more detail my focus on the 
developing world and my choice of India as a case study.
! This dissertation draws attention to the networks that now include a majority of 
the worldʼs people. As Graham (2012) notes, studies that focus on mobile phone 
networks are surprisingly uncommon. Some scholars examine mobile phones and other 
ICTs as components of an information society (Castells, 1996; Hassan, 2008). Others 
focus on the technology and economics of the mobile phone (Castells et al., 2004 and 
2007). And others emphasize the software platforms, such as social media, hosted on 
mobile phones (Arceneaux and Weiss, 2010; Gruzd et al., 2011). There are scholars 
who focus on mobile phone culture (Glotz et al., 2004; Goggin, 2006 and 2008; Katz 
and Aakhus, 2002; Katz, 2006; Ling, 2004), but few who focus their attention on mobile 
phone networks as units of analysis. This dissertation contributes to this ʻnetworks 
literatureʼ and will, I hope, inspire future work on the second order network effects of 
mass mobile phone usage and network expansion.
! This chapter reviews the literature related to (a) the mobile phone in developing 
countries, with special attention to India, and (b) ethnographic studies of telephone use 
in India. Mine is an interdisciplinary inquiry with an interdisciplinary set of sources. In the 
pages that follow, I draw from anthropology, communications, economics, history, 
information systems, political science and sociology. These seemingly disparate studies 
overlap  in several ways. Temporally, they deal with contemporary cases of mass mobile 
phone adoption. Geographically, their focus is the Indian subcontinent and other parts of 
Asia. And socio-economically, these studies emphasize developing countries, which are 
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characterized by informal exchange and informal structures of governance, rather than 
by institutions and rule of law.
! For reasons of scope, I have excluded several types of sources: I excluded pure 
engineering texts because my inquiry focuses on users and usage, and questions of 
design (though important intrinsically) are beyond the scope of my study. By focusing on 
mobile phones specifically, I excluded much of the literature that treat mobile phones as 
a subset of ICTs (e.g. Walsham and Sahay, 2006), or as competitors to desktop or 
laptop computers (e.g. Slater and Kwami, 2005), or as part of an ecosystem that 
includes cybercafes and other competing or complementary means of communication 
(e.g. Haddon and Vincent, 2005). This is not to suggest that I dismiss the value of these 
other forms of communication, or that I think the mobile phone will render them 
obsolete; on the contrary, following Edgerton (2007) I foresee mobile phones coexisting 
with these and other yet-to-be-realized forms communication for many years to come. In 
selecting literature, I also made exclusions based on principles of design: by  focusing 
on the common GSM and CDMA technology, I do not discuss the roles of voice 
alternatives such as wireless local loop  systems, two-way  radios or satellite phones. 
And in my focus on mobile phones, I provide only brief discussion of Public Call Offices 
(PCOs) and their role in the growth Indian telephony. These alternatives are important 
both in rural development and in scholarly thinking about connectivity, but they fall 
outside the scope of this study.
! This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first focuses on India and 
includes the literature examining Indiaʼs telephone policy changes and subsequent 
mass adoption of telephony. I have drawn attention to two broad types of studies in 
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structural change: institutional studies, which emphasize the formal bodies that regulate 
the telephone market and provide services to customers, and market and development 
studies (which emphasize the economic outcomes of policy changes). The second 
section is broader (and longer), focusing on the relationship between mobile phones 
and social change. It includes sources that discuss universal, Asian and Indian social 
change. That section draws attention to studies on connectivity and mobility (which 
emphasize the formation and maintenance of communities) and performance and 
practices (which emphasize the social meanings of mobile phones). The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of gaps in this literature, my research questions, and what I 
hope to contribute to the literature in this dissertation.
Structural Change
! Since the 1990s, Indiaʼs telephone networks have expanded rapidly, from a 
series of localized landline networks for elites to national mobile networks for hundreds 
of millions of users (see Chapter 4). Since the 1990s, a sizable literature has sought to 
explain the changing structural characteristics of the countryʼs expanding mobile phone 
networks. This literature seeks to explain the intentions of planners and the outcomes of 
network expansion. I have divided this into two categories: those that emphasize the 
role of institutions in Indian telephone networks and those that emphasize the role of 
development and markets. The first category includes studies of the regulatory 
agencies, service providers and other large institutions involved in Indiaʼs now-massive 
mobile phone networks. These studies tend to emphasize the role of formalized 
governance, policy and legislation. The second category includes studies of mobile 
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phone networks in action, with greater attention paid to the role of users. These studies 
are frequently local, regional or comparative in nature, and emphasize the ways that 
mobile phone networks alter (or do not alter) market structures. I will examine each of 
these categories of literature and note their contributions and limitations. 
Institutions and Networks
! Several histories of Indian telephone networks have focused on institutional 
changes in government agencies and firms. These studies place (typically 
governmental) institutions at the center of Indiaʼs telephone analysis, and point to 
decisions in policy, rather than market factors such as the demands of users, as the 
driver of major changes in telephony (North 1990). As Liu and Jayakar (2012: 18) write, 
“the institutional approach is ... concerned with the formal and informal structures of 
rule-making, and the identity  and relative power of the participants, and the operation of 
these institutions within a wider social–economic context and provides an ideal 
framework for the discussion of policy and policy change.” These studies emphasize 
that the technology of mobile phones is not limited to the phone itself; it involves 
network architecture, regulation and pricing. The institutional literature on Indian 
telephones emphasizes the national effects of large and influential groups.  Among 
scholars of Indian telephony, there is widespread belief that changes in telephony 
happened as a result of government policy, that major institutions were ill-prepared for 
the changes, and that top politicians meddled in the process, often to the detriment of 
the institutions that were responsible for managing the countryʼs liberalization and 
network expansion.
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! Indiaʼs dramatic policy changes and equally  dramatic network expansion have 
inspired studies focusing on the countryʼs telephone institutions. Saxenaʼs (2009) 
personal narrative of telephone development emphasizes the governmentʼs 
reorganization of the Department of Telecommunications and separation of the BSNL as 
its own agency with newfound autonomy, funding, and a sense of mission. Saxena 
describes a shift in the corporate culture of key government institutions, and shows how 
a new physical infrastructure, a new mission, and new leadership led the BSNL to 
emphasize a new sense of service obligations to telephone subscribers. Saxena is 
largely uncritical of his former colleagues at the BSNL, and blames political interference 
for the delays and mistakes that (perhaps inevitably) took place as the BSNL underwent 
a structural and cultural overhaul as an institution. A very different vantage point and a 
different set of conclusions can be found in Desaiʼs (2006) analysis of Indiaʼs telephone 
regulators. Like Saxena, Desai emphasizes the centrality of state institutions, but has 
little of Saxanaʼs affection for Indiaʼs telephone bureaucracy. Desai argues that the rapid 
growth of Indiaʼs mobile phone industry led to poor planning and a political environment 
that allowed widespread corruption. While Sexana argued that the telephone reforms 
led to greater efficiency and quality of service for for consumers, Desai argues that the 
new norms have been regulatory capture, a cosy oligopoly  of telephone bosses, and a 
missed opportunity  for economic and social development. Thought at times harsh, and 
perhaps unfair, given the pace and complexity of change regulators faced, Desai offers 
a prescient prediction that institutional corruption would have enormous costs; with the 
benefit of hindsight about the 2G license scandal, we can see that many of Desaiʼs 
criticisms in 2006 had merit.
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! Although the institutional literature is effective in analyzing some of the non-
handset elements of mobile phone networks (e.g. the importance of network 
architecture, rules, and bureaucracies) and in highlighting the process of structural 
change, it often neglects the role of users. But institutional studies such as those by 
Saxena and Desai reinforce an institutional bias by focusing on policy documents and 
restricting interviews to policymakers. While they do a good job  revealing the intentions 
of those at the top, they over-emphasize change within institutions and under-examine 
wider change in the societies these institutions serve. As a result, they let us down in 
their explanations of outcomes of network expansion.
Development and Markets
! Given the spectacular growth of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks, it it not surprising 
that a large literature has focused on the new markets that have formed and the 
economic development that has taken place. The short timeframe of policy changes and 
dramatic statistics of adoption and usage have produced a large number of before-and-
after analyses of effects of mobile penetration in India, with an emphasis on the 
outcomes of network expansion.
! Some economists have treated mobile network expansion as a national 
phenomenon and have attempted to cover the whole of India in their analyses. One 
example is Singhʼs (2008) study, which used existing growth rates and assumptions 
about demand to project the size and nature of Indiaʼs mobile market up to 2016. Singh 
had high expectations of growth, but his predictions fell short of growth rate the market 
has enjoyed. Today, India has already reached the subscriber base Singh predicted for 
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2015-16. The network infrastructure (from the electrical grid to cellular towers) is 
overburdened, showing the prescience of his call for substantial infrastructural 
upgrades. A more recent example is Guptaʼs (2012) study of competition in Indiaʼs 
mobile market. Using a variety  of metrics (concentration ratios, market share, revenues, 
access to funds and profits), Gupta provides a useful contemporary statistical picture of 
the major actors in the market. He enriches this with a brief discussion of the problems 
facing Indiaʼs mobile market: favoritism in spectrum allocation, declining return on 
investment, and infrastructural limitations. In Guptaʼs and Singhʼs studies, we see the 
short-term outcomes of network growth, as well as the tangled relationship among 
related infrastructure (transportation, communications, and electricity).
" Other market studies have focused on how specific populations have benefited 
from mobile network expansion. One frequently-researched group in India has been 
fishermen. Jensenʼs (1997) study explored the economic effects of a mobile 
infrastructure and service rollout by the state government in Kerala. That study focused 
on the arbitrage possibilities mobile phones created for fishermen and a set of dramatic 
changes in the stateʼs fishing industry: Jensen found that across Kerala, consumer 
prices dropped, profits for fishermen rose, waste declined dramatically, and supply 
became more reliable. Perhaps his most remarkable finding was that the connectivity of 
mobile phones created the conditions in which the market produced consistent prices 
that made for happy consumers, and gave fisherman incentives to take risks 
(purchasing more and larger boats, and diversifying their catch). Although Jensenʼs 
study involved substantial micro-economic data, I find it especially useful as a reminder 
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of the social possibilities of mobile networks. With a phone and a few contacts, 
fishermen were able to find new markets and fundamentally alter their business models.
! Subsequent studies on producers have added new evidence of the network 
effects of mobile phones on producers and their customers. Even fishermen without 
mobile phones benefited from the new economic reality: in the Bay of Bengal, their 
profits rose on average by $2 per day as a result of general improvements in market 
efficiency that mobile phones enabled (Abraham, 2007; Sreekumar, 2011). The price 
per pound of fish decreased due to a drop in wasted catch and an increase in supply 
available in fish markets. Customers, even those without phones, benefited from the 
new efficiency: they paid less than before, as a result of mobile-induced economics. 
Gandhi and Mittal (2009) found less dramatic but nevertheless measurable 
improvements in agricultural productivity; as with fishermen, farmers benefited from 
their new ability  to get real-time information on market prices. Kleine (2011) 
demonstrates how mobile phone availability  enhanced individual choice, backing up the 
argument that expanded mobile phone networks increase economic capabilities in 
developing countries (Kivunike et al., 2009; Olatokun 2009). In these studies of 
producers, I find an unintended benefit: while the studies focus on the new micro-
economic possibilities that exist on mobile networks, they also reveal (a) the essential 
social component in economic transactions, and (b) the collective benefits that mobile 
networks create when users share information. For Indiaʼs fishermen and farmers, this 
new shared knowledge does more than just increase output and revenues; it provides 
new physical security (by putting users in touch with each other) and creates new social 
practices among economic communities.
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! While economists note the benefits of mobile-induced economics to individual 
players in markets, scholars of development point out that this micro-level focus 
neglects questions of larger transformation – and may overstate the potential for mobile 
phones to create change. Donner and Escobardi (2010) find few signs that pre-existing 
market structures are being dismantled or fundamentally altered; despite the availability 
of new communication devices, existing middlemen continue to enjoy  their position and 
few new livelihoods have been the result of ICT adoption. In their words, “there is 
currently more evidence suggesting changes in degree (more information, more 
customers) than for changes in structure (new channels, new businesses)” (Donner and 
Escobardi, 2010). Several other scholars have identified limits to what mobile phones 
can change in developing and low-income countries. Souter et al. (2005) examined 
mobile phone use in Africa and India and found that the new devices and networks were 
more useful in emergencies and in day-to-day calling among friends than for dedicated 
economic activity. Samarajiva and Dokeniya (2004) emphasize that investment (or lack 
thereof) in network infrastructure determines whether developing countries can 
participate meaningfully  in the global information economy. Mpogole et al. (2008) argue 
that mobile phones often involve costs that exceed the economic benefits. Zheng and 
Walsham, (2008) provide evidence that network expansion may fail to enhance 
economic capabilities. More dispiritingly, Avgerou (2008) argues that mobile phones 
sometimes do not even sustain economic potential. This macro-economic literature is a 
helpful counterweight to the micro-economic literature described above. The heroic 
narratives of fishermen and farmers must be situated within larger debates about 
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whether localized transformations will necessarily lead to change in developing 
countriesʼ role in the world.
" Since the 1990s, following the liberalization of telephony in different parts of the 
world, a large literature has developed on the causes and consequences of telephone 
deregulation. Indiaʼs experience in telephone liberalization has attracted significant 
scholarly attention (Petrazzini, 1996; McDowell, 1997; Dokeniya, 1999; Singh, 1999; 
Mani, 2008). Before the 1991 crisis and economic reforms, Vercruysse (1990) argued 
that underdevelopment and lack of investments for infrastructure growth would lead to 
Western-style deregulation in India. After the first round of policy reforms in the 
mid-1990s, Petrazzini (1996) argued that policy changes moved slowly as a result of 
Indiaʼs heavily-contested politics and pressure on policy-makers by interest groups. 
Since the second round of policy changes in 1999, several scholars have chronicled 
changes in Indiaʼs telephony (Dossani, 2002; Desai, 2006; Jain and Sridhar, 2003; 
Mukherji, 2008 and 2009; Subramanian, 2008; Subramanian, 2010). A sizable business 
literature has examined the impact of mobile network expansion (Kathuria et al., 2009), 
the growth of value-added services (Kumar and Kakani, 2012) and other outcomes of 
telephone liberalization. These studies on Indiaʼs experience have focused on the 
period from 1990 to the present and have emphasized the short-term outcomes of 
policy changes. 
" The literature on markets and development tends to emphasize outcomes for 
mobile phone users and for the provision of goods and services. In this sense it 
provides a wider discussion than is presented in much of the institutional literature 
discussed above. Market and developmental studies are much more likely  to take into 
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account the capacities and perspectives of users; similarly, they  show (albeit often 
unintentionally) the social aspects of new economic efficiencies. I see four main 
weaknesses in the market and development literature. The first is in metrics: most of the 
studies above prioritize metrics over interactions with users, and this limits the insight 
this literature can offer in terms of the social role of mobile phones. Second, this 
literature is often ahistorical, with little discussion of the long network history that 
preceded and informed the policy  reforms of the 1990s (see Chapter 4). Third, there is a 
tendency to under-study the important question about the relationship  between mobile 
phones and social change. A fourth and related weakness is particular to before-and-
after analyses: by focusing on immediate (first-order) effects, these studies miss some 
of the later, larger second order networks that can be seen with long-term study.
Social Change
! In less than 20 years, Indiaʼs mobile networks have grown to include hundreds of 
millions of users who had previously  been excluded from telephone service. This rapid 
proliferation of devices and interactions poses questions about social change on the 
new networks. Contemporary  research on mobile communication has built on 
scholarship on how users relate to the telephone. D.R. Rutter (1987) focused on the 
relationship  between social psychology  and the telephone, noting how users understood 
and made use of the telephoneʼs features. He argued that the most important feature of 
the telephone was its lack of inherent social cues (in his words, its ʻcuelessnessʼ). 
Faced with a social vacuum, users developed social conventions that extend their social 
background and preferences onto the ʻcuelessʼ network. Carolyn Marvin (1988) found 
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that many concerns about telephone usage followed worries of society at large: the 
erosion of traditional families, breaking down of racial and social barriers, proliferation of 
casual relations between men and women, growth of disrespectful behavior, and loss of 
social order. The telephone made it easier to violate established norms and allowed for 
discretion in socially deviant behavior. Fischer (1992) argued that the telephone 
accelerated social life by increasing the number of social contacts Americans had and 
thus reducing isolation. People willingly brought the telephone into their lives. It was “the 
conscious product of people employing things, not of things controlling people.” 
! Similarly, social constructivists have argued that communication technology 
consists not just of physical artifacts, devices and infrastructure, but also of usersʼ 
preferences, entrepreneurial activity and regulatory policies (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; 
Bijker and Law, 1992; Williams and Edge, 1996). Mackay and Gillespie (1992) focus on 
user appropriation in communication technology. They argue that appropriation refers 
not only to how artifacts are used in ways intended by designers, but also how they are 
adapted by users. In his research on telephones in American culture, James E. Katz 
has also emphasized the importance of users. In Connections: Social and Cultural 
Studies of the Telephone in American Life, he uses a series of ʻepisodicʼ essays to 
explore how users in different settings have integrated the telephone into their work, 
family and leisure. By focusing on usage in specific contexts, these ʻepisodicʼ studies 
shed light on the ways users relate to devices, networks, and other users. This 
approach informs my own research design (see Chapter 3) and the case study in this 
dissertation (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7).
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! In the pages that follow, I discuss the literature on mobile phones and social 
change. I see this literature as complementary to the structural literature discussed 
above. In studies of institutions as well as markets and development, we can identify 
intentions and (some) outcomes; in the literature on social change, we can learn about 
the processes of user interaction, and a further set of outcomes. I have divided the 
social change literature into two themes: the effects of connectivity and mobility, and 
changes in practices and performance. Both categories concern the ways in which 
users put to use mobile phones within their own social and economic settings.
Connectivity and Mobility
! The past 15 years have seen a ʻmobile turnʼ in the social sciences, with 
increasing scholarly emphasis on the effects of mobile communication on social life 
(Katz, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2011; Urry, 2007). Some of this scholarship has focused 
on the new possibilities that mobility offers compared to basic connectivity, and the ways 
that text compares to voice (Snowden, 2000). Kakihara and Sorensen (2002) argue that 
human interaction takes place in spatial, temporal, and contextual dimensions, and that 
the mobile phone gives users greater flexibility  in all three dimensions. This new multi-
dimensional flexibility allows us to communicate in new ways in certain social contexts, 
meaning that when we are in a business meeting or sitting in a church pew, we have 
greater and more complex communication possibilities than before. Many writers with 
backgrounds as technologists have emphasized the role of material features in mobile 
phonesʼ mass adoption and usage (Klemens, 2010). Social scientists have been more 
nuanced, but some freely acknowledge that the material qualities of mobile technology 
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facilitate certain types of interaction and activities (Latour, 1999). In a collection of 
essays on the mobile telephone and its users, Reingold (2002) argues that mobile 
phone networks enhance the public sphere by creating new networks and new flows of 
information. Agar (2003) argues that mobile phones have allowed networks of people to 
prosper while hierarchies have suffered. Geser (2005) highlights the subversive 
potential of mobile phone networks and their ability  to erode the power of traditional 
authority. Nyíri (2005a) emphasizes the new spatial dynamics that mobile phone 
networks create, enabling more global communication while reinforcing the local. 
Scholars have debated the social implications of cheap, mass horizontal communication 
(Ibahrine, 2008; Fortunati, 2003; Tenhunen, 2011). Other scholars have focused on the 
relationship  between mobile phones and identity  (Uimonen, 2009; Ling and Campbell,
2011) and on the new culture that has grown on mobile phone networks (Glotz et al., 
2004; Ling, 2004; Goggin, 2006 and 2008).
! Much early scholarship  on mobile networks focused on industrialized countries, 
where mobile phones were first put to widespread use, but in recent years scholars 
have found that developing countries are the sites of even larger transformations. 
Donner and Escobari (2010; also see Donner, 2007) emphasize the special 
circumstances of developing countries, where mobile phones provide most users with 
their first direct exposure to telephony. In the literature on mobile phones and social 
change, Asia has played an increasingly  large role. In the past decade, as its large 
populations have adopted mobile phones in ways both similar to and different from 
users in the West, numerous scholars (Western and non-Western) have focused on 
cultural habits of mobile phone usage in Asia (Bell, 2005; Donald and Anderson, 2010).
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! Perhaps not surprisingly, given the rapid worldwide proliferation of mobile phones 
in recent years, numerous studies have focused on the relationship between mobility 
and social change. Several studies have emphasized global patterns in mobile phone 
use (Katz and Aakhus, 2002; Castells et al., 2007), while others have focused on 
geographically and culturally distinct patterns of usage (Horst and Miller, 2005 and 
2006; Ito et al., 2005; Tenhunen, 2008). Gergen (2008) shows that mobile phones 
reinforce relations within small, geographically  clustered groups. He argues that mobile 
phones have allowed enclaves of people to take over some of the role formerly  played 
by civil society. Other scholars have emphasized the potential of mobile phone networks 
to disrupt old norms and enable new social relations across space and time (Katz, 2005; 
Castells et al., 2007; Arminen, 2005b and 2009; Ekine, 2010).
! The literature on mobile phones in Asia has emphasized the disruptive potential 
of mobile phone networks. Focusing on the Philippines, Pertierra et al. (2002) argue that 
SMS-driven protests played a role in the countryʼs political changes, yielded a stronger 
individualism among Filipinos, and put in place the conditions for future “text 
revolutions.” Scholars of mobile phone use in Asia remain divided on the efficacy  of 
SMS-driven protests. The optimists argue that mobile phone networks give a voice to 
the marginalized and create a means for organizing anti-government rallies (Mudhai, 
2006; Gordon, 2007). But other scholars are more skeptical. In his study  of the anti-
Estrada uprisings in the Philippines, Rafael (2003) argued that participants too often 
saw communication itself as a form of empowerment and victory, and that those able to 
participate were more likely to be middle class professionals than members of a 
disadvantaged group. In Indonesia, Hill (2003) found that SMS-led organization had 
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only a minimal disruptive role in the countryʼs politics. By looking beyond political 
protests, we can see the potential for appropriation (rather than resistance) offered by 
mobile phone networks. Yuʼs (2004) study of SMS usage related to the SARS pandemic 
in Hong Kong, shows how the collaborative use of mobile phone networks by  concerned 
citizens can disrupt normal patterns of communication in a time of crisis. This theme of 
disruption is especially relevant in India, where mobile phones have been put to use as 
tools of activists and violent sub-state actors. In this dissertation, I build on this literature 
by including a case study that is in part a realization of the disruptive and anti-state 
potential of mobile networks (see Chapter 7).
" Most mobile communication is of a more quotidian nature, and a significant portion 
of the literature on mobile phone use in Asia has focused on everyday life. Focusing on 
Uzbekistan, Wei and Kolko (2005) show how pre-existing cultural and economic factors 
affect usage patterns; they also suggest that, over the long term, usage of mobile 
phones may lead to dependence on the devices and networks, and may thus transform 
social relationships. Paragas (2005) explored norms of mobile phone usage on Manilaʼs 
bus network, drawing attention to the ways that the threat of theft affects usage and 
storage of devices. In Indonesia, Lim (2002) studied how day-to-day mobile phone use 
has altered social interactions in the urban spaces. Matsuda (2005) studied users in 
Japan and found that the ownership of a mobile phone changes how individuals choose 
social relationships: increasingly, users are actively choosing social relationships, with 
the mobile phone playing a large role. Pertierra (2005) examined how Filipino users 
understand their relationship of the mobile phone as a part of their participation in (and 
resistance to) globalization, via hybrid local and global spaces and the mobile phone as 
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a mediating technology. Drawing on Chinese film portrayals of mobile phones as 
dystopian devices that destroy  traditional family relations, Zhao (2004) provides a 
contrast with the empowering narrative portrayed by ICT4D conferences such as the 
World Summit on the Information society. These studies of day-to-day mobile usage are 
useful guides on research design and methodology. From them and from other studies, 
I drew questions about how users use their phones, how they relate to other users, and 
how they understand their place and role in the network (see Chapter 3).
! Indiaʼs spectacular growth in mobile connectivity  has inspired a sizable literature 
focused on the social effects of mass mobile adoption in that country (Rao and Desai,
2008; Ravindran, 2009; Jeffrey and Doron, 2011 and 2013). Donner (2008b) found that, 
rather than fostering major disruptions and changes, mobile phone networks have 
allowed for the continuity and reproduction of local meanings. Tenhunen (2011) reaches 
a similar conclusion, but also points out that translocal communication can heighten 
local conflicts. In Tenhunenʼs (2011: 415) words, “while mobile technology amplifies the 
ongoing process of cultural change, it does so selectively, encouraging the 
homogenization of ʻsocial logisticsʼ, an increased multiplicity  of social contacts and 
greater efficiency in market relationships.” Another theme is whether these new devices 
and their networks offer Indiaʼs poor new opportunities (OʼNeill, 2003; Doron, 2010). 
Scholars have emphasized the ways that mobile phone networks can offer enhanced 
legitimacy and personhood to the rural poor (Doron, 2012) and – by  connecting 
disparate people and allowing them to organize – create new publics (Narayan, 2011). 
Donner (2008a) has suggested that inclusion of the poor on Indiaʼs mobile phone 
networks may lead to reductions in severe poverty.
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! In studies of Indiaʼs large and complex democracy, a recurring question is 
whether mobile phone networks will strengthen Indiaʼs democratic institutions and 
create more meaningful inclusivity. Jeffrey and Doron (2012) provided a path-breaking 
study of state elections in Uttar Pradesh, showing the potential of mobile phone 
networks to allow electoral participation by marginalized groups. Popular media 
regularly cover the topic of mobile phones as disruptors of Indiaʼs elite-driven politics 
and as tools of empowerment for those outside elite circles (Saha, 2012). At the same 
time, pessimists point to the uncritical and often unquestioned notion of the mobile 
phone as an empowering device. Kavoori and Chanda (2006) focused on Indian mobile 
phone advertising. They push back on claims of empowerment, describing both the 
advertising and mobile phone networks as top-down, corporate and dislocating rather 
than inclusive. This debate about inclusivity  and empowerment is particularly significant 
in India, which has hundreds of millions of poor, newly-connected citizens.
! The literature on connectivity and mobility  focuses on the ways mobile phone 
networks assist in the transformation of existing communities and the formation of new 
ones. The past 15 years have seen a proliferation in this literature, with Asia receiving 
significant scholarly attention; due to its size, complexity  and rapid growth in mobile 
phone networks, India has been the site of numerous case studies. The literature on 
India includes a wide range of case studies and an ongoing set of debates. These 
include whether mobile networks do or do not empower disadvantaged groups and 
enrich Indiaʼs democracy, and whether the effects of mass mobile phone adoption will 
be disruptive and revolutionary or co-opting and evolutionary. This dissertation draws 
from this literature and adds to it by emphasizing second order networks in a national 
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case study (see Chapter 3). As part of that case study, I will explore the practices and 
performance in mobile phone usage. I have explored that literature below.
Practices and Performance
! In my efforts to understand the social importance of connectivity and mobility, I 
have been aided by studies of user interactions. In a strict sense, we can identify 
material and social explanations for user behavior: On the one hand, usersʼ 
relationships with mobile phones are determined by the features and capabilities of 
lightweight, portable phones and their networks. On the other hand, social conventions 
also influence how users in different parts of the world interact with their phones. The 
research discussed below tends to incorporate elements of the material and the social, 
showing a complex and highly varied set of performative patterns. 
! Contemporary research on mobile phone performance follows in the tradition of 
Goffmanʼs (1959) work on everyday performance and “front stage behavior.” Todayʼs 
research on mobile phone performativity also builds on past studies of electronic media 
and social norms (Meyrowitz, 1985). In the contemporary research on user behavior, 
user presence has been a major theme. Scholars have pointed out the “social 
juxtaposition” of private calls in public places (Katz and Aakhus, 2002; Ling, 2002). 
Others have discussed the “absent presence” that mobile phones enable (Gergen, 
2002), in which we can be present physically in one place but connected to and focused 
on another and the challenge of maintaining “unalienated” communication (Nyíri, 
2005b). Several scholars have pointed out the reciprocal relationship  between mobile 
communication and physical presence in a given locality: Arminen (2005a) and Hulme 
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and Truch (2005) found that the most common mobile activity is making arrangements 
to meet in person. This follows the observation by  McNeill and McNeill (2003), that 
mobile phones are part of a “pervasive and reciprocal” set of ties between technology 
and society, and mobile phone networks represent a small step in the growing 
complexity of society in terms of time and space.
! The often-public nature of mobile phone use has led to evolving and 
differentiated sets of “mobile manners” (Srivastava, 2005; Castells et al., 2007). In their 
comparative study of students in the US and Japan, Sugiyama and Katz (2003) 
examined how users acquired, made use of, and replaced their mobile phones. They 
found that in the two countries, the mobile phone is a “fashion lens” through which 
young people express themselves and perceive others. In these and other societies 
with high mobile phone usage, a common expectation is that one is always available 
and accountable (Ling, 2004; Laursen, 2005). Forced by social pressure to be 
“tethered” to their mobile phones, many  users find that they must be “always on” and 
connected (Turkle, 2008). 
! Scholarly interest in the performative qualities of mobile phones has led to 
numerous case studies in international and comparative habits of usage. This ʻuser 
literatureʼ emphasizes ethnographic methods and includes studies of mobile phone 
adoption, usage and network formation. This scholarship emphasizes ʻactor-centered 
approachesʼ (Vertovec, 2004: 973) to transnational or global phenomena, taking into 
account local peoplesʼ experiences and the role of communication technology.3 
Sunderlandʼs (1999) study of mobile phone ʻfieldworkʼ laid out important principles for 
future researchers, including the intellectual value of case studies in mobile phone 
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performance and the notion of the mobile phone as a tool in anthropological studies. In 
her study of users in Jamaica, Horst (2006) found that mobile phones presented a 
mixture of new possibilities and unanticipated “burdens” for those who used their 
phones to keep in touch with distant family. Donnerʼs (2008b) study of usersʼ freeloading 
techniques showed how collective actions by users can surprise network designers and 
undermine the assumptions that underpin pricing models. De Bruijn et al. (2009) found 
that mobile phone users developed performative habits and that mobile phones have 
become the new ʻtalking drumsʼ that convey meanings to different groups of users.
# The ʻuser literatureʼ on telephone use in India includes several studies I have 
found especially useful in my own thinking and planning. Tenhunen (2008 and 2010) 
found that with shared village phones, women use the devices more than men do, and 
often place phone calls while in the village running errands. Mothers use phones to 
keep in contact with family  members and discuss marriage possibilities for their 
children. When men use village phones, it is often for business reasons: arranging 
deliveries, seeking information about traffic and weather conditions, and speaking to 
contacts usually within the same state. Tenhunen (2008) found that having reliable 
telephone access – even if it involves walking to town, waiting in line, and hoping the 
other party is at the village phone to receive the call – is of tremendous economic and 
social value to users. She also found that village phones tended to reinforce, rather than 
undermine, locality in village life. Users conversed within earshot of those waiting in line, 
and as a result, news – of births, deaths, marriages, and school successes – 
disseminated from the phone lineup to the village. Users in villages treated the phone 
as a collective tool, often taking messages for people who had not arrived at the agreed 
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call time, or fetching someone when a call came through for him/her. Thus the arrival of 
telephones has not erased the importance of locality in village life; instead it has 
reinforced locality, by making private calls public and by inviting users in villages to treat 
the phone as a shared service.
! Ethnographic studies of telephone use also reveal the politics of network 
formation. Tenhunen (2010) examined how political activists in West Bengal have put 
mobile phones to use, organizing protests with participants drawn from across the state. 
She argues that large protests – some of which turned violent – reveal a heightened 
communication that is grounded in everyday life in the village. Village users often have 
similar worries: food prices, quality of transportation, and the possibilities of flooding or 
drought; mobile phone networks allow users to organize – or to “negotiate” a set of 
demands, and deploy people and information in pursuit of these goals. In their study of 
the 2007 state elections in Uttar Pradesh, Jeffrey and Doron (2012) reveal the political 
possibilities of mobile networks: users found ways to communicate quickly  and cheaply, 
to coordinate direct action in pursuit of political goals. These coordinated actions show 
how mobile networks can amplify  local concerns in a globalized world. India harbors 
many social and political conflicts, and the work of Jeffrey and Doron is a helpful 
introduction to mobile activism that could be replicated by disaffected groups across the 
country.
! Ethnographers of Indian telephone usage have also looked beyond the village, to 
usage in urban areas, and to globally-minded entrepreneurs who see telephony as part 
of their business model. In both these senses, the work of Nadeem (2011) applies to my 
project. He conducted a comparative ethnographic study of call center outsourcing in 
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Delhi and Bangalore, conducting structured and semi-structured interviews with 
managers, managers, and trade unionists. He employs the case study method to 
understand not only the processes involved in call center outsourcing, but also the wider 
processes of globalization. In Nadeemʼs (2011: 221) words, “it is exceedingly difficult to 
study globalization in general because it is not a unitary phenomenon. It is possible, 
however, to study its particular figurations. The case study method is useful in that it 
allows you to explore large-scale processes in concrete detail.” Nadeemʼs work is a 
study of what many would call the “winners” of globalization – the (mostly male) English-
speaking Indian professionals who have vaulted into the middle class. Nadeem brings a 
useful skepticism to his study. In these “winners” he sees some of the undeniable 
realities of globalization: for example, the tendency for these professionals to come from 
relatively privileged backgrounds. He sees their success as a recent and unstable 
development: global forces have made it cost-effective to locate call centers in 
Bangalore; these same forces could downsize, automate, or relocate these call centers 
elsewhere if costs rise beyond what firms are willing to pay. Just as call center 
outsourcing has proven a mixed blessing for firms, Indian employees, and customers, 
mobile networks produce positive and negative outcomes, and their own set of winners 
and losers.
" Studies such as those by Tenhunen (2008 and 2011), Jeffrey  and Doron (2012 
and 2013), and Nadeem (2011) emphasize how mobile phones have been absorbed 
into Indiaʼs different cultures (north and south, urban and rural, rich and poor). They 
show that the ability to communicate at a distance does not necessarily  weaken local 
identity; as Tenhunen found, rather than trampling local identity, technology  can 
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reinforce local ties and extend, rather than weaken, the primacy of family in social life. 
And in Nadeemʼs conclusion that call center outsourcing has been oversold, we see that 
distance still matters in telephony. We also see the benefits of a multi-site case study 
model within a country as diverse as India. Using research sites in the north and south 
of the country, Nadeem was able to capture the different economic and cultural contexts 
in which these call centers operated. Although the cultural literature on mobile phone 
often emphasizes the local, there are nevertheless useful lessons for this dissertation. 
The most important of these are the insights offered by interviews and surveys with 
users. In their 2012 article and in their comprehensive text, The Great Indian Phone 
Book, Jeffrey  and Doron (2013) make extensive use of interviews in an effort to 
understand usersʼ motivations, habits and relationships with mobile phones and mobile 
networks.
" The literature on the performance and practices focuses on users and what they 
choose to do with their mobile phones. It identifies, compares and contrasts behavioral 
tendencies among groups of users, emphasizing the cultural values that lead users to 
use similar devices in different ways. As the above section describes, much of this 
literature is ethnographic in nature, giving the research a ground-level perspective that 
shows how users interact with each other using mobile networks. I see significant value 
in this perspective. By  observing and interacting with users in specific contexts, we can 
see what they do with their phones and ask why they perform actions. While I borrow 
from the literature on performance and practices, I am aware of its limitations. In-depth 
local studies such as those by Tenhunen (2008 and 2011) and Nadeem (2011) are 
limited in their geographical scope and thus their results cannot be generalized across 
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the entire country. The approach by Jeffrey and Doron (2013) offers the advantages of 
an ambitious national research agenda, with close interaction among a variety of 
participants (users, executives, and policy  makers). Theirs is a comprehensive empirical 
study of users; if it has a missing element, it is in theory. With this in mind, I use a 
theoretical framework that emphasizes a network as the unit of analysis. In Chapter 3 
(theory and methodology) I describe that framework, the interactions I study and the 
research methods I put to use in this dissertation.
Gaps in the Literature
! The above sections have examined the literature on the relationship between 
mobile phones and two types of change – structural and social – in societies that have 
experienced mass mobile phone adoption. Within the literature on structural change, I 
have identified two categories of studies: those that focus on institutions and those that 
focus on markets and development. The institutional literature tends to focus on 
formalized organizations as shapers of networks rather than on the symbiotic 
relationship  between institutions and networks. Frequently  written by those with direct 
experience in incumbent institutions or specialized knowledge of them gained from 
proximity, these studies run the risk of (a) overemphasizing the significance of 
institutional rules and practices, (b) missing the perspective of insurgent institutions, and 
(c) neglecting the ways that users co-construct, alter and undermine formalized 
networks. The market and developmental literature focuses on measurable economic 
effects of mobile phone adoption and network expansion. Emphasizing metrics on cost, 
ownership and usage, this literature is helpful in explaining certain narrow (primarily 
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economic) outcomes. But as much as market studies illuminate the results of policy 
changes, the arrival of new devices or the expansion of networks via new infrastructure, 
they frequently leave unanswered the larger, harder questions of why users make 
decisions and what meanings they attach to devices.
! My study draws more from the literature on social change, which I have divided 
into two categories: studies of connectivity and mobility, and studies of practices and 
performance. The first category of literature on social change has much to say about 
developing countries and India in particular. It offers a varied and useful set of studies 
about how mobile phone networks affect communities in countries with sprawling 
geography and significant internal divisions. Frequently  these studies emphasize the 
particular over the universal, and in the case of India, tend to focus on local, rather than 
national patterns of mobile phone communities. The literature on practices and 
performance is large, diverse, and rich in case studies showing how differentiated sets 
of users put to use mobile phones and networks. Scholars studying the performativity of 
mobile phone users emphasize the social meaning of phones, the etiquette that has 
developed around usage in different parts of the world, and the ways that the complex 
relationship  between culture and mobile phone networks plays out in public. Perhaps 
owing to the difficulty of national ethnography in a country as large as India, this 
literature is short on studies that describe and analyze national practices of mobile 
phone performance.
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Research Questions and Potential Contributions
! From this literature, I have identified an important and researchable inquiry. My 
dissertation seeks to answer three questions. First, historically, what second order 
networks resulted from the development of Indiaʼs communication networks and the 
shift from elite to mass usage? Second, in the context of a contemporary  national case 
study (the second order mobile network that has grown around the IPL), what have 
been the intentions, processes, and outcomes of mass mobile phone adoption? And 
finally, what does the case of the Indian Premier League reveal about the second order 
networks that have resulted from mass mobile phone usage in contemporary India? 
! Together, these questions allow me to build on the literature described above. My 
inquiry will situate recent mobile network formation in a long history of Indian networks, 
dating back to the early 19th century. In doing so, it will examine the origins of todayʼs 
network architecture and identify long-term patterns in network expansion and evolution. 
My inquiry will also build on the social change literature described in this section, 
including connectivity and mobility and performance and practices. My case study 
(Chapters 5, 6, and 7) offers a portrait of users with shared and differentiated habits on 
a national second order network – that is, a network of users that has grown on top of 
the physical network of infrastructure that now connects most of India. The IPL mobile 
network can teach us about national similarities and variations in telephone usage, as 
well as how users relate to their mobile phones and to the wider network. More broadly, 
it is also a way-in to the wider conversation about telephony and Indian globalization.
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology
! Having examined the literature on mobile network formation and mobile phone 
usage in India (Chapter 2) and situated my inquiry within that literature, I now turn my 
attention to the research design of this dissertation. This chapter begins by outlining the 
historical and cultural importance of networks in India and explaining my interpretive 
goals. It then provides a rationale for my use of Manuel Castellsʼ network theory and 
explains the elements of his theory that I will deploy in my historical analysis (Chapter 4) 
and case study (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Having outlined my theoretical approach, I then 
explain my use of a case study  in second order network formation. The chapter 
concludes with a description of my methods and a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of my approach.
Understanding and Interpreting Communication Networks in India
! Networks have a long history  in India and by studying their historical evolution, 
we can gain useful insight into Indiaʼs economic, geographic and social development. In 
a country with a large population and a history of conquest and movement of borders, 
networks help  explain the evolution of Indian society. Networks have shaped Indiaʼs 
patterns of trade (Erikson and Berman, 2006; Erikson, 2014) and have been important 
to successive political regimes in India. For example, the Mughal empire made use of 
networks linking its capital to major forts and far-flung outposts, with the aim of 
maintaining control over a sprawling territory and diverse population (Faruqui, 2012). 
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Networks have also been important to forces seeking to weaken political regimes. The 
British used networks of spies and informants in the decades before they were able to 
oust the last Mughal Emperor, Zafar, from the Red Fort in 1857 (Bayly, 1996). And more 
recently, networks have also played a large role in Indiaʼs formation of a postcolonial 
national identity (Guha, 2008). 
" From the mid-19th through the mid-20th century, India was the site of a series of 
intertwined colonial communication networks (the telegraph, rail and, to a lesser extent, 
telephone), built by the British for the purposes of resource extraction and political 
control (see Chapter 4, Part I). Over time, as these networks extended farther into the 
Indian hinterland and relied on an increasing percentage of Indian workers, these 
colonial networks evolved into sites of significant anti-British activity during Indiaʼs 
independence movement. More recently, India has developed one of the worldʼs largest 
mobile communication networks (see Chapter 4, Part III). That network has grown and 
intensified rapidly, and in the process become the medium for a set of individual and 
collective practices of communication. Indiaʼs mobile network has been the site for the 
consolidation of existing social networks of family, friendship, language and religion; it 
has also been the site for the establishment of new social networks of business, 
entertainment, and other small-c cultural diversions (see Chapter 4, part III).
" Networks help  us understand the unities and divisions that govern life in complex 
societies. India is more than a nation-state; it is a civilization with significant internal 
diversity and a complex set of unities and divisions. India has many weak and porous 
institutions, including government departments and programs, that attempt to reach the 
entire population but fail due to distance and socio-economic barriers (Singh, 2009). At 
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the same time, India is home to many strong networks, including those of family, tribe, 
community, caste, religion, profession, school, and political party. For this reason, 
institutional studies of India inevitably miss many people and important social 
phenomena. Much of Indiaʼs culture and social life is not about how citizens react to the 
state or other institutions; it is about how they relate to each other, how they perceive 
and put to use communication networks, and what performative practices are a part of 
their lives. Accordingly, while this dissertation includes discussions of institutions and 
communication technologies, it emphasizes the social importance of networks in Indian 
communications.
" Network theory is often described as new phenomena in the social sciences 
(Rainie and Wellmann, 2012). Indeed, Castells discusses networks as the new social 
morphology (Castells, 1996: 469). This dissertation challenges the idea that networks 
are new and, by including a historical and contemporary analysis, shows that networks 
are and have always been an essential social feature in Indian society. This dissertation 
highlights the countryʼs long history  of networks, a set of distinct Indian and global 
characteristics of those networks, and the mix of continuity and change that these 
networks represent in Indiaʼs history. Following Charles Tilly (1984), I approach this 
dissertation with the belief that while the nature and scale of networks evolves, networks 
are the fundamental human social construct. Of course, networks are not the only social 
form in India; the countryʼs social complexity is also shaped by  family, community, caste, 
religion, and language. I have chosen to emphasize networks for several reasons: First, 
they transcend geographically-constrained social forms such as family and community, 
and hereditary social forms such as religion and caste, and thus are means of 
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understanding a wider India. Second, networks are dynamic and exist in relation to the 
communication technology available at a given moment in time. And third, networks 
have an important spatial dimension; by studying their formation and evolution, we gain 
insight into the ways that Indian identity has developed and evolved. For these reasons, 
I believe that a network analysis of India is essential to understanding Indiaʼs past, 
present and future.
" In this dissertation, I emphasize the interplay  between first and second order 
networks. As large-scale communication networks develop and become more complex, 
they become the sites for second order network formation. First order networks are 
composed of the material components (the towers, switches, cables, and devices) that 
link users; second order networks are social, user-driven by-products of first order 
networks. By focusing on second order network formation, this dissertation shows the 
dynamism and instability  of networks; it also emphasizes the ways that, as first order 
networks expand, they can become sites for expected and unexpected outcomes. By 
focusing my attention on second order mobile network formation, I hope to identify the 
ways that mobile networks have enabled new links and new social relations, and the 
outcomes that these new social relations have produced. In doing so, I hope to add to 
network theory in two ways: First, I advance an intellectually useful but underdeveloped 
concept (second order network formation). Second, I conduct an empirical study of a 
second order network via a case study in contemporary mobile phone networks.
" In this dissertation, I use the concept of second order networks to explain 
transformative change of large, complex communication networks. Over time, networks 
built for one purpose can produce flows (of information and capital) and social forces 
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that alter or undermine the networkʼs original goals. To illustrate the relationship 
between first and second order network formation, Chapter 4 explores the growth and 
evolution of Indiaʼs communication networks during Indiaʼs colonial, post-independence, 
and post-liberalization periods. I highlight the ways that, as Indiaʼs colonial 
communication networks expanded from elite to mass usage, they became sites for 
second order networks of resistance and nationalism. Built as exclusive networks to 
further colonial objectives of political control and commercial domination, Indiaʼs 
railroads and telegraph lines evolved into quintessentially Indian networks. This history 
is prologue to a different and larger type of second order network expansion taking 
place today. My object of study  in this dissertation is the second order network of mobile 
applications, websites, social media and user-to-user mobile phone usage that has 
developed in relation to the Indian Premier League. This network has grown on top  of 
the first order network of mobile phone infrastructure across India and internationally, 
and is thus a social add-on to a material network.
" In this dissertation, I study networks not simply to identify and describe them, but 
more importantly to interpret the meanings of their social arrangements and practices 
(Von Wright, 1971: 5-6; Taylor, 1971: 116). My understanding of interpretation is based 
on that of Daniel Little: “Interpretation involves viewing individual actions and social 
practices as expressive of human meanings” (Little, 1991: 69). Similarly, I find utility in 
his interpretive program:
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Individual actions and beliefs can only  be understood through an act of 
interpretation, by  which the inquirer attempts to discover the meaning or 
significance of those actions or beliefs for the agent. There is radical diversity 
across cultures concerning the way  in which social life is conceptualized, and 
these differences give rise to different social worlds. Social practices (bargaining, 
promising, going to work, parenting) are constituted by  the meanings that 
participants attribute to them. There are no ʻbrute factsʼ in social science – facts 
that do not allude to specific cultural meanings (Little, 1991: 68-69).
Little argues that there is “no recipe for a good hypothesis” and that the most important 
criterion for interpretive research is coherence: the elements of the interpretation 
“should hang together as a consistent, meaningful whole” (Little, 1991: 72). To offer 
empirical support for an interpretation, we can turn to explanations of actors or other 
members of the actorsʼ culture. If we wish to understand a communicative action, we 
may ask those who performed the action why they did so; alternatively we may ask 
those from that same culture why they believe the actor performed that action. By 
focusing on why actors perform certain communicative actions, we can learn the 
meanings of these actions within a local or national cultural context.
" This dissertation draws attention to communicative practices as indicators of 
second order network formation. The notion of communicative practices is deeply 
intertwined with the concept of social drama. As Victor Turner writes, “Social dramas 
and social enterprises ... represent sequences of social events, which, seen 
retrospectively by  an observer, can be shown to have structure. Such ʻtemporalʼ 
structure, unlike atemporal structure ... is organized primarily through relations in time 
rather than in space” (Turner, 1974: 35-36). I will examine a contemporary social drama 
that reveals the temporal nature of social action and the role of creative agency in the 
production of culture. In doing so, I hope to produce what Clifford Geertz calls “a 
credible, fleshed-out picture of a human form of life” (Geertz, 1983: 10).
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Manuel Castellsʼ Network Theory
! Given my goal of understanding and interpreting communicative practices, my 
dissertation requires a theoretical framework with certain features. The first is cultural 
and social flexibility: my framework needs to have enough reach to include India but at 
the same time not be limited to India; similarly it needs to leave room for Indiaʼs large 
internal diversity. A second necessary feature of my theoretical framework is that it allow 
for case study analysis. Because I am studying a network within a communicative 
context, I need a framework that will allow me to observe user practices and usersʼ 
relationships with technology, identify changes in Indiaʼs communication networks, and 
interpret social meanings of communication technologies. Finally, my theoretical 
framework must permit mixed methods and a varied data set. Since networks have 
economic, social and cultural dimensions, my study involves a mix of content analysis, 
participant observation, interviews and surveys.
! Manuel Castellsʼ network theory fulfills these three characteristics. Developed in 
his ʻInformation Ageʼ trilogy, Volume I: The Rise of the Network Society (1996), Castellsʼ 
network theory offers a useful framework for understanding changes in the production 
and flow of information, the continued importance of elites, and the central role cities will 
play in shaping networks in the 21st century. In this section I will expand on Castellsʼ 
theoretical approach and discuss its relationship with my proposed research.
!  In The Rise of the Network Society, Castells describes a new organizational 
paradigm – he calls it ʻinformationalismʼ – characterized by several features. First, the 
networks of ʻinformationalismʼ are by and for commerce, and come in several forms: 
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family-based, entrepreneurial, hierarchical and communal, distribution, and what 
Castells calls “inter-border” networks. Second, these networks put to use new 
technological tools: new networks, new devices, and new linkages between activity on 
networks and activity in the physical world. Third, competition goes beyond the local 
and the national: it is now global. Together, these elements lead to a shift toward virtual 
production and consumption of information (Castells, 1996: 196-97). 
! For Castells, this “spirit of informationalism” does not represent a new unifying 
“network culture”; rather, it is an extension – newer and faster – of Schumpeterʼs thesis 
on capitalism and change (Castells, 1996: 210-15). In his classic text Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter described what he called the “creative 
destruction” inherent in capitalism:
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion 
comes from the new consumers, goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that 
capitalist enterprise creates ... The opening up of new markets, foreign or 
domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory  to 
such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation ... 
that incessantly  revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly  creating a new one (Schumpeter, 1942: 
82-85).
In his network theory, Castells takes Schumpeterʼs notion of revolution in production of 
tangible goods and applies it to the production of information. The spirit of 
informationalism describes the ways that the shift toward virtual production and 
consumption leads to disruption and structural change in informational flows. For India, 
this has special value: it is a society with significant informal economic activity and 
information-sharing. Unencumbered with the formality and rigidity  of a strong state, 
India is home to significant informal activity  and informal power structures. Many such 
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structures do not exist in the eyes of the government: they neither own land nor pay 
taxes, and their finances and operations are indistinguishable from those of the 
individuals that run them. In such an environment, Castellsʼ ʻinformationalismʼ is a 
helpful lens through which we can see and describe the growth of networks, and make 
sense of the Schumpeterian changes taking place.
# A crucial element of this creative destruction is the shift from the “space of 
places” to the “space of flows.” For Castells, space is “a material product, in relationship 
to other material products – including people who engage in [historically] determined 
social relationships that provide space with a form, a function, and a social 
meaning” (Castells, 1972: 152). Citing the rapid proliferation of mobile phones, Castells 
argues that the materiality of space has changed (Castells, 1996: 440-48). In the 
network society Castells describes, struggles of power and function cross traditional 
(political and geographical) boundaries and blur our sense of space. Locality  is no 
longer the defining feature of societies. Instead, the network society is based on a 
series of flows: of capital, information, technology, organizational interaction, images, 
sounds, and symbols. The speed and depth of these flows are responsible for an 
ongoing spatial reconfiguration, not just of communications practices, but also of entire 
societies. Castells identifies three layers in the space of flows: the first is the circuit of 
electronic exchanges that now link the worldʼs major cities and a rapidly growing 
number of small population centers. The second layer is made up of hubs and nodes 
whose characteristics are determined by the functions of a particular network. Finally, a 
third layer is formed by the spatial organization of managerial elites in different networks 
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(Castells, 1996: 442-46). This multi-layered framework is useful for examinations of 
mobile telephony, and of particular value for my case study. 
! This theory contains several assumptions. One is that societies are organized 
around the interests of elites, and around the institutions that represent those interests. 
Another is that the space of flows is the dominant spatial logic in the world because it 
serves the interests of elites. A third is that despite this spatial reorganization in 
organizations and societies, the notion of place still matters, as demonstrated by the 
socio-economic geography of cities. For Castells, then, the space of flows and the 
network society it produces are elite-led and elite-centric developments. Castells 
emphasizes the importance (for elites) of organization, and describes the ways that 
dominant institutions disorganize and disable interests that represent the numerical 
majority. 
! One thing that remains unclear is to what extent the space of flows will continue 
to represent the same elites and to what extent it will empower upstarts and insurgents. 
This question is at the heart of Indiaʼs telephonic transformation. No other technology 
brings the ʻnew Indiaʼ to more people and, with internet penetration still far behind 
telephone penetration, no other technology provides the same potential for the 
previously disconnected to profit from their newfound connection. Yet this optimism, so 
common in ICT4D scholarship, belies more fundamental truths: those with education, 
influential contacts, and access to capital are those most likely to profit from mobile 
phone use. Ultimately, who will win: the establishment or the insurgents? In India, the 
pervasiveness of mobile phones makes this a question of large and still-growing 
importance.
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! While it is still too early to know the answer to this question, it is clear that the 
battle will be fought and decided in cities. Since the 1960s, population growth in low- 
and middle-income countries has created mega-cities across Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. For Castells, the important point is not whether these cities are “dominant 
centers of the global economy, but [that] they... connect to this global system huge 
segments of the human population” (Castells, 1996: 434). This arrival of the previously-
disconnected many is creating a new set of links within and among the worldʼs cities, via 
a process that defies strict hierarchies. Today, outside the industrialized world, the 
worldʼs large cities are brimming with arrivals from small towns. These cities are home 
to disproportionate and growing shares of their countriesʼ capital, communications 
technology, and young people. As Saskia Sassen writes:
! Beyond their long history  as centers for international trade and banking, these 
! cities now function in four new ways: first, as highly  concentrated command 
! points in the organization of the worldʼs economy; second, as key locations for 
! finance and for specialized service firms ...; third, as sites of production, including 
! the production of innovation in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets 
! for the products and innovations produced (Sassen, 2001: 3-4).
With urbanization continuing at a rapid pace, megacities outside the West are poised to 
enjoy new prominence in the decades to come. With large populations increasingly 
connected to a global latticework of internet and telephone networks, these cities are 
becoming the unintended beneficiaries of the space of flows. Formerly relegated to the 
periphery of global communications, non-Western megacities are playing larger roles in 
the production and consumption of information. Indeed, the ʻarrivalʼ Castells describes is 
the beginning of a transformative process in the space of flows: in an increasingly 
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interconnected world, non-Western megacities are now stages for globally significant 
events (Castells, 1989; Borja and Castells, 1997).
! Castellsʼ network theory offers several advantages for scholars wishing to 
understand second order network formation. One advantage is Castellsʼ nuanced 
understanding of the interplay between society and technology. In his words, 
“technology does not determine society. Nor does society  script the course of 
technological change, since many factors, including individual inventiveness and 
entrepreneurialism, intervene in the process of scientific discovery, technical innovation 
and social applications, so the final outcome depends on a complex pattern of 
interaction” (Castells, 1996: 5). Another strength is Castellsʼ focus on structural change: 
he encourages us to “stop using the notion of information society and replace it with the 
concept of the network society as the specific social characteristic of our time” (Castells, 
2000: 110).
! Building on the work of other theorists, Castells attacks a state-centric view of 
communication and power. Ulrich Beck (2006) argues that state command over media 
is limited by globalization (which limits national sovereignty), market pressures (which 
promote deregulation), and declining public legitimacy  of the state. Castells builds on 
Beckʼs argument by discussing the ways that state monopolies of information have 
broken down since the 1970s. In place of state monopolies of information, a significant 
amount of economic, political and cultural power has devolved to media systems. But 
the term ʻsystemʼ is inadequate; new structures – networks – have developed and 
support certain patterns of social interaction, authority, and sources of power. In the 
ʻInformation Economyʼ that has emerged, firmsʼ competitiveness is determined 
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increasingly by their access to (and knowledge of) networks. Since the state is no 
longer the central authority  in the production and legitimation of information, media 
networks are shaped by social relations and communication technologies. New 
information technologies have fostered and reinforced networks as legitimate and 
increasingly powerful organizational forms. 
Communications in Context: A National Case Study of Mobile Telephony
! This dissertation focuses on a single major non-Western society  with a 
compelling narrative of network expansion. It operates from an assumption that 
networks in India and other non-Western societies have social, economic and technical 
characteristics that separate them from Western societies and from each other. I see 
this as a deliberate corrective to a literature that has too often relied on a Western-
centric view of telephony, that has neglected the opportunity to explore non-Western 
societiesʼ contributions, and that needs to do more to examine communications within 
non-Western social contexts.
! A major element of this dissertation is its use of a case study. I examine a 
national communicative phenomenon (mobile network formation) using a national case-
study that shows a national network in a specific commercial and cultural context. As 
Yin writes, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon with its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly  evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). Using a design that 
emphasizes an Indian cultural context, I use my case study to study second order 
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network formation in contemporary India. In doing so I follow the methodologist Robert 
E. Stake: 
! The real business of case study  is particularisation, not generalisation. We take a 
! particular case and come to know it well, not primarily  as to how it is different 
! from others but what it is, what it does. There is an emphasis on uniqueness, and 
! that implies knowledge of others that the case is different from, but the first 
! emphasis is on understanding the case itself (Stake, 1995: 8). 
My case study has several distinguishing features that, when combined, allow me to 
study second order mobile network formation in India. My case study focuses on a 
single object of study, using qualitative analysis (Yin, 2003: 13). I use several sub-
methods, including participant observation, interviews and surveys. Using these sub-
methods in a communicative context, I establish a chain of evidence (Gilham, 2000: 20; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994: 261). My case study identifies a context in which we can 
understand how communication networks have developed and what social meaning 
communication technologies have in India. 
! This dissertation identifies professional sports as contexts in which we can see 
global and national communicative forces at work. Sports have offered important 
contexts for ethnographic studies of race and class relations (Liebow, 2003). For much 
of the 20th Century, international sports took for granted the leading role of the West, 
but globalization has brought new players, new audiences, and new money to 
international sports. Today, a transition of power is taking place in international sports, 
with non-Western nations increasingly playing the roles of financiers, hosts, 
broadcasters and symbolic leaders (Gupta, 2010). With large and increasingly 
connected populations, many nonwestern nations are the locations where media 
markets are growing most quickly. Through these changing dynamics of international 
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sports, we can understand social change within particular societies. With this in mind, 
Axford and Huggins (2010) call for greater attention to historical and cultural contexts 
and suggest that researchers learn from direct engagement with audiences. Citing 
Geertz, they argue that research should focus on the context in which audiences 
experience the sport. With an understanding of how audiences interact with the 
mediatized communications tools of the sport, researchers will gain insight to wider 
processes of communications and culture in a globalized world (Axford and Huggins, 
2010: 122-49).
! My case study uses Indian cricket to study the relationship between users and 
communication networks. Cricket has a special significance as a cultural lens on Indiaʼs 
postcolonial identity (Gowariker, 2001; Guha, 2001; Majumdar, 2008; Agur, 2013; Astill,
2013). It is by  far the largest sport; indeed, in terms of television audiences, dollars 
spent, and news coverage it is the only sport with a consistent national following (Gupta 
2010). It is also, along with Indian cinema, one of the countryʼs two largest sources of 
entertainment. Indian cinema has regional divisions, with centers of film production in 
Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali, Punjabi and other Indian languages, distinct regional 
traditions in filmmaking, and different audiences (Velayutham, 2008; Dechamma and 
Sathya, 2010; Gehlawat, 2010; Mehta and Pandharipande, 2011). By contrast, cricket is 
a genuinely  national pastime, with national tournaments, national broadcasting of 
matches and a powerful national governing body. Whereas film follows and often 
reinforces geographical and cultural divisions, cricket can stake a claim as a uniquely 
inclusive and unifying element in Indiaʼs entertainment culture. In the words of Sharda 
Ugra (2005), “cricketʼs sweep across the landscape of popular culture in India has had 
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little time for the growth or development of something so deep-rooted as local 
affiliations” (Ugra, 2005: 78). In the past decade, India has made cricket a signature of 
its arrival as an active and confident player in a globalized economy. Boria Majumdar 
argues that in the past decade, “cricket has become integral to ... a nation anxious to 
define its own position in a rapidly changing world characterized by globalization and 
growing interdependence ... The fortunes of the Indian cricket team encapsulate the 
story of postcolonial India in microcosm: a tapestry  permanently  being woven around 
the performance of eleven men who carry on their shoulders the demands of a 
billion” (Majumdar, 2008: 78-79).
! In addition to its use in studying post-colonial identity formation, cricket also 
offers a lens through which we can see and understand a new communicative reality 
forming in India. Barry Axford and Richard Huggins (2010) have written that cricket 
reveals a “manifestation of global processes” in a post-television age. They argue that 
three global processes are evident in the ongoing transformation of cricket. First, the 
game has become systematically  commercialized and its component markets linked by 
global broadcasting rights. Second, audiences have access to a wide array of technical 
tools – including websites, social media, and mobile applications – to follow the sport, 
both in and out of the stadium. Third, linked by internet and mobile phone networks, 
consumers have become participants in a global society of “networked individualism.” 
Together, these changes mean that the physical act of being at a stadium watching a 
match is a highly mediated process. At the ground, electronic screens provide 
advertisements, announcements, replays, real-time statistics, and Hawk-eye animation.4 
Audiences in the stands can use social media to communicate about the game and to 
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other fans. They are physically inside the stadium and in many other ʻplacesʼ via their 
mobile phones. As Axford and Huggins write, Indiaʼs “intense mediatization of cricket, 
largely financed by non-indigenous, transnational corporations, has made it part of both 
material and ʻsymbolicʼ globalization” (Axford and Huggins, 2010: 130). As a result, India 
is ushering in a new paradigm in the sport, a “culture of speed – fast cricket delivered to 
dispersed audiences in real time by  ever faster media” (Axford and Huggins, 2010: 135; 
Agur, 2012a). 
# This trend is explained by the rapid growth of Twenty20 cricket, especially in the 
form of the Indian Premier League (IPL). No previous Indian initiative in cricket has 
come close to the ambition or success of the IPL. Since its inaugural season in 2008, 
the IPL has upset purists and found legions of (mostly  young) fans in India and other 
cricket-playing countries. The IPL is a globally-oriented form of entertainment: it 
operates in English, makes prominent use of expensive foreign players and broadcasts 
its matches to all cricket playing countries. The IPL has positioned itself as an upmarket 
form of entertainment that captures the essence of the “new India” (Agur, 2013). It is the 
newest, richest, most global and most tech-savvy cricket league in the country; it is also 
the largest financial bonanza cricket has seen to date, presenting enormous 
opportunities for legitimate profit and for graft, match-fixing, and spot-betting (Steen, 
2010: 95-104). Amit Gupta (2010) argues that “the IPL has flourished because it has 
been able to draw upon the successes of global sports marketing and modern 
technology to produce what is a national league with a body  of international 
players” (Gupta, 2010: 50).
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! The IPL is also a useful context for studying mobile phone usage and mobile 
network formation in India. Gupta (2010) argues that three factors have made the IPL 
possible: the expansion of television from the late 1970s onward, the success of Indiaʼs 
national team and (most importantly) the Indian governmentʼs lifting of the stifling 
economic controls that governed the country from independence to the late-1980s. The 
IPL has integrated mobile phones into its branding: when customers have tickets 
delivered, the tickets come with a note from the host team, inviting the customer to 
“enter the world of IPL mobile communication.”
! The IPL provides a context in which I can apply Castellsʼ theory. The space of 
flows begins with the material characteristics of mobile networks. On top of that we can 
add a second order network (the network of mobile applications, social media, websites 
and user-to-user mobile phone communication related to the IPL) and its hubs (host 
cities and stadiums). This mid-level includes the IPLʼs audiences, dispersed throughout 
the country  but concentrated in certain localities. Finally, this framework emphasizes 
elites, and this helps explain the functionality  of the network and its characteristics (for 
example, why the IPL is a largely urban phenomenon). Using these three levels of 
analysis, I intend to explore the IPL as a case study in the space of flows.
! The IPL offers a useful way to discuss global processes, including a shift in 
capital from West to East, a corresponding shift in power dynamics, and the 
empowerment of new actors outside the industrialized world (Rumford and Wagg, 
2010). So too does the IPL reveal a new cosmopolitanism at work in India. Habibul 
Haque Khondker (2010) draws four broad conclusions for our wider understanding of 
culture: first, that culture is relatively autonomous. Second, that it is fluid. Third, that 
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while cultural features may die out, they can also be created or transformed. And finally, 
that “the possibilities of cosmopolitanism are embedded in the very core of cultural 
practices.” To Khondker, the practices of cricket are part of a global project in 
intercultural understanding and harmony (Khondker, 2010: 169). In this sense, what 
may seem like unimportant changes in cricket may foreshadow cultural shifts on a 
national and global scale.
!
Studying a Network Using Mixed Methods
! This dissertation studies telephone adoption and network growth in India, using a 
case study of users to show how the countryʼs mobile networks have evolved and the 
relationships contemporary  users have with mobile phones. Although mine is a study of 
contemporary telephone usage, I have grounded my work in Indiaʼs long history of 
telecommunications, beginning with the British-built telegraph networks of the mid-19th 
century and continuing through the countryʼs independence in 1947 to the policy 
reforms of the 1990s and 2000s. This dissertation includes a historical analysis of 
Indiaʼs communications networks (Chapter 4) and an in-depth study of a second order 
network that has developed on the national mobile network (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). By 
combining historical analysis with a contemporary  case study, I show the origins of 
contemporary mobile networks in India, the recurring pattern of first- and second order 
network formation in communication networks, and the mix of domestic and global 
forces that are unique to Indiaʼs network expansion. I emphasize the ways that, over 
time, intentions in network design give way to processes of usage that are often co-
designed by users, and these result in a series of outcomes that may or may not reflect 
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the original goals of those who built the network. The story of Indiaʼs colonial 
communication networks is instructive in terms of the power of social networks; I use 
that history as background and connect it to the contemporary phenomenon of mobile 
phone networks via a common theoretical framework. In doing so, I show both the scale 
and pace of network growth in Indiaʼs mobile phone networks; I also show (especially in 
Chapter 7) that the old question of control has reappeared on new networks.
" To analyze the history of Indiaʼs telecommunications networks, I have studied 
existing texts on Indian communications history, government reports from the British Raj 
and Indian government, and selected communication (letters, telegrams, memoirs) from 
prominent government and commercial figures. To study the dramatic growth of Indiaʼs 
telephone network, I have studied policy documents and interviewed telephone 
engineers, policymakers, and executives. This mixed-methods approach allows for a 
discussion of a networkʼs origins, evolution over time, and current state of play.
" To build on this network history, the dissertation also includes a case study  that 
reveals the contemporary state of play in Indiaʼs mobile phone networks and usersʼ 
relationship  with mobile phones. I use the Indian Premier League (IPL) as a context in 
which to observe and understand network features and usersʼ relationships with mobile 
phones. My case study includes document analysis, expert interviews, observation of 
mobile phone use at IPL matches, interviews of mobile phone users, and analysis of 
social media platforms. This case study  extends what I gained from content analysis of 
telephone policy documents and interviews with industry figures. Moreover, my case 
study has allowed me to draw deeper interpretations about the social meaning of mobile 
phones in India today.
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The Origins and Evolution of Indian Telephone Networks
! To understand the development of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks, this 
dissertation puts to use a mixture of text-based sources and interviews with industry 
figures. My text-based sources include legislation, government and corporate reports, 
research studies, and articles from Indiaʼs trade press on communications. In India, 
English is the standard language for government and corporate documents and I had no 
difficulty finding legislation, reports, and other documents. To supplement these 
documents, the dissertation puts to use semi-structured interviews with a selection of 
telephone policy experts responsible for different aspects of network growth and 
maintenance. I interviewed senior executives at companies that construct network 
infrastructure, provide telephone service, and consult to major industry figures (see 
Chapter 4). In these interviews, I focused my questions on policy goals, factors in 
planning, the expected and unexpected challenges that arose in network development. I 
asked questions about first- and second order network formation, the role of telephony 
in sports and entertainment (including the IPL), and expected and unexpected 
developments in telephony. Using paper and pen, I transcribed notes for my interviews; 
after each interview I read my notes, typed them into a Word document, and coded the 
interview by identifying key themes the interviewee had raised. With these interviews, I 
have gained a better understanding of the political, institutional, and market contexts in 
which these policies developed, and the unstated meanings of policies.
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Case Study: Mobile Phone Usage in the Context of the Indian Premier League
! In addition to its analysis of historical and contemporary  network formation in 
India, the dissertation features a case study of a second order network in action. My 
case study focuses on the countryʼs most popular sport (cricket), specifically  the Indian 
Premier League during its sixth playing season (April-May 2013). Several features make 
the IPL a worthwhile object of communicative analysis: The IPL has a series of high-
traffic official mobile apps and has inspired dozens of unofficial apps that cater to IPL 
fans with a variety of mobile phone types. The IPL is the source of a great deal of social 
media. It is also the countryʼs most popular cricket league, and is now old enough to 
have institutional traditions and a culture of its own (see Chapter 5).
! I began my study of IPL mobile network practices with a selection of interviews of 
team officials with the Delhi Daredevils and Chennai Super Kings, the teams in the two 
cities where I resided in India. These interviews ranged in length from 30min to more 
than an hour and focused on how the team uses social media and the internet to reach 
fans, how these practices have changed over time, and what relationship the team 
wants to have with mobile phone users. 
! To build on these expert interviews of team officials, I conducted more than 80 
surveys of mobile users at IPL matches across India (see Chapter 6). This final and 
largest phase of my data-collection came during the IPLʼs sixth annual playing season, 
held in eight cities during April and May 2013. I attended one match in each city with an 
IPL team (Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kolkata, Mohali, Mumbai, and 
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Pune) to observe when and how fans use their mobile phones in relation to the game 
and survey them about their preferences and usage.
User Surveys
! At matches, inside the stadium, I approached mobile phone users individually 
and in small groups, and asked if they  would answer a few questions about their mobile 
phone usage in relation to the IPL. Some users were initially hesitant about who I was 
and what kind of questions I wanted to ask; after I explained my the nature of my 
research, I never had difficulty gaining usersʼ trust. I did not ask interviewees for their 
names, but did request some basic personal information such as age, place of 
residence, occupation, and how long users had owned a mobile phone. 
" I asked users to show me how they use applications and other mobile services; I 
also asked about their general habits and preferences with mobile content and how 
much they spent on their monthly  bill. Throughout this study of users, I sought survey-
takers in different seating areas of the stadiums, ranging from box seats to general 
admission. In doing so, I tried to find a good mixture of ages and genders and thus gain 
a data set representative of teamsʼ audiences (see Chapter 5). Wherever I went, I 
brought with me a small notepad and jotted down notes on usersʼ communicative 
practices. This process is in keeping with the advice offered by Gans (1979) and Becker 
(1986). In my initial research design and my Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
submission, I went to great pains to stress the ways I would anonymize my data to 
protect users (Agur, 2012b). This proved to be unnecessary. Most survey-takers 
introduced themselves to me by name; some handed me business cards or wrote their 
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contact details on my notepad, in case I had further questions and wanted to get in 
touch. More than one user asked hopefully if his name might appear in a famous 
newspaper or magazine. 
! Few things excite Indians more than mobile phones and cricket. Mobile phones 
provide an extension of Indiaʼs oral culture and allow illiterate or semi-literate users to 
communicate instantly with other users. At the same time, mobile phones provide a 
wide range of text-based options for users, from the simple (text messages) to the 
sophisticated (specialized apps and websites). Mobile phones appeal to old and young, 
rich and poor, and illiterate and educated; there is a model for every type of consumer, 
and pay-as-you-go minutes are cheap (see Chapter 6). Similarly, cricket has a national 
following in India, with fans drawn to the game for a variety of reasons. For those who 
remember the early years of Indiaʼs independence, cricket offers a reminder of the 
countryʼs colonial past. Those who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s watched 
broadcasts of Indiaʼs triumph in the 1983 Cricket World Cup, and see cricket as a 
national rather than colonial pastime. Cricket is also popular among Indiaʼs several 
hundred million young people. They have grown up  with three forms of cricket (Test, 
one-day and Twenty20) to choose from, with India as the host country  for the worldʼs 
leading Twenty20 league, and with mobile phones as essential elements of attending or 
following matches. From informal conversations with users to the last match of the IPL 
season, I found that the users I encountered were happy to discuss their experiences, 
preferences, habits and how much they paid for telephone service. 
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Advantages of a Mixed Methods Approach
! My mixed methods approach offers several strengths. The first is that by 
triangulating data, I am able to overcome the limitations that a single source of data 
(e.g. institutional reports) or a single methodology (e.g. content analysis) would have 
presented. As Norman Denzin writes, “by combining methods ... in the same study, 
observers can partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator and/or 
one method ... In this respect, triangulation of method, investigator, theory, and data 
remains the soundest strategy  of theory construction (Denzin, 1989: 300). Throughout 
this dissertation, I emphasize the importance of usersʼ perspectives in understanding 
how a network functions. In this sense, my study follows the ʻuser literatureʼ of 
technological adoption (Perriault, 1989; Haddon et al., 2005). A second advantage of my 
approach is that I made the most of my solo-researcher status. The individual nature of 
this study was unavoidable because of the requirements of a doctoral dissertation, but I 
found that solo ethnographic research offered advantages. As a single researcher, I had 
an easier time gaining trust of interview and survey subjects than I would have if 
working in a team. And unlike in collaborative studies in which I have been a researcher 
(Belair-Gagnon et al., 2014), in this study I conducted each interview and each survey, 
and did not need to rely on other researchers for data. 
! As a solo researcher from the West conducting research in India, I needed to be 
self-aware and self-reflexive throughout the process. Rosanna Hertz (1997: viii) defines 
self-reflexivity  as an on-going conversation about how researchersʼ selves, identities 
and subjects affect the process and its outcomes. As J.D. Brewer writes, reflexivity  “acts 
as a bridge between interpretation and the process by  which it is conveyed in 
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text” (Brewer, 2000: 127). In my case, self-reflexivity  meant being aware that my 
appearance, speech and body language would affect the degree to which interviewees 
and survey-takers trusted me and the ways in which they perceived my questions. I 
could not alter or hide my status as a foreigner, but I could (and did) make conscious 
choices that would help me blend in and gain the trust of individuals I sought to 
interview, survey and observe. By consciously integrating myself (as much as possible) 
into my surroundings, I sought to make effective use of my experience as an observer 
of a second order network in action. In doing so, I aspired to Marie L. Campbellʼs maxim 
that “use of experience as data in this approach holds the analysis accountable to 
everyday/every night actualities in a lived world” (Campbell, 1998: 55; see also Beeman 
and Paterson, 2001; Berger, 2001).
" I have designed my study with an awareness not only of its strengths, but also of 
its limitations. While mine is a national study, it is biased toward urban centers, since 
these are the places where I spent most of my time while in India and where I collected 
my data. While I believe my study succeeds in linking people in Indiaʼs disparate 
regions, linguistic groups and religions, my study gives disproportionate attention to 
Indians with mobile phones and to those with the means to attend IPL matches.5  My 
case study also has limitations: While I believe that the IPL is a useful lens through 
which to understand second order network formation, neither the league nor the sport of 
cricket completely  transcends Indiaʼs socio-economic, geographical or cultural divides. 
As Ugra (2005) writes, Indians “play  together and live apart.” Cricket promotes unity, but 
it does not necessarily level the wider playing field (Ugra, 2005: 80-87). In this sense, 
the studyʼs limitation reflects the incompleteness of Indiaʼs mobile networks: this is a 
67
study in networks that are still far from universal, in a country  with a stratified social and 
economic structure.
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Chapter 4: History of Communication Networks in India
! ! This chapter examines the history of communications networks in India and the 
relationship  between first and second order networks. Divided into three different time 
periods (the British Raj, the first four decades of independence, and the years since 
1991), this chapter examines how first- and second order networks have developed, the 
intended and unintended effects of network formation, and the effects of communication 
networks on Indiaʼs economics, politics, and identity. I explore the intentions behind 
colonial network development and the implications of the shift from elite to mass usage 
on Indiaʼs communication networks. Throughout, I emphasize a long-term 
transformation in India, in which second order networks – especially that of the 
independence movement – grew out of the telegraph and railroad networks and gave 
new social meaning to these ʻtools of empire.ʼ By emphasizing this history of 
transformation, I show the difficulty of maintaining control of large-scale communication 
networks; I also show the unpredictable nature of such networks, especially when they 
grow from elite to mass usage.
! ! This chapter views Indian telephone history through the network theory 
developed by Manuel Castells. In his Information Age trilogy, Volume I: The Rise of the 
Network Society, Castells offers a framework for understanding changes in the 
production and flow of information, the role of elites, and the importance of cities in 
communication networks (Castells, 1996). A crucial element in Castellsʼ theory is the 
what he calls the “space of flows.” For Castells, space is “a material product, in 
relationship  to other material products – including people who engage in historically 
69
determined social relationships that provide space with a form, a function, and a social 
meaning” (Castells, 1997: 152). Castells identifies three layers in the space of flows: the 
first is the circuit of exchanges that link the worldʼs major cities. The second layer is 
made up of hubs and nodes whose characteristics are determined by the functions of a 
particular network. Finally, a third layer is formed by the spatial organization of 
managerial elites in different networks. Castellsʼ three-layer framework helps us 
understand the modes of power and counter-power in Indian communication networks, 
and when used in historical analysis, gives us insight into long-term patterns in network 
design and functionality.
" " The chapter develops in three parts. It begins with the colonial period, beginning 
in the 1840s with the growth of British shipping, rail, and telegraph networks in India and 
continuing to Indiaʼs independence in 1947. Here I emphasize the intertwined nature of 
colonial communication networks: built as statist projects in pursuit of colonial strategy, 
the networks of shipping, rail, and telegraph operated in symbiosis, giving a small 
contingent of occupying rulers a centralized and hierarchical network that reflected the 
importance the British Empire placed on long-distance communication networks. In 
outlining the symbiotic nature of Indiaʼs colonial communication networks, I show the 
economic, political, cultural and communicative context in which Indiaʼs early 
telecommunications developed, and the forces that shaped the early  telegraph and 
telephone networks.
" " The second part of this chapter narrows the focus to the countryʼs telephone 
network and follows its development during the period from Indiaʼs independence in 
1947 to the end of Rajiv Gandhiʼs government in 1989. This part discusses how the 
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governments of Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-1964), Indira Gandhi (1966-77 and 1980-84) 
and Rajiv  Gandhi (1984-1989) saw the countryʼs telephone network in relation to 
economic and social development, and national identity. For much of this period the 
telephone network remained small, un-prioritized and undercapitalized, while the 
government monopoly offering service it became large, bottom-heavy and ineffective in 
expanding the network or providing quality  service to users. The crisis in statism that 
followed Indira Gandhiʼs Emergency Rule in the late 1970s, coupled with demands that 
the government make electronics and other ʻluxuryʼ goods more widely available, 
prompted the final (1980-84) government of Indira Gandhi to invest in the telephone 
network. The 1984 installment of Rajiv Gandhi as a politically inexperienced but 
technologically  savvy Prime Minister led to a change in the governmentʼs attitude 
toward telephony. This section of the chapter discusses the role of Sam Pitroda as a 
telephone and computer visionary, the initiatives the government undertook with the 
goal of making the telephone network truly national, and the mix of success and failure 
that characterized efforts during the Rajiv era.
# # The third part of this history focuses on the policy shift that took place during the 
economic crisis of 1991 and on the dramatic network expansion that has followed. It 
begins by chronicling the events in 1991 that forced Indiaʼs government to open up  the 
telephone sector. It then identifies the features Indiaʼs circuits of telephony, the hubs 
and nodes on the network, and the spatial organization of managerial elites who at 
times collaborated and at other times battled for control of the network. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of long-term patterns in Indiaʼs telephone networks. Having 
examined the origins and evolution of Indiaʼs telephony, the chapter conclusion 
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describes a complex mix of continuity  and change in Indiaʼs contemporary mobile 
network architecture and the social implications of mass mobile telephony.
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Part I:
The British Raj and Colonial Networks (1840-1947)
! ! This chapter begins with the colonial wave of network development that took 
place in India between 1840 and 1948. During these years, Britain constructed a series 
of colonial communications networks (shipping, rail, and telegraph) to achieve a set of 
military and commercial goals. By examining Indiaʼs communication networks using 
Castellsʼ three-layered approach, this first part of the chapter show the ways that Indiaʼs 
colonial communication networks, built to augment and extend British control over the 
subcontinent, became conduits for Indian resistance and nationalism. This history 
shows the difficulty of maintaining exclusive control of expanding communication 
networks and the susceptibility of colonial communication networks to disruption and co-
option by conquered peoples.
Circuits of Colonial Communication Networks in India
! ! In shipping, railroads, and telegraphy, the British fundamentally  altered patterns 
of communication that had developed during the Mughal Empire.6  Britainʼs networks of 
imperial control included new circuits of communications, hubs and nodes, and spatial 
organization of elites. These first-order networks allowed Britain to reshape Indiaʼs 
communicative relationship with the outside world and reconfigure its internal 
governance around a set of military and commercial goals (Fisher, 1993).
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! ! In the early-1600s, the British East India Company (later the British government 
itself) initiated what would later become the largest colonial communication network in 
human history.7 That network – or, more accurately, that series of networks – involved 
several types of communication technology. For communication from Britain to India 
and later, from India to points farther east in the British empire, a shipping network 
linked the subcontinentʼs major ports with other British-controlled ports and coaling 
stations. For communication between Indiaʼs port cities and sites of production, a 
railroad network extended inland, traversing the subcontinent. Telegraph wires and 
railroads in India linked the same places by electrical pulse and rail; once constructed, 
telegraph lines provided British administrators in hubs with continual updates on 
weather conditions, movement of goods, troops and people, and political stirrings 
(Lahiri-Choudhury, 2010).
! ! To speak of communication networks within India, one must first understand 
communication to India. In the early  nineteenth century, improvements in shipping 
technology, coupled with the growth of British naval power, led to more regular 
communication between India and trading centers elsewhere in the Indian Ocean.8  In 
their efforts to establish a shipping network linking India with the empire, British 
planners needed to overcome a set of geographical challenges. First, on its Malabar 
and Coromandel coasts, India has few natural deep-water harbors. This challenge, 
coupled with the small numerical size of British forces in India, prompted the East India 
Company and the British government to concentrate shipping in a few major hubs: 
Karachi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. To augment their power in the south of India, 
the British relied on Madras as a port. The city sits on a broad sandy plain and has no 
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natural harbor; not until 1890 did Madras have a secure artificial harbor for year-round 
shipping (Macmillan, 1928: 290-91). Second, climate played a major part in the 
development of shipping timetables and routes to India. Strong trade winds meant that a 
journey from London to Calcutta was faster than a journey from London to Bombay, 
despite being much farther. Calcutta also offered the advantage of being situated on the 
Hooghly River, a distributary of the Ganges. This gave British merchants a navigable 
passage upstream and allowed British colonial officials to extend their control inland as 
far as what is now Uttar Pradesh. Calcuttaʼs geographical advantages were sufficient 
that the British tolerated disease, heat, annual flooding and the threat of cyclones. For 
these reasons, Calcutta became the hub  of British military, political, and commercial 
activity in India (Headrick, 1981: 134).
" " While shipping enabled better communication to India, railroads extended British 
communication within the subcontinent. British engineers were quick to see the utility of 
rail communication in India: in 1844, Sir Rowland Macdonald Stephenson published his 
Report upon the Practicability of the Introduction of Railways into British India, which 
prompted surveys for a series of short lines to move stone and other goods. In 1853 
Indiaʼs commercial rail network began modestly with a 14 carriage train carrying 400 
passengers 21 miles from Bombay to Thane. The following year, Calcutta saw its first 
trains running on a similarly short route (Alivelu, 2010: 5). In the late 1850s, a period of 
significant railroad expansion began. Led by Robert Graham and (later) Robert Maitland 
Brereton, British efforts at railroad construction involved ever-longer lines, increased 
freight capacity, and new developments in passenger service – these included double-
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decker coaches and the countryʼs first luxury carriage, built for the Governor of Bombay, 
Henry Bartle Frere (Awasthi 1994; Kerr 1995).
" " Compared to other large countries, India was a late starter in rail travel but 
played catch-up quickly: its share of the worldʼs track grew to 1.3 percent in 1860, 4.1 
percent in 1880, and 5.3 percent in 1900. As existing lines expanded and new ones 
were laid, Indiaʼs rail network became increasingly dense: by the 1930s, only the United 
States and Western Europe had denser networks. All of this construction was 
expensive: of the £271 million in British capital exported to India before 1911, 75% went 
to railroads (Headrick, 1988: 53). The political economy of railroad development in India 
had significant effects on the built forms that resulted. Early government plans offered 
favorable terms to the privately held firms that constructed the lines, ostensibly to 
maximize efficiency and minimize graft. In this political economy, the British government 
acted as rules-setter and financial protector. The British governmentʼs promise to 
construction firms that they be guaranteed 5% profit annually encouraged spendthrift 
methods: builders opted for an unusually wide gauge of 5ʼ 6” for Indiaʼs rail lines, nearly 
a foot wider than Europeʼs 4ʼ 8” standard gauge (MacPherson, 1955: 180-81; Thorner, 
1955: 208). So too did they select sturdy, expensive British-built locomotives and rolling 
stock. The most lavish consequences of the guarantee system came in railway stations. 
In Karachi, Lahore, Delhi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, major stations took on 
monumental form and significance (Thorner, 1955: 180-82). This colonial political 
economy also created a larger material legacy: it gave the great port cities of India 
special significance and routinized the flow of goods, people, and ideas between these 
cities and the hinterland.
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! ! While the rail network allowed for new patterns of economic development, it was 
the telegraph that most fully  integrated the sprawling Indian subcontinent into a 
coherent communicative whole. The telegraph also allowed a comparatively tiny  British 
contingent to govern a vastly  larger number of colonial subjects (Bayly, 1996: 317). 
William OʼShaughnessy, a medical doctor and autodidact in electrical systems, was a 
major figure in the establishment of Indiaʼs early telegraph lines. In the late 1840s, 
OʼShaughnessy strung a series of experimental lines (one as long as 13 miles) by 
attaching the wires to trees; he also lobbied the Colonial Office for funding to build 
several long-distance lines of 1000 miles or more. Fortunately for OʼShaughnessy  and 
other proponents of telegraphy, Indiaʼs Governor-General, James Andrew Ramsay, the 
Marquis of Dalhousie, was both knowledgeable about communication networks (having 
previously been president of the Board of Trade and solved several problems in Britainʼs 
railroad industry) and an ambitious colonial administrator. Ramsay grew frustrated by 
the pace and complications of communications in India; in 1852 he wrote to the Court of 
Directors of the East India Company: “Everything, all the world over, moves faster now-
a-days than it used to, except the transactions of Indian business” (OʼShaughnessy, 
1853: xi). To increase the speed of commerce in India, Ramsay tasked OʼShaughnessy 
with the design and construction of a telegraph network that incorporated Indiaʼs climate 
and the building materials available; the resulting lines contained a clever mix of soft, 
locally-sourced materials (poles made of bamboo, which would bend during tropical 
storms and return to an upright position afterward) and hard, imported materials (iron 
rods as conductors, which were largely impervious to vandals, who lacked the tools 
necessary to open the box) (Gorman, 1971).
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! ! Built at the same time and often along the same rights-of way as railroads, 
telegraph lines assisted in the operation of rail traffic; likewise, the proximity  of railroads 
to telegraph lines made it easier for the British to expand the network and perform 
maintenance. Indian subjects soon realized the power of the telegraph network as a tool 
of imperial control: while being transported to the gallows after a failed revolt, one 
conspirator pointed at a telegraph wire and exclaimed, “there is the accursed string that 
strangles us” (Horst and Miller, 2006: 105). In the wider British Empire, the telegraph 
had a unifying role: with the proliferation of undersea cables in the 1870s, the telegraph 
emerged as an amphibious communication technology that linked British possessions 
and allowed for centralized diplomacy and military control.9  The land- and sea-based 
technologies of shipping and rail travel came to depend on the telegraph: unlike ships 
and trains, the contents of telegrams did not stop at the waterʼs edge. Messages sent 
from the office of the Secretary of State for India in London traveled via land and sea, 
through a series of British-controlled hubs (telegraph offices, relay stations, coaling 
stations, and port cities) to their final destinations in India. This meant that Secretaries 
of State from Sir Charles Wood (1859-1866) onward could communicate directly  with 
subordinates in India. Telegrams were substantially more expensive than letters sent via 
the mail and, consequently formed a much smaller part of communication between 
England and India. But for those with access to the network, the telegraph effectively 
shrunk the distance between Britain and Indiaʼs port cities, and between these hubs and 
British possessions inland.
! ! For the British government and British commercial interests in India, the circuits 
of telegraph lines offered two interrelated advantages: speed and scale. Initiated under 
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the leadership  of Governor-General James Ramsay (1848-56) and expanded 
dramatically under his successor, Charles Canning (1856-62), the telegraph was a 
statist project designed to serve the needs of the British colonial government and British 
companies.10  With privileged access to this network of wires, British officers and trading 
companies (clustered in Calcutta, Delhi and Bombay) enjoyed differential speed in long-
distance communications to and within India. This allowed a tiny minority of occupiers to 
coordinate substantial commercial activity across a large territory, monitor news (on 
weather and political developments) across the country, and deploy its comparatively 
small resources (of personnel and equipment) in ways possible only with the 
advantages of communicative speed over locals. Plannersʼ initial dreams of ʻinstantʼ 
communications melted into a reality in which messages took several days and 
sometimes weeks to reach their destination (Hoskins, 1928: 373-92). Nevertheless, 
average transmission times were significantly faster than the journey by ship. As 
engineers laid additional cables and improved the networkʼs reliability, telegraphy 
dramatically sped up the transmission of information both between Britain and India, 
and within India. This reduced the vulnerability of Britainʼs colonial interests in India, 
decreased risks for investors, and – since the early  cables ended at Britainʼs main ports 
in India – furthered informational concentration and sophistication in these port cities. 
And with a network of undersea cables linking India to other British colonies, the 
telegraph offered its users what we would now call ʻnetwork effects.ʼ Britain had no peer 
with respect to scale: the ʻall red routesʼ included 190 000 miles of wire under British 
control in an exclusive network that eventually encircled the globe (Colin, 1901: 147; 
Johnson, 1903).
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! ! Within this network, India played a unique role: it was an empire-within-an-empire 
(home to four-fifths of the population in the British Empire), and its geographical location 
made it an essential communicative hub for Britainʼs subsequent conquests in South-
East Asia and the Pacific (Latham, 1978: 104, 112, 117). The undersea cables linking 
Britain with India offered a significant communicative advantage for British planners and 
colonial officials. As Daniel Headrick has written, the telegraph network offered “rapid, 
safe, secret communications with India, and several backup  systems in case of trouble. 
It was the spinal cord of the British Empire” (Headrick, 1988: 101; Kennedy, 1971: 
728-52).
! When examining the circuits of communications of an empire that prioritized 
communicative technologies, it is curious that the telecommunications infrastructure of 
India did not (and still does not) include significant landline telephony (TRAI, 2012a). In 
1881, five years after Alexander Graham Bell received his patent for the telephone, a 
British firm, the Oriental Telephone Company, initiated service in India. The British 
government granted the company a license to operate until 1944 (Subramanian, 2008: 
34). In the late 1870s, Britain was building landline telephone networks at home and 
had the expertise to do the same in India (Perry, 1977). Despite this capacity, the British 
government pursued limited telephony  in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Two factors offer partial explanations for this omission. The first is that existing 
communication networks (rail and telegraph), plus the colonial post office, accomplished 
much of what local telephone service would have accomplished. The second was that 
telephone networks involved significant last-mile costs with no immediate promise that 
such an investment would pay for itself. By the 1870s, Britain was engaged in significant 
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construction related to its rail and telegraph networks, and could have integrated a 
national telephone network into its planning. That it chose not to do so suggests a set of 
priorities in colonial communications: When it came to long-distance communication 
networks (shipping, rail, and the telegraph), Britain demonstrated a zeal without match 
among nineteenth century imperial powers, but when it came to local communication 
networks, Britainʼs appetite had limits.
Hubs and Nodes of Colonial Communication Networks in India
" " To administer India, the British government sought control of the movement of 
people, goods and information throughout British India. In the circuits of Indiaʼs colonial 
communication, particular hubs and nodes had a profound and lasting effect on flows of 
information and commerce, and on colonial power dynamics. Many of the cities that 
came to dominate India in the 19th and 20th centuries got their start as hubs on a set of 
complementary British-built communication networks: shipping, railroads, telegraphy, 
and the post. Delhi had been the capital of the Mughal Empire and would remain an 
important center long after the 1857 rebellion and the end of the Mughal Empire. But 
while Delhiʼs power was political, Bombay was the leading commercial hub in India – a 
role it has retained to this day.
" " Shipping played a major role in shaping Indiaʼs hubs of trade. The development 
in the 1830s of steam-powered ships, followed by subsequent advances in iron hulls, 
propellors, and high-pressure engines, allowed for increasingly  high-volume shipping 
according to regular schedules, at declining prices for those sending mail or goods 
(Headrick, 1981: 142-48). Increased frequency and flows of trade led to Britain 
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concentrating its growing colonial administration in a few major centers, mostly ports but 
also inland on navigable rivers. Karachi, Lahore, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, and Delhi 
were each transformed into colonial hubs with infrastructure to match. Thus the 
priorities and methods of imperial Britain turned Indiaʼs economic orientation outward 
toward the sea, via a series of portals linking India with the wider British Empire. With 
Indiaʼs political economy built on exports and statist colonial administration, the 
countryʼs major railroad termini and ports grew dramatically with shipping traffic 
(Thorner, 1950: 23-25). These hubs developed relationships with other hubs (port cities 
under British control) in the Empire; these relationships were routinized with regular 
schedules and year-round shipping. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to more 
traffic and trade, and strengthened relationships between Indian ports and coaling 
stations along the coasts of the Arabian Sea and Red Sea (Fletcher, 1958: 558; Dwivedi 
and Mehrorta, 2001: 88).
" " From its port cities, Indiaʼs rail network extended inland and to other port cities. 
The design of the railway network in India reflected British colonial purposes: nodes in 
the hinterland existed to bring goods from production sites to ports, where they could be 
shipped elsewhere. Indiaʼs colonial railroad network was hierarchical and urban-centric: 
termini were located in major port cities, with lines radiating outward to secondary  and 
minor centers. The network further favored cities with special prices for freight: rates 
from inland cities to ports were lower than to other inland points. This had the effect of 
making India one of the worldʼs largest agriculture exporters, but hindered the ability of 
Indian businessmen to build their own distribution networks. Nationalists complained 
that the design of the network, with routes and prices skewed toward port cities, served 
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the interests of British elites at the expense of national industrial development (Tiwari, 
1941). In a country  whose population remained overwhelmingly rural, the dominance of 
a few hubs was an early exercise in communicative centralization and control.
! ! Port cities also served as depots, administration centers and informational hubs 
on the telegraph network. These hubs were were built and configured to suit their 
military and economic goals of their designers. British colonial officials used these hubs 
to organize and deploy limited resources in a sprawling empire-within-an-empire. As 
leaders of a tiny  population seeking to govern a substantially  larger population, 
successive Governors-General and Viceroys were aware of the need to concentrate 
personnel and information in a few strategically located hubs. Early  supporters of 
telegraph expansion included Governor-General John Ramsay (1848-56) and his 
successor Charles Canning (1856-62). The lines they commissioned augmented the 
positions of Calcutta and Bombay, since goods and news flowed disproportionately 
through these two cities. This concentration of information led to these cities becoming 
hubs of information, transportation, commerce, and politics. For two reasons – 
symbiosis of development with rails, and informational concentration in major port cities 
– telegraph networks were especially  useful in projecting British power beyond the 
garrisons and administrative offices of major ports (Wenzlhuemer, 2012: 77-83).
! ! In 1857, British and Indian residents of one telegraph hub (Delhi) witnessed the 
importance of the telegraph network. In May of that year, disaffected sepoy mercenaries 
stormed Delhi as revenge for what they saw as an egregious insult: The standard drill 
for greasing Enfield rifles was to bite off the top  of the cartridge, pour its powder into the 
rifle, then use a rod to stuff the ball and the rest of the fat from the cartridge into the 
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chamber. By biting the cartridges, sepoy guards gained a mouthful of foul smelling 
grease, which was not only  unpleasant but offensive: by including fat from pigs and 
cows, the East India Company managed to anger Muslims and Hindus. Although the 
Company quickly  realized the error and opted for new kinds of grease, the damage was 
done. Angry sepoys launched coordinated attacks on British garrisons and offices in 
Delhi (Bhatt and Versaiker, 2011). As the mutiny overwhelmed British forces, the Delhi 
telegraph office sent a message over the wires:
Mutineers from Meerut 3rd Light Cavalry  number not known said to be one 
hundred and fifty  men cut off communication with Meerut. Taken possession of 
the Bridge of Boats. 54th NI sent against them but would not act. Several officers 
killed and wounded. City  in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down 
but nothing certain yet (Punjab Archives).11
As Delhi descended into chaos, the telegraphic office sent one more message before its 
staff fled. That message conveyed in no uncertain terms the gravity of the situation:
We must leave office. All the bungalows are being burned down by the sepoys of 
Meerut. They  came in this morning. We are off. Mr C Todd is dead we think. He 
went out this morning and has not returned (Punjab Archives).
Surviving British soldiers, supported by  arrivals from other garrisons, brutally crushed 
the sepoy uprising. Soon after, the British ousted Zafar from the Red Fort, ending the 
330 year-old Mughal Dynasty and placing Delhi under direct British control. As military 
officials in London became aware of the uprising, of the urgent messages sent by 
telegraph assistants on their way out the door, and of how close British forces came to a 
major loss of control, early investors and visionaries who backed undersea telegraphic 
expansion enjoyed a sense of vindication (Bayly, 1996: 315-37). From that point 
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forward, the British Foreign and Colonial Offices pursued telegraph development in 
earnest. In the decades that followed, their efforts would produce a national network 
that allowed for nearly instant communication between its disperse set of nodes, and 
concentrated information in a handful of British-controlled hubs.
! ! The British government pursued network development in India with a distinct set 
of purposes. Politically  and militarily, communication networks represented a means 
toward several colonial objectives: they  assisted Governors-General and Viceroys in 
their pursuit of control, served as tools for the late 19th-century consolidation of British 
power in the Princely States, and acted as an aggregating force in a sprawling colonial 
project (Lahiri-Choudhury, 2010: 21-22). They also kindled plannersʼ hopes that 
effective transportation and communications infrastructure would create the conditions 
necessary for India to become politically unified (under British control) and economically 
self-sustaining – making it, in theory, easier to govern and defend from rival powers 
(Scriver, 2001: 20-21). Added to these political objectives were a series of commercial 
goals. Indiaʼs abundance of farmland and cheap labor offered an ideal combination for 
production of cotton, sugarcane, coffee and tea (Morris, 1963: 609). The British 
government sought Indian products not only for use in Britain, but also, and increasingly 
as the 19th century wore on, to existing and potential colonies farther east (Bernstein, 
2008: 287). Thus the commercial goals of the British in India encouraged national 
communications and transportation networks linked to the wider empire (MacPherson, 
1955: 178-79). These objectives both enlarged and altered the significance of 
communication hubs in India: rather than being a destination in itself, Britainʼs largest 
colony became a communications super-hub for the empire.
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! ! The significance of Indiaʼs colonial shipping, rail, and telegraph networks 
becomes evident when we consider them in aggregation. The large-scale nature of 
industrial Britainʼs shipping, telegraph, and railroad networks suggests a desire for 
absolute control, but the apparent necessity of these networks also suggests that such 
control remained an aspiration rather than a reality. In the British empire, India was no 
ordinary colony: its land mass sprawled from Afghanistan to Burma, and contained a 
diverse and divided population totaling four-fifths of the British Empire. For this reason, 
many British government officials referred to India as the Indian Empire (Edney, 1997). 
In this context, planners realized that large-scale development could not be wholly 
British, but instead would inevitably take on characteristics of British and Indian culture 
(Thorner, 1955: 201).
! ! Thus, rather than monolithic entities, Indiaʼs colonial communication networks 
evolved into cultural hybrids in their design and operation. This hybridity  reveals at once 
the strength of British imperialism in building infrastructure deep  inside a conquered 
territory, and also the limitations of such a project: even an imperial power with the 
material capacity  of Britain had to plan for compromise, and accept that its 
communication networks would be something less than 100% British in practice (Peers, 
2007: 245-46; Bayly, 2004: 259). In addition to their intended functions, the architectural 
spaces (ports, train stations, telegraph and postal offices) built to sustain the networks, 
also served as meeting places: in a country with a relative absence of large publicly 
accessible buildings, these new meeting places brought an ever-widening slice of Indian 
life into contact with one another (Bear, 2007: 91-107). As a result, these 
communication networks were neither wholly  British nor wholly Indian; they  were 
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physical representations of the dominance and the incompleteness of British control 
over its greatest colony.
Spatial Organization of Managerial Elites in Colonial Communication Networks in India
! ! The spatial organization of elites reflected the objectives of British military and 
economic policy, as well as the tiny  size of the British contingent relative to the number 
of Indian subjects. To speak of ʻelitesʼ in British India is to speak almost exclusively  of 
British military  officers and leading businessmen whose commissions flowed from 
government largesse. Although the British government claimed to operate a 
meritocracy, few Indians were able to gain positions as engineers; fewer still were able 
to rise to managerial positions (Basu, 1967). The Britishness of elites in Indian 
communication networks followed the Britishness of the ambitions and objectives of the 
networks themselves. Britain constructed colonial communication networks with the 
explicit aims of maintaining its control of the subcontinent and expanding its colonial 
presence farther east. The goal was not to build what we would today call an 
ʻinformation societyʼ; rather, British planners designed the networks to be exclusive and 
hierarchical, and to give a small number of elites communicative command over 400 
million Indian subjects. Britainʼs contingent was clustered into a few hubs: Calcutta, 
Bombay, Delhi, Madras, Karachi, and an ever-expanding number of secondary and 
tertiary settlements.
! ! The British-built communication networks in India also involved another set of 
elites: financiers and policymakers in London. From the 1850s onward, a handful of 
British banks – notably the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, Mercantile 
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Bank of India, Lloyds Bank, and Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank – enjoyed rights to 
conduct financial transfers to India via the telegraph network. These banksʼ involvement 
in colonial finance gave their top executives a role in the day-to-day communications 
between London and British hubs in India, especially  Calcutta and Bombay (Goswami, 
2004). The speed of communication made possible by telegraph lines, combined with 
the scale of the ʻall-red-routesʼ, allowed for the growth of centralized technocratic 
governance in London (Headrick, 1988: 130-34). The Colonial Office and Foreign Office 
each included growing bureaucracies dedicated to the collection of information about 
India (often via telegraph cables) and scientific researchers studying the technologies of 
production and construction of materials for railroads (Kumar, 2006; Nickles, 2003). In 
India, key actors included high-level colonial administrators, their (small) bureaucracies 
in major port cities and regional centers, and British engineering and architectural firms 
hired to design and build railroads and stations, provide rolling stock, and integrate 
railroads with the networks of shipping and telegraph. British architects visited India 
when granted commissions and, like a large portion of the British population in India, 
rarely stayed long. Engineersʼ and architectsʼ short-term residency, often based on a 
single project, contributed to a transient community in India and a more permanent one 
in London, composed of engineers who had designed Indian network infrastructure and 
returned to Britain (Scriver, 2001: 25-26). 
# # Elites in India and Britain were the primary  beneficiaries of colonial 
communication networks, and their spatial organization helps explain how and why the 
networks developed. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the uncertainties and delays 
of mail – especially  before the arrival of steamers plying regular routes – meant that 
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colonial officials were largely on their own as administrators.12  News of tensions, plots, 
uprisings, and coups reached London long after the events themselves had taken place; 
likewise, instructions from London on how to deal with a crisis would arrive after the 
administrator had, for better or worse, chosen a course of action. Improvements in 
shipping gradually reduced the uncertainty and delay of mail, but worked within the 
paradigm of physical letters transported by  sea. Long distance telegraphy represented a 
paradigm shift: colonial administrators were able to send regular dispatches to London, 
informing government officials of recent developments and ongoing issues (Kennedy, 
1971; Bayly, 1996: 142-79).13  Telegrams carrying information to London allowed for 
long-distance debate on complex issues facing diplomats, and reduced the decision-
making autonomy of Governors-General accustomed to free reign. The passage of the 
Indian Telegraph Act in 1885 is a testament to Britainʼs ability to govern at a distance. 
That document authorized the Viceroy and his government to construct telephone and 
telegraph lines throughout India, regulate service, and punish those who tampered with 
infrastructure or misused equipment. A little more than a quarter-century after the 1857 
rebellion, the Indian Telegraph Act laid out a vision for the telephone and telegraph as 
tools of the British Raj (Indian Parliament, 1885).
" " By the end of the nineteenth century, these changes in communication between 
home and colonies ushered in a new paradigm of immediacy in information about 
overseas British possessions (Nickles, 2003). This led to new forms of long- and short-
term planning, based on real and imagined scenarios, and predicated on the belief that 
telegraphy would overcome the challenges of distance, climate, culture, and finite 
military resources (Lange, 2004). The shipping, rail, and telegraph networks 
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transformed relations between London and colonial offices, allowed for greater 
centralization and coordination in the governance of the British Empire and, for a time, 
heightened Britainʼs control of India.
Second Order Network Formation During the British Raj
" " If the story of first-order network formation in India was one of intentions, the 
story of second order networks was one of surprises. British officials relied on a series 
of communications networks to govern India and extract resources from its hinterland. 
While the networks were formally under British control, colonial officials could not have 
managed shipping, railroads, or telegraphs without significant Indian contributions: the 
ʻBritishʼ networks functioned thanks to the laborers who constructed and maintained the 
networks and the operators who kept the networks functioning. As these networks 
expanded, British officials became dependent on a growing staff of Indians who 
performed the quotidian tasks required to send thousands of messages among military 
and business elites.
" " The expansion of first-order communications networks built by  the British, 
coupled with their increasing use by a wider swath of Indians, led to the formation of 
second order communication networks in India. Growing along with the infrastructural 
networks of rails, wires, routes, hubs and nodes, second order networks developed as a 
result of material conditions and social relationships. Over time, these connections 
among previously disparate people became networks unto themselves. A key factor in 
this development was staffing: the infrastructure and policies were British, but those 
implementing the policies were Indian. Initially, Indian staff were hired to perform menial, 
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repeatable tasks; over time – as a result of network expansion, staffing needs, and the 
British use of merit-based testing – Indian staff took on greater responsibility. Although 
formal and informal barriers limited their progress, in the late 19th century  a generation 
of Indian engineers gradually rose up  the ranks and gained authority over operations. 
Initially  collaborators in British-built and British-run communication networks, Indians 
came to occupy positions of operational control and administrative authority (Headrick, 
1981: 190). 
! ! As these networks expanded across Indiaʼs hinterland, as prices of rail tickets, 
telegrams and postal delivery declined, and as passenger numbers, freight traffic, 
telegrams and postal deliveries increased, the networks lost some of their colonial 
exclusiveness and became more representative of the country in which they existed. 
The Indianization of colonial communication networks created new communicative 
spaces, which in turn allowed for communications across vast distances and 
conversations among Indians of different religions, castes, and geographical origins. On 
board Indian Railways, the division of travel classes resulted in the seclusion of elites in 
first class and the mixing of the multitudes in packed third class compartments. This 
mixing created moving bazaars for merchants to sell their goods, and allowed for the 
informal distribution of goods and ideas to different parts of the country  (Gandhi, 1917; 
Kaul, 2004). Headrick notes that as the networks expanded and economies of scale 
allowed ticket prices to decline, “Indians flooded the cities and places of pilgrimage. 
Those who predicted that Brahmins, Untouchables, and members of other castes would 
refuse to sit together, proved ... to be wrong” (Headrick, 1981: 189). Built to serve the 
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commercial interests of British elites, Indian Railways grew into a quintessentially  Indian 
network of trade and communication (Westwood, 1974: 23, 71).
! ! The telegraph saw a similar process unfold. In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, the growth of the network required an ever-higher number of Indian telegraph 
employees to transmit messages and maintain the infrastructure. Along the wires, local 
operators grew accustomed to dealing with their counterparts in neighboring towns and 
cities. And as the telegraph network became more accessible to Indians, the wires 
became the conduit through which family members communicated important events, 
including births, deaths and marriages. Built as a tool that would provide real-time 
communication to British colonial administrators, the telegraph network evolved into a 
medium that linked Indians to each other.
! ! Britainʼs attempt to unify India with communications technology was an 
ambitious, costly, and labor-intensive undertaking that relied heavily on standardization 
and long-distance exchange of information (Metcalf, 1997: 113-59). Progressive-minded 
network builders believed that the railroad and other communication networks “would 
surely and rapidly  give rise within this empire to the same encouragement of enterprise, 
the same multiplication of produce, the same discovery of latent wealth, and to some 
similar progress in social improvement, that have marked the introduction of improved 
and extended communication in various kingdoms of the Western world” (Davidson, 
1868: 2). To achieve in India what had been achieved with communication networks in 
the West, British planners sought to replicate and standardize technology. These efforts 
ranged from the literal ʻstandard gaugeʼ of the rails to the standardization of the national 
postal rate, employee ranks, uniforms, and equipment used to operate the rail and 
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telegraph networks, and the use of English as the official language of business and 
politics, a British sense of order and structure.14  This was taken to its logical conclusion 
in 1907, when the Viceroy, the Earl of Minto, imposed standard time (GMT +5.5 hours) 
on the whole of India (Lahiri-Choudhury, 2003). Indian Standard Time was Delhi time 
writ national, and provoked protests from the post office, farmers in the far west and 
east, and ordinary citizens (Masselos, 2008).
! As the British government sought more standardized and ʻscientificʼ ways to 
leverage control over the movement of goods, people, and information, India evolved, in 
fits and spurts, toward a unity not imagined or welcomed by Britain. As Indiaʼs 
communication networks linked more and more of the country, the result was not a 
seamless and permanent integration into the British Empire. In 1908 a telegraph strike 
paralyzed the country; this moment is often seen as the starting point for an Indian 
consciousness about communications and control of the countryʼs future (Brown, 2009). 
In that strike, low-level employees (“delivery  peons”) were soon joined by several 
thousand signalers and engineers; telegrams piled up  in Calcutta and some strikers 
fused together wires to disable their use. Moreover, signalers used the wires to send 
press releases to the Statesman, the Bandemataram, and other Indian newspapers. 
Stories about the strike deepened the crisis and directed the newspaper-reading 
publicʼs attention to the newfound capacity of Indian workers to disrupt a British-built 
network. Deep  Kanta Lahiri-Choudhury argues that the strike showed that Indian 
telegraph workers had developed a vision of cooperation that extended well beyond 
their local offices:
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The governmentʼs inability to deal with this shows how startling were the 
methods forged by  the first virtual community  through and because of the 
telegraph, that held the attention of business, state, and media simultaneously. 
An industry-wide strike was achieved involving vertical as well as lateral 
cooperation and the telegraph and media were used to organize strikes at the 
same time in different centers (Lahiri-Choudhury, 2003: 69-70).
In the years to follow, this virtual community would expand and deepen. As Indians 
developed expertise in the construction, operation, and maintenance of existing lines 
and the planning of new ones, Indiaʼs increasingly vocal independence movement 
gained support. A report in 1921 by the colonial government drew attention to an 
“awakening national self-consciousness” felt by  Indians that could increase if Britain did 
not demonstrate better administration of communication networks, which Indians had 
come to see as national possessions (Rao, 1975: 38-39). Linked by a transportation 
network designed to turn India into a more governable colony, India instead became a 
colony increasingly unified in its desire to end British dominance (Thorner, 1955: 210).
" Backers in London often struggled to understand why technology so seemingly 
universal as railroads and telegraph lines could not be made to work the same way in 
India as in Britain. Officials in the colonial offices of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta 
witnessed the ways that British-built networks were being put to use in unintended 
ways: a 1938 survey of 10 000 passengers found that 29% used the rail network for 
pleasure or religious pilgrimage (Ellis, 1939: 792-94; Miller, 2006). On the rails and 
wires that criss-crossed India, similar effects played out: networks initially  intended for 
resource extraction and colonial control evolved into methods by which Indians travelled 
the country, communicated with distant family members, pursued employment 
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opportunities in growing cities, and established new, increasingly  national habits of 
communication (Bear, 2007: 35-62). 
! Increasingly, these practices involved media by Indians, for Indians. And, 
worryingly for the Viceroy, the new media were increasingly organized and led by 
educated Indians who put to use the communication networks that spanned British 
India. The governmentʼs decision to lower telegram rates and the cost of registering 
newspapers created the material conditions in which an independent press could grow. 
Lord Curzonʼs partitioning of Bengal, followed by the telegraph strike of 1908, inspired a 
proliferation of new publications criticizing the Viceroy and his government. Using the 
newspaper The Bengalee, published in Calcutta, the Swadeshi (“our land”) movement 
gained a following across Bengal. From 1915 onward, Mohandas K. Gandhi put the 
British-built railroad and telegraph to masterful use. Gandhi published in English and 
Hindi, and served as editor of several newspapers, including Harijan, Young India, and 
Navajivan (Hofmeyr, 2013). For his efforts, he frequently landed in jail for violating the 
Indian Press Law of 1910, which made it illegal to “bring into hatred or contempt His 
Majesty or the Government or to incite dissatisfaction toward His Majesty  or said 
Government” (Gopal, 1990: 168). Charles Hardinge, Viceroy from 1910-16, vigorously 
enforced The Indian Press Law. By 1919, more than 350 presses and 300 newspapers 
faced fines for publishing content critical of the Viceroy or British rule of India, and some 
200 presses and 130 newspapers were denied the ability to register (Ghose, 1967: 61). 
But these efforts at censorship could not hold catch each offending article in the English, 
Hindi, or other vernacular papers that had formed thanks to the availability  of cheap 
news (the telegraph) and distribution (the railroad). The authors of many popular articles 
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were English-speaking Indians, like Gandhi, who sympathized with those who resisted 
British rule (Headrick, 2010: 61).
! As Indiaʼs resistance movement grew, it took full advantage of Indiaʼs 
communication networks: Gandhi travelled the country extensively, riding in third class 
compartments and using a colonial network as a source of support to end colonial 
control. For a man often hostile to machinery, Gandhi had an unusual affinity for 
networks, especially that of the telephone. His Collected Works contain numerous 
references to the telephone as a useful means of staying in touch with family and 
associates (Gandhi, 1924). Gandhi also stipulated that in his ashram, a telephone 
should be present and located prominently, “outside the office, so that the telephone 
would be accessible even when the office is closed... and the telephone used whenever 
necessary” (Jeffrey  and Doron, 2013: 26-27). This is a remarkable exception for a man 
who once wrote, “I cannot recall a single good point in connection with 
machinery” (Gandhi, 1915: 96; Jeffrey, 2010). Gandhi himself did not make extensive 
use of the telephone, but he did leave room for the device within an ideology that 
otherwise rejected industrial production. Thus one could follow Gandhiʼs preaching of 
austerity and nationalism while enjoying the convenience of a telephone, despite the 
fact that it was a product of the machines Gandhi opposed. Few of Gandhiʼs supporters 
were able to install a telephone as he had done, but many were able to put to use 
Indiaʼs other, larger communication networks. The railroads became both means of 
bringing together independence supporters, and sites of communication for further 
conversion. And the telegraph wires conveyed news about Gandhiʼs speeches at pro-
independence gatherings. Members of Indiaʼs resistance movement mass printed and 
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distributed handbills, leaflets, and posters, in conjunction with mass rallies made 
possible by rail and reported by the telegraph (Patil, 1984: 41-44). Using a sophisticated 
approach that drew on the features of different networks, Indians gained a confidence 
and control over their communication networks. No longer did a set of “accursed wires” 
strangle them; instead, the wires and the rails became tools they could put to use 
against the empire that had constructed them.
 ! The story of second order network formation in India reveals a double-movement 
in empire and communications. Britainʼs imposition of colonial administration and 
construction of long-distance communication networks initially facilitated and deepened 
control of the Indian Empire. This control reached its zenith after Britain used 
transportation and communication technology to remove the remnants of the Mughal 
Empire, consolidate control of the Princely States, and centralize government (first in 
Calcutta, then in Delhi). During the last decades of the 19th century, colonial 
communication networks helped turn a distant and diverse country into a governable 
colony. Over time, these same networks had an unintended unifying function: they 
encouraged Indians to see themselves not as British subjects and not strictly as 
members of a specific ethnicity or region, but as members of a society  that could and 
ought to be an independent nation-state.
Conclusion
! ! In India, the sites, designs, and building materials used in communication 
networks reveal much about the material and symbolic relationship  between Britain and 
India during the 19th century. Britain enjoyed advantages over India in capital, steam 
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power, metallurgy, shipbuilding, and telecommunications, and these material differences 
shaped the ambitions and actions of colonial network builders. The port-centric nature 
of the early rail and telegraph lines is a testament to the commercial ambitions of the 
East India Company and the British government itself. This hub-and-spoke design 
reveals the tools Britain put to use in pursuit of empire expansion: naval supremacy, iron 
hulled steamers for trade, telegraph cables across land and seabeds, and a network of 
garrisons linked by telegraph. These networks and their hubs would become the means 
through which Britain would project control over an entity vastly larger than itself.
! The colonial networks Britain constructed in India followed several patterns in 
their design. The ʻcircuitsʼ of communication – in shipping, rail, and the telegraph – 
prioritized long-distance communication between a relatively  small number of hubs 
where British military and business elites were concentrated. The networks were 
designed to facilitate the extraction of material goods from Indiaʼs hinterland and 
maintain political and military control. To achieve these goals and link India to a wider 
empire, the British constructed the rail and telegraph networks as hierarchical and 
urban-centric: rail and telegraph lines (often on the same rights-of way) radiated inland 
from ports, while undersea cables and shipping routes connected these ports to other 
communicative hubs in the empire. Britainʼs colonial communicative network-building 
was an elite-oriented project; the new lines of communication linked clusters of elites 
within India and connected them to government and commercial offices elsewhere in 
the empire. In India and elsewhere in the empire, British control depended on this series 
of networks.
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! Just as they followed similar patterns in design, the telegraph and rail networks in 
India suffered similar fates. By the 1920s and 1930s, communication networks that at 
first strengthened Britainʼs hold on India had become indispensable carriers of Indian 
commerce and ideas, and had been woven into an identity  that Indians were 
increasingly eager to shape themselves, without British control. After a century of 
network expansion, the story of British communication networks was one not of 
perpetual dominance or the irreversibility of colonial infrastructure, but of the limits of 
communication technology as a tool of empire.
! In our efforts to understand this evolution in Indiaʼs colonial communication 
networks, the theory and framework of Castells is helpful. This first part of the chapter 
has analyzed three integrated networks (shipping, rail, and telegraph) using Castellsʼ 
notion of the space of flows. By examining their circuits of communication, organization 
of hubs, and spatial distribution of elites, we gain a new understanding of how these 
networks functioned and of the limits of Britainʼs capabilities in communication 
technology. If the power of British imperialism came in material form, the counter-power 
of Indian resistance came in cultural adoption. As Indiaʼs colonial communications 
networks grew, they took on cultural characteristics of the host country: they transported 
its people and goods, circulated its ideas and languages, and became the conduits for 




Independence, a National Telephone Network, 
and the Origins of Indiaʼs Mobile Revolution (1947-1989)
! ! This second part of Indiaʼs communications history narrows the discussion from 
Indiaʼs colonial networks (shipping, railroads, and the telegraph) to a single network: 
that of the telephone. It covers the period from independence in 1947 to the end of the 
Rajiv  Gandhi era in 1990. In many respects this was an interlude between the massive 
periods of network construction that took place during British control, and from the 
1990s onward.
! ! During this interlude, the Indian government consolidated statist control of the 
telephone network and established large institutions to manage it, but did little to 
expand the network, improve service or prioritize telephony as part of post-colonial 
statecraft. Instead, for four decades the telephone network was held back by  a 
corporatist approach to economic and social development that kept telephones scarce 
and unreliable. National policies favored the poor and unions, discouraged luxury goods 
(including the telephone), curtailed imports of foreign electronics. In its telephone policy, 
the Indian government concentrated planning, operation, maintenance, and regulation 
in the Department of Telecommunications.
! ! Toward the end of this period, India saw the initial stirrings of the mobile 
revolution that would happen in the 1990s. During the last mandate (1980-84) of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, the government faced a crisis of state control and growing 
demands for improvements in science and technology. In response, it promoted a 
techno-populist discourse, which gained many followers during the single term of Rajiv 
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Gandhi (1984-89. His government made telecommunications one of six mission areas 
in science and technology, and promoted developments in computing and connectivity.
! ! In my exploration of this historical interlude, I identify two phases. During the first 
phase, excessive and low-quality statism hindered Indiaʼs development of a national 
telephone network. The corporatism of the DoT limited expansion of Indiaʼs telephone 
circuitry and prevented qualitative improvements in network technology. Similarly, for the 
first 20 years of independence, India maintained a stagnant network structure with a 
closely  bound set of hubs and nodes and a tight geographical concentration of elites in 
a single all-purpose department. A second phase began with the unexpected arrival of 
Rajiv  Gandhi as Prime Minister in 1984. In hindsight, we can see that the Rajiv era 
inspired some of the technical and political developments that needed to occur for the 
reforms of the 1990s to be possible. Two major parts of this development were the 
division of the Post and Telecom monopoly and the encouragement of new 
telecommunications nodes and growth of telecommunications elites beyond Delhi.
Independence and Indiaʼs Telephone Network
! ! Following Indiaʼs independence in 1947, the government of Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru sought to impose socialist policies on the British-built communication 
networks that the country inherited. Strongly influenced by Nehruʼs emphasis on 
collective interests before personal profit, and by Gandhiʼs vision of swaraj (self rule/self 
reliance), national telecommunications policies excluded private and foreign operators 
and sought to Indianize the colonial infrastructure the state had taken over from the 
departing British.15  Nehru and Gandhi differed in their beliefs about how to achieve 
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modernization, but they shared a belief that India could chart its own path and be 
“modern without being Western” (Prakash, 1999: 231). At the time, many policymakers 
believed that directing funds toward landline expansion would upset the drive for social 
equity and foster resentment. When India gained independence, the new country had 
fewer than 100 000 telephones, 321 telephone exchanges (concentrated in five cities), 
and 338 long-distance public call offices for a population of more than 300 million 
people (Government of India, 1987: 2). In a country  of few telephone connections, 
public call offices (phone booths shared by a neighborhood) provided connectivity  and 
social interaction in cities and towns across India. The DoT gave public call office 
licenses to discharged soldiers, who built other businesses (often fruit or vegetable 
stands) around them. By combining the connectivity they offered with other, seemingly 
unrelated business, licensees gained regular customers and turned their businesses 
into social meeting points. Despite the success of public call offices, Indian telephone 
network development was hampered by several factors: Unlike certain unions and 
heavy industries, telephony lacked a champion who could inspire greater investment in 
the network. There was little money, public or private, invested in telephone R&D. And 
from independence until the 1980s, government policy treated telephones as a luxury; 
when confronted with criticism about the quality of service, officials from the DoT stated 
that “subscribers should return their telephones if they  did not think their service was 
satisfactory” (McDowell,1997: 134).
! ! The telecommunications bureaucracy  did not connect many Indians by 
telephone, but it created manufacturing jobs in disadvantaged areas and offered the 
national government a steady  source of revenue. The DoT imported (and later built its 
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own) switchboards, manufactured and owned telephones (which it rented to the public), 
built and maintained telephone lines, provided connectivity, administered wait lists, 
regulated the industry (which was largely an exercise in self regulation), planned future 
development, and offered advice to the government on the role telecommunications 
should play in Indian society. As Paula Chakravartty notes, “the state served the public 
interest by ... using profits from telecommunications services to cover the basic 
operation of the labour-intensive postal sector, which was seen as a more basic 
developmental priority” (Chakravartty, 2004: 232-33). In this developmental context, the 
Department of Telecommunications formed a key part of the corporatist state that 
dominated Indiaʼs economy during the first four decades of independence.16  Though it 
was the source of many jobs, the telephone network lagged behind other national 
communication networks. As Subramanian states:
During the years of the ... monopoly, rural telecommunications infrastructure 
underwent a benign neglect. There was no shortage of lip service provided by 
politicians who clearly  saw  the potential of telecommunications to national, 
especially  the development of Indiaʼs nearly  600,000 villages, where 70% of the 
population lived. But real developments were woefully  short in coming 
(Subramanian,  2008: 36).
For the first two decades after independence, Indiaʼs telephone network remained tiny 
compared with the large and still-growing post and telegraph networks. Although it is 
difficult to make a straightforward volume-based comparison among these networks, a 
few numbers are suggestive. In 1964, the year of Nehruʼs death, Indian Posts and 
Telegraphs maintained nearly  90 000 offices and carried nearly  5 billion items in the 
mail – ten items per Indian citizen. That same year, Indian Railways carried an average 
of 500 000 passengers per day. Meanwhile, the telephone network included fewer than 
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600 000 phones – one per 800 citizens (Government of India, 1964: 307, 329, 332). 
Moreover, the telephone network was more geographically concentrated than the rail or 
telegraph network. The relatively few telephone exchanges that did exist connected 
wealthy urban users, with 90% of the phones in the hands of 10% of the population. 
From the 1960s through the 1970s, the telephone network remained severely limited. In 
1980, when Indira Gandhi began what would be her final term, vast swaths of the 
country remained excluded from phone service and fewer than 1% of Indiaʼs villages 
had even a single telephone. The rural areas where service did exist tended to be 
relatively close to urban areas and near a major trunk line; in such places, a public 
phone might exist in the main bazaar or railroad station (Ravi, 1994).
" India was hardly alone in this approach or in its consequences for network 
growth and performance; indeed it was one of many low-income former colonies with 
poor telephony in the early 1980s, promoting the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) to appoint the Maitland Commission with a mandate to study and 
recommend policy options. The Commissionʼs report, published in 1984, identified the 
tendency of low-income and (especially) newly-independent countries to pursue a statist 
developmental agenda in pursuit of social objectives, at times to the detriment of greater 
efficiency and commercial possibilities in telephony (International Telecommunications 
Union, 1985: 37-42). The Commissionʼs report went beyond merely describing a well-
known problem; it provided a multifaceted prescription for network development. It 
made the case for structural reform public telephone monopolies. It called for R&D 
focused on the requirements (often environmental and climactic) specific to low-income 
countries, emphasizing the need for indigenously produced technology. In doing so it 
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identified India and a handful of other “special cases” with the potential to create 
telecommunications research institutes and achieve excellence in manufacturing 
equipment. The report stated that in Indiaʼs case, the potential use of telephony  was 
illustrated by the measured benefits enjoyed by those few who had access to telephony: 
in villages, the economic return on long distance public telephones had been five times 
the cost of the call, even taking into account the time lost from work and bus fare to the 
calling booth (International Telecommunications Union, 1985: 9). The Maitland report 
argued that if India made telephone connectivity a higher priority, it would enjoy 
significant economic and social development far greater than the cost of network 
expansion. For scholars seeking to understand the deficiencies – as well as the 
possibilities – of telephone networks in India in the early 1980s, the Maitland 
Commissionʼs report is useful reading. For those who, at the time, were frustrated by 
Indiaʼs failure to move beyond legacy systems and legislation, the report provided 
institutional legitimacy for policy changes and new network growth.
" In the early 1980s, India lagged behind other low-income countries in key 
indicators of development in telephony. In a country with nearly 700 million people, 
slightly  more than two million phone lines existed in total. The national tele-density 
rate17  of 0.3% placed India below most other low-income countries across Asia and 
Africa (Panagariya, 2008: 372). In vast swaths of rural India, telephone service was 
non-existent, since it had not expanded beyond business and governmental elites in 
urban centers. Indiaʼs ʻnationalʼ telephone network could more accurately be described 
as a handful of localized networks largely disconnected from each other. Many rural 
Indians lived far from trunk lines; others lacked the right connections to move up  the 
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long wait lists; and even among wealthy consumers, service was spotty even for those 
lucky enough to own a phone. While much of the developing world had pursued 
telephone reform with capital investment and network expansion, India remained 
wedded to a set of policies decades past their effectiveness. Customers faced long and 
preferential waiting lists for equipment, poor service quality, and a severely limited 
network (Athreya, 1996: 11-13; Jeffrey and Doron, 2013: 32-37).
! While the number of connected telephones grew slowly, the bureaucracy  serving 
them expanded significantly. The DoT contained a uniquely Indian “Brahmanic 
socialism,” with senior officials drawn from the high castes and a large number of lower 
positions reserved for marginalized castes, religious minorities, and tribal groups 
(Bardhan, 1984: 58). This created a bottom-heavy organization and a sharp  divide 
between the high administrators and engineers, and the low operators, mechanics, 
casual laborers, and office assistants. The governmentʼs neglect of connectivity in favor 
of employment led to a dysfunctional bureaucracy and low public esteem of the DoT 
(Desai, 2006: 37-41). Gurchuran Das described service quality  and official attitudes 
toward telephone availability as follows:
The telephones that existed were not dependable – it was rare to get a number 
on the first attempt. The employees of the telephone department were arrogant 
and corrupt. If the lines were down, it could take months to fix unless one bribed 
the linesmen. When an MP complained in Parliament of these breakdowns ... 
Mrs. Gandhiʼs communications minister replied that telephones were a luxury, not 
a right, and that ... there was an eight-year waiting list for this ʻbroken-down 
productʼ (Das, 2000: 208).
During her 1980-84 mandate, a mix of economic and political pressure led Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi to make major changes in telephone policy. The 1980 election of 
Ronald Reagan was followed soon after by declining aid from the US to India. This 
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exacerbated other problems India faced (a gas crisis and balance of payments). At the 
same time, the government endured growing criticism of telephone connectivity and 
service. With an eye toward technological development and the middle class voters who 
had become frustrated with the economic nationalism that had dominated since 
independence, Gandhi relaxed import restrictions on communications equipment, 
expanded the national television network, and deregulated the advertising industry.18  In 
1981 she appointed the Sarin Committee with a mandate to assess Indiaʼs telephone 
management. Its key recommendations – splitting the Post and Telegraph Department 
into two autonomous units, and allowing greater imports of telephone equipment – 
faced bureaucratic resistance; not until 1985/86 did these changes take place in 
practice. The reorganization of the DoT in 1986 led to national telecommunications 
being divided into three parts. The newly-created state-owned Mahanagar Telephone 
Nigam Limited (MTNL) managed phone service in Delhi and Bombay; elsewhere in 
India, the DoT retained control of service; and the newly-created Videsh Sanchar Nigam 
Limited (VSNL) handled all international calling (Nair, 2002). While at times half-hearted 
and subject to political calculations, the reforms of Indira Gandhiʼs 1980-84 government 
helped shed some of the protectionist impulses that had been the norm under Nehru 
and during most of Indira Gandhiʼs time in office (Athreya, 1996: 11-13).
" At the same time, her government created the Center for Development of 
Telematics (C-DoT) to develop  indigenous technologies and private manufacturing of 
customer premise equipment. A major aim was to build small rural exchanges and 
improve tele-density levels in the vast and under-serviced rural parts of India. Its 
immediate goals were to develop a small rugged switch that would work in Indiaʼs 
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tropical heat, and an advanced large switch capable of handling 40 000 lines. The high 
quality  and low cost of switches helped them proliferate in villages throughout the late 
1980s (Government of India, Centre for Development of Telematics, 2013a, 2013b and 
2013c). Certainly India had a problem with scarcity  of telephone equipment in the 1980s 
and the C-DoT provided some relief as the decade drew to a close. But taking the long 
view, the benefits of the C-DoT reach beyond this narrow mandate. Indiaʼs 
telecommunications and computing sectors reduced their dependency on imported 
equipment and established new technological confidence (Meemamsi, 1993; Singh 
1999).
The Origins of Indiaʼs Mobile Revolution
" " From his start as Prime Minister in 1984, Rajiv  Gandhi made telecommunications 
development a very  public priority. Prior to his entry  into politics, he had worked as a 
pilot for Indian Airlines; thus when he came to office, he had an unusually keen 
understanding of communication networks, as well as acute knowledge of Indiaʼs 
position as a telephone laggard. The younger Gandhi deregulated the computer 
industry and created a Software Technology Park in Bangalore to encourage the 
development of an export-oriented software industry. During the Rajiv years, television 
penetration quadrupled to more than 200 million, and the government promoted the 
idea that India could engage in “leapfrog” development, skipping stages in industrial 
development on the way to an information revolution. Crucially, telephony was 
rededicated from a luxury to a national priority, and included as one of six science and 
technology “mission” areas for the government (Sharma, 2009).
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! In 1984 Sam Pitroda, a non-resident Indian businessman who had enjoyed 
success in US telephony and computing, returned to India and quickly became a major 
player in the countryʼs burgeoning IT sector (Chhaya, 1992: 105-53). Pitroda became a 
close associate of Rajiv Gandhi; placed in charge of the Telecom Mission, Pitroda 
sought to improve quality of service in urban areas, extend connections in rural areas, 
and computerize government agencies. In his words, government policy took the view 
that telecommunications “played an indispensable role in promoting openness, 
accessibility, accountability, connectivity, democracy, and decentralization – all the ʻsoftʼ 
qualities so essential to effective social, economic, and political development” (Pitroda, 
1993: 68). Pitroda championed a techno-populism that sought to use communication 
networks to empower the poor and enrich the countryʼs democracy: “as a great social 
leveler, information technology ranks second only to death. It can raze cultural barriers, 
overwhelm economic inequalities, even compensate for intellectual disparities. In short, 
high technology can put unequal human beings on an equal footing, and that makes it 
the most potent democratizing tool ever devised” (Pitroda, 1993: 66). 
! Despite the rhetoric of telephony being a developmental priority aimed at the 
poor, in practice government policies served narrow swath of Indians in the middle-class 
(and above) who wanted telephony for business purposes.19  Advertisements for Indian 
telephone service promoted the device as an accessory for a high-income, upper-caste 
lifestyle (Saxena, 2009: 26). Some critics pointed out that, despite the good intentions of 
this statist agenda, the discourse of “taking technology to the people” reflected an older 
elite bias that “had little or no contact with the basic social reality that constitutes 
India” (Kothari, 1989: 12-17). What Rajiv Gandhi, Sam Pitroda and their allies saw as 
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the future of India, opposition parties and traditionalists dismissed as a “yuppie 
fascination with technology” (Bhagwati, 1993: 97).
! To pursue the goals identified by the Telecom Mission, Rajiv  Gandhiʼs 
government made two major steps (Athreya, 1996; Chowdary, 1998). The first was in 
provision of equipment. In 1985 the government allowed private firms to manufacture 
and sell phones across the country, and initiated a scheme to have entrepreneurs 
manage for-profit STD20 booths with equipment supplied by the DoT and profits divided 
between entrepreneurs and the DoT (Mody, 1995; Panagariya, 2008: 373). STD booths 
proliferated across the country, offering customers more reliable service that had been 
the case under the old public call offices managed by the Post and Telegraph 
Department. The governmentʼs attention to the problem of equipment scarcity led to the 
early entry of private players at local levels of telephone management. This had an 
expansionary effect, providing many villages with a cheaper and better connectivity, and 
many others with their introduction to telephony. The governmentʼs second major step 
came in mobile technology. The impetus had initially come from the DoT, which in 1987 
announced efforts to create a cellular network in Bombay. The network would have 
been managed collaboratively by the Swedish equipment manufacturer Ericsson and 
the DoT, giving the former a small but certain-to-grow market and the latter a golden 
opportunity to develop  new capacities in telephone organization and technology. But it 
faced opposition from some key players (especially  Pitroda) and was killed by  politics 
(Chakravartty, 2004: 243).
! The technological enthusiasm that pervaded Rajiv Gandhiʼs government lent 
itself to ambitious national telecommunications policies. The government was effective 
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in laying an economic and (to a lesser extent) political foundation for success in building 
telephone networks, though India remained some distance from the goals set by Sam 
Pitroda and other proponents of leapfrogging. The growth rate for telephony remained 
above the 7% mark throughout the 1980s, but India still struggled to connect many of its 
citizens; at decadeʼs end, barely five million phones existed in India, of which more than 
three million were considered ʻoutdated instruments.ʼ Meanwhile, the waiting list for 
telephone connections was still four times the supply  of installed lines (Panagariya, 
2008: 372). While the national government spoke increasingly about improvements in 
communications taking hold, it struggled to link the country by telephone.
# In the late 1980s, several factors stood in the way of efforts to expand Indiaʼs 
telephone networks. First, economic rent-seeking by  the DoT resulted in a telephone 
bureaucracy that paid more than 300 000 workers but allocated little funding for network 
expansion (Mukherji, 2008). During Rajiv  Gandhiʼs government, Sam Pitroda promised 
to increase the rate of telephone ownership  without increasing the already-large 
bureaucracy. The question of affirmative action remained ever-present and the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continued to be hostile to the techno-populism of Rajiv 
Gandhiʼs Congress Party (Lakha, 2002). When a BJP-led coalition came to power in 
1989, the new Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, attempted to pass recommendations from the 
Mandal Commission that would have allocated 50% of positions to religious minorities 
and lower-caste groups. Hoping to maintain their influence in the new government, top 
officials in the DoT firmly supported these measures (Government of India, 1990). 
Second, Indiaʼs policy  framework contained a legal bias toward the status quo, with no 
provision for new entrants or an independent regulator to check the power of the DoT. 
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Policy analyst Bella Mody writes that, as in many Third World countries, India had “no 
disinterested non-governmental organizations to advise ... on telecommunication 
technology” (Mody et al., 1993: 270). The DoT owned the networks and equipment, 
provided service, regulated that service, and provided (often self-serving) 
recommendations to the government.
! The power of the legacy provider resulted in limited growth: With the entire 
network in the hands of the Department of Telecommunications, small private entrants 
were forced to connect to the DoT network, thus reinforcing its power. The DoT took 
advantage of its continued monopoly  on long-distance telephony, using profits from 
long-distance calling to subsidize losses it incurred from domestic calls, for which it kept 
rates low to fend off rivals (Mukherji, 2008). Despite efforts to limit the power of the DoT 
and encourage new entrants into the market, in the late 1980s Indiaʼs telephone 
network struggled amid corporatist politics, vested interests, and bureaucratic inertia. 
Symptomatic of these forces was Swamyʼs Treatise on Telephone Rules, the official 
guide to Indiaʼs telephone monopoly. The 1989 edition included more than 700 pages of 
bureaucratic rules and procedures pertaining to the acquisition, operation and 
maintenance of a government-owned telephone (Muthuswarmy and Brinda, 1989).
! ! The post-independence struggles over Indiaʼs telecommunication networks have 
implications for our theoretical understanding of the country and its network 
development. As the 1990s approached, Indiaʼs communication networks had shed their 
colonial identity  and become national networks, as well as symbols of the capacity and 
limitations of independent India. Although the material legacy of the British-built circuits 
endured, four decades of post-colonial policy and use had transformed British-built 
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networks into essential features of independent Indiaʼs communications. Major and 
secondary cities continued to enjoy privileged positions as hubs in the networks, and 
while the vast majority of Indians continued to live in rural areas, urban India remained 
disproportionately  connected via rail, telegraph, and telephone. While the Nehru and 
Gandhi governments sought to impose new nationalism and ideology on Indiaʼs 
communication networks, what emerged was a consolidation of certain features of 
colonial network architecture (port- and city-centric, resource-oriented, class-
dependent), albeit with new and distinctly Indian meanings. Four decades after 
independence, the spatial organization of managerial elites remained fairly constant (in 
government offices and some of the same neighborhoods vacated by the departing 
British), but the country had a new set of elites, including government ministers and 
industrialists. This new generation of elites enjoyed many of the same benefits British 
colonial officials had formerly  enjoyed: differential access to transportation and 
communication networks, pricing that favored their geographic locales and industries, 
and a built-in hierarchy that limited prospects for lower-class advancement. For the 
masters of Indiaʼs telephone network, the late 1980s were a comfortable time; in the 




Liberalization and National Mobile Networks
(1990-present)
! ! Indiaʼs telephone networks became the source of controversy and contentious 
debate in the 1990s. When the decade began, few policymakers, bureaucrats, 
observers, users or would-be users languishing on the long wait-list could imagine the 
scale of change that would unfold in the years to come. Between 1991 and 1999, Indian 
telephony would experience a policy overhaul, the formation of new institutions, bitter 
disputes in court, massive construction of infrastructure, and rapid expansion of new 
mobile phone networks across the country. Initially  forced (by external economic events) 
to accept the liberalization of its telephone sector, the government underwent a 
philosophical shift on the significance of telephony. As a result of this shift, a series of 
governments (led by three different political parties) implemented sweeping changes in 
telephone policy, with new goals of economic and social development.
! ! This third and final part of Indiaʼs telephone history describes these changes and 
analyses them using Manuel Castellsʼ space of flows theory. It begins by chronicling the 
events in 1991 that forced Indiaʼs government to open up the telephone sector. It then 
identifies the mix of continuity  and change that characterized Indiaʼs circuits of 
telephony, the hubs and nodes on the network, and the spatial organization of 
managerial elites who at times collaborated and at other times battled for control of the 
network. In this part, I make four main arguments: First, that although Indiaʼs mobile 
network could have developed as a result of efforts made during the Rajiv Gandhi era, it 
was economic forces (and an external institutional push) that forced the Indian 
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government to adopt a new philosophy of telephony. Second, that after a messy early 
period of private-sector inclusion and growth, India gained a more diverse set of 
communications circuitry, hubs and elites. Third, that this network expansion should be 
seen as a second great wave of communication network growth in Indiaʼs history, 
perhaps even greater that of the countryʼs colonial period. And last, that the growth in 
Indiaʼs telephone network has inspired a set of foreseen and unforeseen behaviors by 
several hundred million users.
Crisis and Change in Indian Policymaking
" In the early  summer of 1991, a series of major political and economic events 
fundamentally  altered Indiaʼs governance of telephony. In May, former Prime Minister 
Rajiv  Gandhi, who had been ousted from office two years earlier, was assassinated by a 
suicide bomber during an election rally. The Congress Party quickly  chose Narasimha 
Rao as replacement leader; he won the election several weeks later. When Rao took 
office, he faced an acute economic crisis. Several years of fiscal deficits increased the 
Indian governmentʼs cost of borrowing, and the shock of high oil prices from the Gulf 
War led to a sharp  devaluation of the Indian Rupee and depleted most of the countryʼs 
foreign exchange reserves.21  With three weeks of cash reserves remaining, the new 
government approached the International Monetary Fund for assistance. Although the 
crisis had not been caused by Indiaʼs tight regulatory structure (the famous ʻLicense 
Rajʼ), as part of its International Monetary Fund bailout the Indian government was 
nevertheless forced to make sweeping changes in how it managed several sectors, 
including telecommunications (Desai, 2006: 45-47; Sinha, 2001). Prime Minister Rao 
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appointed Manmohan Singh, a respected economist, as Finance Minister and gave him 
the task of liberalizing Indiaʼs economy.
" The Rao governmentʼs commitment to liberalization extended far beyond the 
resolution of the crisis. When the Athreya Committee published a series of pro-market 
recommendations, the Department of Telecommunication dismissed them as 
interference from foreign consultants (Desai, 2006: 45-46; Athreya, 1991). But the new 
government found much it liked in the Committeeʼs recommendations. In 1994 the Rao 
government emphasized private sector involvement in telephony as part of its much-
vaunted New Economic Policy. In this policy and in reforms focused on telephony, a 
pattern emerged: the Prime Ministerʼs Office and the Ministry of Finance pushed for 
reform, while the Department of Telecommunications largely resisted change in policy. 
The decision to invite private participation in mobile networks had the effect of 
rewarding first movers, since until that point the major government players had made 
mostly  perfunctory gestures toward mobile communications (Mukherji, 2009). The 
government had allowed foreign firms collaborating on telephone projects to hold 51% 
equity stakes. While the government was successful in attracting the interest of private 
operators, the sector needed more than just new players; it required a new policy 
framework (Desai, 2006: 48-50; Mani, 2012). 
" In 1994 the Rao government announced its plans to pass new legislation to 
enlarge and enhance telephone service. The National Telecom Policy (NTP 94), which 
laid out a vision of vastly improved telephony for the country. Key objectives included 
making telephones available on demand (instead of placing would-be users on waiting 
lists), redoubling efforts to make India a major manufacturing base for telephone 
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equipment, establishing telephone connections to all villages, and providing higher 
quality  service at low prices (Indian Parliament, 1994). NTP 94 set specific targets for 
the provision of public phones, telephone connections to villages, and total telephone 
lines in the country. It also set forth the broad goals of providing “world standard” service 
with the “widest possible range” of telephony options to users in urban and rural areas.22 
The policy allowed new entrants to provide basic mobile telephone services as 
supplements to the DoT, while maintaining the DoTʼs privileged status as sole provider 
of long distance service (Hossain, 1998: 213-23).
" NTP 94 acknowledged that government alone could not meet key targets, and 
explicitly recognized that private investment and private sector involvement would need 
to play a new and significant role.23  Private sector participation took place first in value 
added services such as paging and cellular services, and then in landlines. The DoT 
kept its monopoly in landline service and let new private entrants compete for the 
uncertain mobile service market. The government held a competitive bidding process 
and issued licenses to private operators in the four metros (Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, 
and Madras) as well as in all states (Desai, 2006: 47-49). The bidding process began in 
1992 and became a protracted struggle. As the incumbent in the market, the DoT had 
an interest in delaying the arrival of private operators and in hindering their ability to 
succeed. The licensing process was challenged in court after it became apparent that 
the DoT had used hidden criteria to select bidding firms. A 1994 court ruling found in 
favor of the DoT, on the grounds that no existing piece of legislation prohibited such a 
move (Supreme Court of India, 1994: 4947-50). The DoT selected the winning bids, and 
in the summer of 1995 cellular service began in the four metro circles; three years later, 
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nearly  all cellular operators given licenses had begun operations. Basic services in 
landlines took longer, because unlike in mobile markets, the landline market had been 
under government control and the DoT had much to lose if it faced competition.
! The initial reforms (1991-1995) had taken place under a government led by the 
Congress Party, which had historically resisted free trade and private sector involvement 
in telecommunications. When the more free market-oriented Bharatiya Janata Party 
formed a government from 1998 onwards,24  telecommunications liberalization ranked 
high on the government agenda. The governmentʼs creation of a high level committee to 
develop internet services led to an expanded set of responsibilities for the committee: 
within a year it had initiated what would become an even larger and more sophisticated 
series of reforms in telecommunications policy. In 1999 the Vajpayee government 
announced the New Telecom Policy  (NTP 99). NTP 99 was an attempt to rectify some 
of the problems in NTP 94 and take a large step to improve Indiaʼs still-lagging tele-
density.25  The earlier policy had acknowledged the need for greater private sector 
participation, but much implementation was delayed due to policy missteps (pricing the 
licenses beyond the level of revenues private mobile operators could expect) or political 
wrangling. It removed some of the small, costly  details left in NTP 94, such as the 
provision that the last mile linkage be composed of copper (Singh et al., 2000: 7). The 
last mile of expansion presents a major opportunity for unions and, in this instance, 
construction firms (who earned a higher profit on copper than on alternative metals). 
The last mile is a particular challenge in India, due to the low purchasing power of 
Indiaʼs rural poor and a corresponding lack of return on investment in rural network 
expansion.26
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! NTP 99 was more than just a policy do-over; it was a genuinely new and more 
wide-ranging policy document. It sped up competition in data and domestic long 
distance. It emphasized the role of R&D in developing world-class equipment 
manufacturing. It clarified rules on the number of licenses an operator could hold at any 
time. It opened up  voice and data service to 100% foreign ownership. Perhaps most 
noteworthy about NTP 99 over NTP 94 is the long-range nature of its provisions. It 
proposed uniform 20-year licenses for both basic and mobile services, with extensions 
of five years (initially) extending to ten years. It emphasized the need for modern, 
efficient infrastructure and considered the challenges and opportunities of convergence 
in IT, media, telephony, and consumer electronics. It also set out a vision on a range of 
related issues including standardization, training and HR development, and disaster 
management (Indian Parliament, 1999). An important step in NTP 99 was a new 
national revenue sharing regime. Under this regime, all mobile service providers pay a 
small up-front fee upon entry  to the market, and from that point forward they pay a 
percentage of their revenues to the government. NTP 99 recognized the problems of 
high fees and overly  optimistic revenue estimates for mobile operators, and the resulting 
debt crisis some faced after a few years of operation. To lessen their debt burden and 
make them more competitive, existing mobile operators were allowed to pay a fixed 
sum to the government, and were then switched to the new revenue sharing model 
(Government of India, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2013a; 
Jain, 2001).
! The implementation of NTP 99 ended a transformative decade in Indian 
policymaking in telecommunications. Just as striking as the policy changes themselves 
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are the changing reasons for this transformation. In 1991, the Indian government was 
forced – by  economic circumstances and by the conditions of its IMF bailout – to adopt 
a new philosophy of governance in telecommunications.27 By 1999, the government had 
moved from reactive to deliberate liberalization of its telecommunications. During this 
crucial decade, a series of governments (led by three different political parties) 
implemented increasingly ambitious policy, with far-reaching goals. These included 
connectivity and economic/social development, integrating India into the global 
information society, and making the transition from an agrarian and largely rural 
economy to industrial and service economy centered in increasingly connected cities.28 
In the early  1990s, the question of liberalization provoked bitter disagreement among 
players in the telephone sector, since many elites felt that they had much to lose and 
little to gain from a transformation of Indian telephone policy. By the decadeʼs end, at 
the level of elite policymakers, something approaching a consensus had emerged: India 
would need to leave behind its corporatist past in telephony and embrace a new model 
of network development.
Circuits of Mobile Communication Networks in India
" " In the years since NTP 99, Indiaʼs circuits of telephony have grown in spectacular 
fashion. Figure 4.1 shows that, even in a country with a large population and high 
growth rate, mobile phone networks have spread with remarkable speed since the 
reforms of the 1990s.
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Figure 4.1: Telephone Adoption in India
Year Indian Population Telephones in Use Teledensity
(phones per 100 citizens)
1947 340 000 000 100 000 0.029
1964 464 000 000 580 000 0.125
1984 728 000 000 2 600 000 0.357
1991 842 000 000 5 100 000 0.606
2001 1 036 000 000 37 000 000 3.571
2011 1 240 000 000 900 500 000 72.581
2013 1 270 000 000 1 048 000 000 82.520
Sources: Statistical Outline of India (Mumbai: Tata Services); India: A Reference Annual (New Delhi: 
Publications Division), 1947-present; Cellular Operators Association of India, National Telecom Statistics, 
from the COAI website, 2005-present; Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India, Telecom 
Subscription Data, from the TRAI website, 2011-present.
In addition to the number of phones in use, other statistics give a similar sense of the 
countryʼs network expansion. Today, India has more than 400 000 cellular towers dotting 
the landscape; by comparison, the United States has roughly half as many towers 
covering a much larger geographical expanse (Steel in the Air, 2013). From humble 
infrastructural beginnings, Indiaʼs telephone network has grown into a massive web  of 
circuitry stretching across the country.
" In the early  1990s, India had a significant (and old) telegraph network, but very 
limited and localized telephone networks, managed exclusively by  the government-run 
DoT. Given the governmentʼs tight financial position and the scale of the efforts 
necessary to liberalize telephony, the policy reforms emphasized the need for private 
sector involvement (Indian Parliament, 1999: 2).29  To construct a national telephone 
network, India needed towers, cables, switches, exchanges, satellites and other 
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network infrastructure (Jeffrey and Doron, 2013: 35). Even after the Indian government 
had recovered from the 1991 crisis, it did not have the capital to build this network 
infrastructure. In addition to this shortage of fiscal capital, the government also 
recognized its limits in human capital. Although the DoT had some 300 000 employees 
in its payroll, it did not contain the specialized workforce necessary  to expand and 
manage the network (Samtani, interview 2013). More than financial or human capital, 
India needed new institutions. Initially, DoT executives resisted the governmentʼs efforts 
to divide the DoT into separate organizations for policymaking and the provision of 
telephone service. To protest the planned division of the DoT into two parts, in 
September 2000 more than 300 000 workers, represented by the National Federation of 
Telecom Employees (NFTE) and the Federation of National Telecom Organization 
(FNTO), went on strike, paralyzing Indiaʼs IT sector. After receiving reassurances from 
Prime Minister Vajpayee that their jobs would remain secure after the split, the two 
unions called off the strike (Donald, 2000). In October 2000, the government created a 
new arms-length institution (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, or BSNL) to take control of 
the DoTʼs telephone service.
" " The expansion of Indiaʼs circuits of telephony required not just new actors and 
institutions, but also an entirely new political economy. To regulate the sector and raise 
capital, the DoT established a licensing model. With each new standard in mobile phone 
technology, the DoT held a series of sales of licenses and spectrum. The early years of 
private sector involvement involved considerable uncertainty  over the economic value of 
the networks and how much companies should be asked to pay for licenses and 
spectrum. To regulate a market composed of multiple players, the DoT divided the 
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country into 20 licensing ʻcirclesʼ of different shapes, sizes, and populations; in 1994 the 
Indian government opened bidding for licenses in each circle, with service to commence 
in the summer of 1995 (Panagariya, 2008: 374-77). The results were messy: some 
license circles received a high number of bids while others received none, some firms 
won rights to more circles than they were capable of serving, and some losing firms 
complained of preferential treatment during the bidding process.30  Initially, the private 
service providers paid high prices for licenses and spectrum on the assumption that 
they would be able to swiftly amortize their investments and take advantage of a rapidly 
growing national mobile network. During 1995-98 it became clear that these companies 
would not be able to reach their revenue targets and, as a result, several new entrants 
found themselves with unsustainable debt levels (Desai, 2006: 56).
# # Creating a new political economy was easier said than done, and several factors 
led to a dysfunctional arrangement in the late 1990s. The first factor was the hostile 
relationship  that quickly developed between private firms and the DoT. After decades as 
an unchallenged monopoly, the DoT faced direct competition from new entrants who 
had none of the legacy costs (in infrastructure and personnel) left to the DoT. To protect 
itself, the DoT attempted to retain control of the more profitable elements of the 
telephone market, including international calling, and limit the profitability of new 
entrants, by  forcing private companies to use the legacy network and charging 
interconnection fees (Kathuria, 2000; Panagariya, 2008: 375-76). The second factor 
causing a dysfunctional political economy was the unclear power dynamic that 
developed between the DoT and the newly formed regulator, the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). Accustomed to providing service and regulating the 
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sector, the DoT saw its own role as different from that of the new entrants, who were – 
according to DoT thinking – businesses that needed to be kept in line. Initially the 
TRAIʼs mandate did not give it authority over the DoT: when the TRAI ruled against the 
DoT, the latter would invariably appeal to the Delhi High Court, which would invariably 
side with the DoT on the grounds that the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 did not allow an 
independent regulator to supersede the license-granting authority of the DoT. Private 
service providers resented what they saw as a regulator that could not regulate the 
then-largest player in Indian telephony. These issues created a lack of clarity  on 
regulation and enforcement: private firms did not know to what extent the new regulator 
had the ability to curtail the DoTʼs power or prevent it from trying to render the new 
entrants unprofitable. In a sign of things to come, this uncertainty, combined with rapid 
growth in users and network density, produced significant instability  in the mobile 
telephone market.
" To reduce the uncertainty surrounding the new regulatory agencyʼs power, the 
TRAI Act was amended in the wake of NTP 99. The amended Act divided the regulatory 
and dispute settlement roles of the TRAI and established a new Telecom Disputes 
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT). With a direct line to the High Court (only it 
can overrule TRAI decisions), enhanced institutional legitimacy in law and in public 
perception, and greater protection from cabinet interference, the revamped dispute 
settlement process is safer from the politics that had frustrated TRAI effectiveness in its 
first three years. The amended Act also spelled out more explicitly  TRAI responsibilities: 
it gained a mandate to provide recommendations on new service providers, 
technological improvements, quality standards, and the details of license contracts.31 
And while the government was and is not bound by TRAI recommendations, it is still 
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required to seek recommendations of the TRAI prior to the introduction of new services. 
The public disclosure involved in such a process, coupled with the added legitimacy of 
the TRAI post-amended Act, means that the government will not be able to take 
advantage of the TRAIʼs weakness; now more established, and backed up with greater 
legal force, the TRAI has emerged as an agency with regulatory teeth
" " To deal with the uncertainty  in Indiaʼs early mobile networks, the major service 
providers made a series of decisions. First, they pursued a policy of shared access to 
infrastructure such as towers and chose not to charge each other for interconnection 
(Bhardwaj, 2013). Second, as the networks expanded and the construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure became a massive undertaking, the major service 
providers outsourced this work to specialized infrastructure firms. Third, later on, as 
labor costs began to rise, major service providers looked outside India and outsourced 
aspects of their operations (Shankar, interview 2013). Over time, these actions by major 
players had two effects: they transformed the political economy of telephony in India 
and allowed for major network expansion.
" " Today, the circuitry of Indian telephony is extensive but strained, and not only 
because of phone usage itself. Indiaʼs telephone network is dependent on two other 
national networks that remain inadequate to the growing mobile network-related tasks 
they are now required to perform. The first of these is electricity. Two-thirds of Indiaʼs 
towers are connected to the electrical grid, but because of inconsistency in the electrical 
supply, more than 60% of the power requirement for the countryʼs mobile phone towers 
comes from gasoline or diesel. Such is the scale of Indiaʼs mobile phone network that 
1.8 billion liters of fuel are burned annually  by generators that keep the countryʼs towers 
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operating (Greenpeace, 2011; Global System for Mobile Communication Association, 
2012). Indiaʼs towers – especially those off the electrical grid – are also dependent on a 
second network: Indiaʼs roads. The maintenance of Indiaʼs towers requires the delivery 
of fuel, spare parts, and personnel to conduct inspections and make repairs. All of this 
transportation adds to the already-high usage of fuel and creates major vulnerabilities 
for the companies that own and operate the towers: these include changes in the world 
price of oil, inconsistencies in local supply  and thieves who break into tower sheds to 
steal gasoline. In rural areas, towers are expensive to maintain and difficult to secure 
(Sethi, interview 2013). In this sense we see not only the scale of Indiaʼs mobile phone 
circuitry, but also the complex ways it is dependent on old networks that remain 
underdeveloped.
" " In less than 20 years, India has been transformed from a society largely bereft of 
telephony to the second-largest telephone market in the world, measured by the 
number of users.32  A device that was once a rarity is now ubiquitous; the telephone has 
been woven into work, family life, leisure and criminal activity. India is still some distance 
from achieving universal service: a 2013 study found that significant numbers of phones 
are owned by users with multiple devices, and the countryʼs tele-density figures 
therefore exaggerate the level of penetration.33  Nevertheless, even taking into account 
ownership rates rather than mere tele-density, Indiaʼs telephone circuitry is orders of 
magnitude denser and more inclusive than when the reforms began in the early 1990s. 
In addition to these quantitative differences, we can identify qualitative differences in 
todayʼs circuits of telephony. Today, India is home to new and increasingly ambitious 
governmental goals for the network, a rapidly-expanding market of 900 million 
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telephones, and a home-grown international telephone giant, Bharti Airtel. In 1990 it 
seemed highly unlikely that India would become home to either the worldʼs second 
largest market or the worldʼs third-largest mobile service provider (Jeffrey and Doron, 
2013: 27-29). But along with this change, we can point to continuity  in todayʼs telephone 
circuits: there remains a wide disparity between haves and have-nots, and this disparity 
follows the same socio-economic and geographical divides that existed in previous 
periods of Indiaʼs telecommunications history.
Hubs and Nodes of Mobile Communication Networks in India
" Several important features characterize the architecture of Indiaʼs contemporary 
mobile networks. In some respects, Indiaʼs mobile network development has followed 
historical patterns of hubs and nodes; yet in other respects, India has embarked on a 
new geography and architecture of network-building in communications.
" One of the most striking features is the importance of cities as hubs. In 
administration, network design and mobile usage patterns, the so-called “Four 
Metros” (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai) have led the way. Among these cities, 
Delhi (as capital) and Mumbai (as the countryʼs financial center) serve as super-hubs of 
mobile telephony. In some respects this is a continuation of practices from the 1980s 
and early 1990s: In 1986 the Indian government highlighted the communicative 
importance of Delhi and Bombay by establishing the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam 
Limited (MTNL), a landline service provider focused on these two cities. The MTNL 
complemented the BSNL, which served the rest of the country. Likewise, in 1987 the 
Indian government chose to set up a cellular pilot project in Bombay rather than in a 
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secondary city whose characteristics would have allowed for a network design that 
could be replicated in other similar cities. What is important about these decisions is that 
they gave high priority  to pre-existing communications hubs and continued the 
communicative legacy that dates back to Indiaʼs colonial communication circuits.
" " While colonial-era hubs continue to dominate the countryʼs telecommunication 
networks, it would be inaccurate to say that the new network architecture has simply 
followed colonial patterns. Symbolically  and materially, Indian telephony has broken 
new ground: the new hubs are increasingly in suburban areas of the country, in 
business parks on the outskirts of Delhi and Mumbai. To the south of Delhi, among the 
shiny office towers of Gurgaon, sits the headquarters of Bharti Airtel, the largest mobile 
service provider in India and third-largest in the world. Also in Gurgaon and not far away 
are the headquarters of Aircel and MTS. Gurgaon is also the home to Cyber City, a 
large-scale corporate development focused on the telecommunications and computing 
sectors. Indiaʼs other major telephone hub, Mumbai, has also seen a suburbanization of 
its major players. North of the city, in East Bandra, not far from Chatrapati Shivaji 
International Airport, lies the headquarters of Tata Communications. Farther north and 
east, on the highway to Pune, in Navi is the sprawling headquarters of Reliance 
Communications. Reliance is the flagship  occupant of the Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge 
City, suburban Mumbaiʼs counterpart to Cyber City in Gurgaon. While the new private 
sector service providers and specialized firms have set up  offices in the suburbs of 
Delhi and Mumbai, the old government-owned BSNL and MTNL occupy government 
blocks in Delhi and Mumbai (Saxena, 2009: 48-54). The old state-owned 
telecommunication headquarters are in the centers of cities close to other government 
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offices and railroad termini. By contrast, the new privately-owned telecommunication 
companies have located their headquarters near airports in suburban, almost pastoral 
settings, with room to expand.34
! The dominance of Delhi and Mumbai as administrative hubs is in keeping with a 
larger feature of Indiaʼs mobile circuitry: network infrastructure and coverage are 
disproportionately  concentrated in urban areas. Service providers construct network 
infrastructure in rural areas because they are required to (and paid to do so), not 
because they believe that rural network infrastructure will generate a short- or long-term 
payoff (Gupta, interview 2013). In this sense we see the continuation of certain 
hierarchies in Indian communication networks: during the colonial period, urban areas 
enjoyed the best service and cheapest rates of transmission and transport; today, with 
Indiaʼs cellular networks growing and becoming more dense, urban areas enjoy better 
coverage and more service options than are available in rural parts of the country. 
Wealthy urban users also have greater access to 3G and 4G networks, which allow for 
large-scale data transmission, the integration of internet service into smart phones, and 
a wide range of applications (Samtani, interview 2013). These geographical and 
economic hierarchies follow pre-existing communicative hierarchies that date back to 
the British-build colonial communication networks of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
This tendency has reinforced pre-existing design biases and given rise to a ʻdata divideʼ 
in mobile communications. If left unchecked, this divide may exacerbate existing levels 
of inequality and make national economic policymaking more difficult (Sridhar and 
Sridhar, 2009).
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! ! While Delhi and Mumbai dominate as super-hubs, Indiaʼs mobile networks have 
also been shaped by a set of secondary hubs (mostly  in the South) that have profited 
from their newfound status as major sites of technology design and production. The 
most famous of these is Bangalore, which is home to major call centers, computer 
hardware and software companies and IT consulting firms. Much like Gurgaon and Navi 
Mumbai, Bangalore has a suburban district dedicated to high-tech business; the 
Bagmane Tech Park contains Indiaʼs largest concentration of IT company headquarters 
(Stallmeyer, 2013). Hyderabad has developed as a center for software design and 
business process outsourcing, much of which takes place in the Hyderabad Information 
Technology Engineering Consultancy  (HITEC) City, a series of business park in the 
suburbs of the city  (Luther, 2013). Pune is a more recent addition to Indiaʼs constellation 
of high tech centers. The city has benefited from its proximity to Mumbai: less than three 
hours by car or train, Pune has become a secondary hub with a concentration of IT 
consulting firms in Magarpatta Cybercity, a suburban business park focused on 
telecommunications and computing (Venkatesan, interview 2013). In the cases of 
Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Pune, secondary  communications hubs have developed in 
places with markedly different geographical features from Indiaʼs ʻfour metroʼ cities. 
Bangalore and Pune are each landlocked, with neither port facilities nor navigable rivers 
to transport goods. For these same reasons, none is a major rail hub. These secondary 
hubs have developed because their locations have become advantageous in a new 
communicative context of air travel and mobile telephony (Aron, 2013).
! At the same time as urban India enjoys coverage and tele-density comparable to 
much richer countries, rural India continues to lag behind (Cellular Operators 
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Association of India (2013b). For a decade, the Indian government has struggled to 
extend cellular coverage into impoverished rural areas. The Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) Fund represented a philosophy of telephony as a service and even a 
right, not a luxury as government ministers had claimed as recently as the early 1980s. 
Instead of denigrating telephony as a luxury, the government chose to treat it as an 
essential service. The Vajpayee government believed that the high capital expenses of 
telephony, combined with the reality that most profit came from densely populated urban 
areas, would leave rural India underserved by market forces alone. It therefore 
designed an ambitious set of initiatives to provide voice and low-speed data service to 
nearly  300 000 villages without telephone connections, link all district headquarters to 
the internet by 2000, and roll out telephone on demand in urban and rural areas by 
2002. To achieve these goals, the USO involved a “universal service levy” of 5% 
charged to all telephone service providers, who in turn passed on the tax to consumers. 
This money was funneled through the BSNL with the goal of expanding rural access 
service via new rural landlines. The USO Fund had an odor of politics: Rather than 
employing the simplest method (a cash transfer), the government gave the BSNL 
privileged status and a cash flow paid for by  subscribers of other networks (Jain and 
Raghuram, 2009). Today the USO Fund is the primary means of government-funded 
rural network expansion; to date, it has provided Rs. 15523.57 crore  (approximately US
$3.8 billion) for rural network expansion (Government of India, Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, 2013b).
! Government policy now treats rural access to telephony  as a national policy goal. 
The 12th Five Year Plan contained an entire chapter on telecommunications, much of 
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which emphasized rural telephony (Indian Parliament, 2012a). Likewise the 2012 
Telecom Policy included new goals and funding to promote rural connectivity (Indian 
Parliament, 2012b). Indian government discussed a new and potentially more far-
reaching program. In addition to these large-scale vision documents, the Indian 
government has pursued targeted initiatives in rural connectivity. One such program, 
called “A Mobile in Every Hand,” would have distributed one mobile phone to each of six 
million families (Nelson, 2012). Critics pointed out the lack of clarity  on the type of 
phone and quantity of minutes recipients would enjoy; meanwhile, cynics charged that 
the program was a way to funnel government money into the BNSL other favored 
telephone service providers, and that the program was intended for political gain, since 
the targeted area was in the vote-rich state of Uttar Pradesh. While rural networks 
continue to expand and rural tele-density has improved, rural Indians are half as likely  to 
own a phone as their urban counterparts (TRAI, 2013; Cellular Operators Association of 
India, 2013a and 2013b).
! As Indiaʼs mobile networks have grown, they have followed the colonial pattern of 
relying on a small number of hubs in major centers and using these hubs to project 
control over vast expanses of the country. At the same time, a new set of hubs has 
taken hold. As Indiaʼs cities have grown, they have become increasingly  suburban; 
while the old state-owned service providers still occupy old government blocks in Delhi 
and Mumbai, the private telecommunication companiesʼ headquarters are all located in 
suburban business parks full of modern steel-and-glass towers. Looking nationally, one 
of the striking spatial features of Indiaʼs mobile networks is the location of its hubs: Delhi 
(or, more accurately, Gurgaon) is the most common location for telephone service 
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providersʼ headquarters. Mumbai is second, though that city  has a special role to play 
due to its role as the countryʼs financial hub. Beyond these two super-hubs, a set of 
secondary hubs (Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Pune) are concentrated in the South of 
the country. Just as Indiaʼs changing communication network has created new winners, 
so too has it created losers. Kolkata, once the capital, largest city, and largest port, has 
lost each of these distinctions, and is headquarters to none of Indiaʼs major telephone 
service providers. Colonial needs created a set of hubs that served the communication 
networks of the 19th and early 20th century. In the past 20 years, new ambitions and 
policies have continued the dominance of some colonial-era hubs while reducing the 
power of others.
Spatial Organization of Managerial Elites in Mobile Communication Networks in India
" " Since the 1990s, new and substantially  larger telephone networks have created a 
new set of interactions among new institutions in India. Today, Indiaʼs mobile networks 
contain a dynamic set of actors, including giant multinationals, medium-sized national 
companies, and upstarts. In contrast to the oligopolies common in Western markets, 
Indiaʼs mobile service market is hyper-competitive. As a result, for service providers, it 
offers low profit margins – even for established major players with the densest 
networks, the most customers, the best engineers, extensive experience in Indian 
telephony and high-level political contacts (Shankar, interview 2013). In addition to its 
service providers, India is now home to a growing array of specialized companies 
focused on some of the trickier aspects of network development and management. 
Initially, Indian telephone giants sought to integrate all aspects of network expansion 
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into their business model: with economies of scale and scope, Bharti Airtel and Reliance 
tried to make their size part of their competitive advantage as institutions trying to 
dominate a new network. As they gained more customers and covered larger swaths of 
the country, these companies found that managing telephone networks involved 
expertise well beyond that of managing telephony  itself (Sethi, interview 2013). Rather 
than concentrate a range of experts in-house and attempt to guard them from rivals, the 
larger telephone service providers realized the benefits of outsourcing. This has turned 
on its head the logic that a single company (or, in the case of the old DoT, a government 
department) can or should handle all aspects of telephony. This diffusion of expertise, 
involving a wide range of specialized actors and institutions scattered across the 
country, in some ways matches the distribution and complexity of the mobile networks 
themselves. Todayʼs networks are large, spatially concentrated, used to their limits, and 
tied to other even more strained networks such as electricity and transportation. In a 
dynamic and competitive market, service providers must make quick and difficult 
decisions about what to outsource and what to do in-house. This challenge has created 
a complex new relationship  among the multitude of institutions and actors now involved 
in Indiaʼs telephone networks.
" " Indiaʼs expanding and changing telephone networks involved a different, though 
still substantial role for government. During the initial years of reform, many 
telecommunications elites tried to slow down, weaken, or stop the legislative changes. 
These elites had good reasons to be worried: Indiaʼs monopoly service provider was 
inefficient and uncompetitive; they resisted change for the very reasons that many 
others believed change was necessary. Today, instead of managing a small network 
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with a large bureaucracy and a policy regime that severely  restricted usage, the Indian 
government manages telecommunications in a more decentralized fashion. This 
includes national legislation, special Parliamentary committees, the DoT, the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India, the courts, and two government-
owned service providers (the competitive BSNL and the rapidly-shrinking MTNL).
! ! This decentralized approach has reduced the power of DoT elites, who 
previously faced little accountability, since the DoT was at once the service provider, 
regulator, policy advisor, and adjudicator of complaints. It would be simplistic to say that 
the state has “left telecommunications to the private sector.” Rather than abandon its 
role in network-building and maintenance, the Indian government has learned to deploy 
its power in specific and deliberate ways. Belatedly and unexpectedly, Indiaʼs 
government has developed ambition and competence as a network-builder. Part of the 
explanation is situational: telephony is precisely the sort of nationalistic and technocratic 
project that a post-colonial government can champion. Some of it is also evolutionary: 
Indiaʼs new institutions have learned to co-exist and share governance of the new 
networks. The scale of Indian mobile telephony  is now so significant that no one 
institution could govern the entire apparatus (Samtani, interview 2013).
! ! As Indiaʼs networks have expanded and become more dense, the country  has 
gained a new set of telephone elites. Since the policy reforms of 1991 and beyond, 
India has shed two key  aspects of its historical approach to communications networks. 
The first is that these networks are no longer colonial projects. Todayʼs telephone elites 
are Indian entrepreneurs and financiers, as opposed to foreign colonial officials, military 
officers and businessmen who saw India as a colony to be exploited. That said, while 
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India has jettisoned one form of poor governance, it retains another in the form of 
widespread corruption.35  In mobile telephony, several interrelated factors have allowed 
for the institutionalization of corruption: these include the scale of the telephone 
network, the speed at which it has been built, and a lack of oversight, especially  during 
the early years of network expansion. 
! ! The most spectacular example of corruption among elites came during the 
scandal that resulted from the 2G licensing and spectrum sale in 2008. The 
Telecommunications Minister, A. Raja, defied market logic and chose not to conduct an 
open auction; instead, he used a first-come-first-serve sale, with the selling date 
mysteriously  moved up  by a week without public notice. Many would-be bidders were 
caught unprepared by the sudden change in dates. Meanwhile, a few companies had 
no trouble making the new deadline; some even had applications dated prior to the 
announced date change, suggesting that their executives had been privy to the 
scheduling change before the information was made public (Economist, 2012). The 
DoT sold 122 licenses (a third of the national total) at prices based on assumptions from 
2001 and collected a total of Rs 12,386 crore (US$2.8 billion) from successful bidders 
(Jain, 2001; Swamy, 2012; Thakurta, 2012)). This was a dramatic under-sale of a 
significant government asset. In its investigation of the scandal, Indiaʼs Comptroller and 
Auditor General (CAG) revalued the 2G spectrum and licenses using several 
benchmarks, with its highest assessment coming in at Rs 176,645 crore (US$40 billion), 
some 15 times the revenue the 2008 sale yielded the government (Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of India, 2010: 51-56). As a result of the scandal, A. Raja and others 
involved in the scandal were sent to prison on corruption charges, all 122 licenses from 
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the sale were declared invalid, and the ruling Congress Party vowed to keep a closer 
eye on the DoT (Central Bureau of Investigation, 2012). What is striking about the 
scandal is the brazenness with which DoT elites and selected businessmen were able 
to carry out a wholesale theft of publicly-owned spectrum. The 2G spectrum scandal 
revealed the power the DoT retained, even after losing many of its former functions: a 
decade after the entry of private service providers and more then five years after the 
arrival of an empowered, independent regulator (TRAI), the DoT still played a central 
role in the ʻnewʼ political economy of Indian telephone networks.
# # By examining the spatial distribution of elites, we gain important insight into 
Indiaʼs geographic and socio-economic patterns of decision-making. Todayʼs 
policymaking process is undoubtedly  more accountable and decentralized than during 
the Raj period or in the years from independence to 1990. But while there are numerous 
new actors involved in the provision and administration of telephone service in India, the 
new political economy has allowed for the continuation of some old bad habits. While 
the circuits of mobile phones now include users across India, including all urban centers 
and most rural areas, elites remain spatially concentrated in Delhi and Mumbai (and 
these citiesʼ suburbs), close to Indiaʼs political and financial elites. The decentralization 
of Indian telecommunications into a hyper-competitive market with a mix of different 
players (large, small, domestic, foreign, GSM, and CDMA) belies the spatial 
concentration of telecommunications headquarters and interests in contemporary India. 
As the 2G spectrum scam revealed, even a ʻdecentralizedʼ policymaking regime 
contains the potential for regulatory  capture and cozy alliances among supposed rivals. 
In the years since the 2G scandal, the government (via Parliament, TRAI, the 
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Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Supreme Court) has created institutional 
checks on telephone elites, prompting complaints from some of pre-emptive punitive 
treatment (Sethi, interview 2013). 
Conclusion: Continuity and Change in Indiaʼs Communication Networks
! ! This chapter has charted the history of Indiaʼs telephone network through three 
periods: the British Raj (from the mid-19th century to 1947), the corporatist period that 
followed independence, and the reform period that has ensued since 1990. By 
examining the origins of Indiaʼs mobile phone network, this chapter has sought to 
uncover long-term patterns in Indiaʼs telecommunications. To this end, Castellsʼ theory 
allows us to identify the ways that Indiaʼs communication circuits, hubs and nodes, and 
spatial distribution of elites have evolved and self-replicated over time. Today, Indiaʼs 
mobile phone networks are complex mixtures of the forces that created them: 
colonialism, corporatism and liberalization. As a result, Indiaʼs contemporary mobile 
networks include elements of the past, present and likely communicative future. Having 
examined the history  of these networks, this chapter will conclude with an analysis of 
the continuity and change that makes them quintessentially Indian.
! ! In some respects, Indiaʼs mobile phone networks are extensions – newer, larger, 
and more inclusive – of the colonial communication networks that developed in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. The British-built circuitry  of communications, constructed over 
the course of a century of colonial occupation, included massive rail and telegraph 
networks. Perhaps more importantly, that circuitry established a communicative and 
administrative architecture that remains remarkably intact today. It would be overstating 
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the case to argue that Indiaʼs mobile networks are merely  derivative of the telegraph 
and rail networks that initially linked the country. But the degree of architectural 
continuity  is striking: Indiaʼs colonial communication networks had an urban bias in their 
design and pricing structure; that remains the case with mobile networks today. Indiaʼs 
colonial communication networks radiated out from a set of major hubs to smaller 
nodes, with the goal of projecting control over distance; today Indiaʼs largest hubs (Delhi 
and Mumbai) remain the most important points on the countryʼs mobile networks, while 
some traditional communication hubs (Calcutta in particular) have been supplanted by 
new high tech centers in the South. In the spatial distribution of elites, we also see 
aspects of continuity: Indiaʼs colonial communication networks involved a tight 
concentration of elites in a few major centers; today this geographical concentration 
continues, with a few square miles in Delhi, Gurgaon, Mumbai and its suburbs home to 
the countryʼs telecommunications elite. In this sense, Indiaʼs contemporary architecture 
of telecommunications contains important reminders of the past.
" " At the same time, seen through the lens of Castellsʼ theory of the space of flows, 
mobile phone networks present a new and distinct phenomenon for India. The 
economics of mobile telephony favor users: basic handsets and service are cheap, 
roaming charges have been phased out, and the government has created initiatives 
(such as the USO Fund) to expand cellular coverage to ever-more-remote parts of the 
country.36  And for a country  divided by geography, caste, class, religion and language, 
the mobile phone offers a new spatial logic. A owner of a mobile phone with a few 
minutes left in its account can call other users anywhere there is service nationally. As a 
result, mobile phones are quickly becoming the new offices and entertainment platforms 
139
for many young Indian entrepreneurs, and the conduits for match-making by parents 
eager to find a spouse for their children (Telelinkers, 2013). While these stories are 
often celebrated as the deconstruction of a spatial reality  based on inequality, most 
quotidian mobile phone usage takes place within pre-existing local social networks. 
Mobile phone communication adds new complexity  and immediacy to existing social 
relations and can strengthen family  and community networks (Tenhunen, 2008 and 
2011). The mass usage of telephones has not, and likely  will not, dissolve all of Indiaʼs 
geographical and social divides; what this usage has done is reinforce existing social 
relations, while exposing Indians to communication with their fellow citizens near and far 
by design, by accident, and by the motivations of users.
" " If there is a single theme linking Indiaʼs century-and-a-half of telecommunications 
history, it is that of networks expanding and evolving as a range of actors (from 
financiers to engineers to users) made expected and unexpected use of the networks. 
Indiaʼs rail and telegraph networks were intended for colonial purposes of extraction and 
control, but they evolved into the means by which Indians travelled their country and 
communicated with distant relatives, and ways in which colonial subjects organized and 
rose up  against their occupiers. Indiaʼs mobile phone networks were designed 
differently, with mass usage and economic development as the explicit goals (TRAI, 
2012a). Today, these networks are home to considerable expected and unexpected 
change. In the past fifteen years, users have transformed entire sectors, from fisheries 
to farming (Jensen, 2007). They have planned and conducted terrorist attacks on high 
profile targets in major cities (LaRaia and Walker, 2009). They  have coordinated 
protests in response to social problems such as corruption and violence against women 
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(Belair-Gagnon et al., 2014). With the arrival of smart phones and 3G networks, they 
have put to use an enterprising array of mobile apps that save time or money, or provide 
new social experiences. Users have also integrated mobile phones into leisure 
activities, adding a new communicative dimension to already-popular forms of cultural 
expression. For Indiaʼs two largest forms of entertainment – film and professional cricket 
– mobile phone networks bring audiences closer than ever.
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Case Study: Chapters 5, 6, and 7
! Having examined Indiaʼs colonial and post-colonial communication networks 
(Chapter 4), I now turn my attention to a national case study of contemporary second 
order network formation in Indian telecommunications. In the three chapters that follow, 
I explore the IPL mobile network – the second order network of mobile applications, 
social media, websites, and fan-to-fan communication – that has grown out of Indiaʼs 
mobile phone networks. My object of analysis is not the league itself, but instead the 
second order network created by  the league, with advertisers, application developers, 
social media sites, and (increasingly) users as participants. While the IPL mobile 
network is a creation of the league, the following chapters will show the ways that users 
have become co-creators, taking advantage of tools and functionalities in ways 
unintended by  the IPL. This case study shows both the instability of large-scale 
networks and their vulnerability  to aggregates of users who can co-opt the network for 
their own (sometimes benign, sometimes dangerous) purposes.
! Founded in 2008, the IPL is an annual cricket tournament that takes place each 
April-May in cities across India. The league is owned and administered by the Board of 
Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), the national governing body for cricket, while teams 
are owned by rich Indian industrialists, media tycoons, and celebrities. For the 2013 
season, the IPL had nine teams, located in cities across India, and these teams 
contained players from all cricket playing countries except Pakistan. Each team has a 
salary cap  (approximately $14 million in 2013), and playersʼ individual salaries range 
from $50 000 to more than $1 million. Teams bid for players in a televised auction held 
each February; adding to the players who have renewed their contracts, each team 
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attempts to fill its roster for the season without exceeding the salary cap. The IPL 
playing season involves 60 matches compressed into seven weeks, with all matches 
using the Twenty20 playing format. Twenty20 is the newest and shortest of the three 
accredited formats in international cricket, and has gained a global following among 
young fans, broadcasters, advertisers, and national governing bodies. In a Twenty20 
match, each team is allocated 20 overs (each containing six deliveries), for a total of 
120 balls per side. A typical Twenty20 match lasts less than three hours, including a 20-
minute break between the two teamsʼ batting innings. This abbreviated format has led to 
a more aggressive style of play that would be out of place in traditional Test matches 
(3-5 days long) or, arguably, even one-day matches (typically 50 overs). To watch a 
Twenty20 match is to witness a fast-paced, prime-time spectacle in which each ball 
counts toward the result. And to watch the IPL is to experience a brash Twenty20 
tournament, run by the richest of cricketʼs national governing bodies (the BCCI), in a 
country with more than 1 billion people and a single national sport. 
" The IPL developed when it did because of a confluence of financial, 
technological, and sporting factors. The early 2000s were boom years for many of 
Indiaʼs manufacturing and media conglomerates, creating new tech millionaires in 
Bangalore and Hyderabad, and elevating a lucky few to super-rich status. Largely as a 
result of Indiaʼs economic growth, the country became the largest market for cricket 
broadcasting and the BCCI became the richest national governing body. Changes in 
cricket also played a role: The Twenty20 playing format came into existence in England 
and quickly found a following in other cricket-playing countries, including India. Also at 
this time, mobile phones proliferated across India, allowing more direct communication 
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between businesses and users. By  the mid-to-late 2000s, India had the financial base to 
support a league on the scale of the IPL (with expensive franchise costs and players 
flown in from around the world) and the media capacity to broadcast and license its 
matches. The league came into existence in 2008, when India had some 250 million 
phones in use. As several team officials pointed out to me in interviews, the league is 
“mobile native.” In the six years since the leagueʼs start, the BCCI has incorporated 
mobile phone networks into the IPLʼs identity, marketing plan and revenue model, and in 
doing so has shown how old institutions can be active shapers and leaders of new 
networks. The IPL shows how Indiaʼs mobile phone networks offer new opportunities for 
the provision of goods and services, and for a new spatial relationship  between 
enterprises and their customers. 
" In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I explore the IPL mobile network as a communicative 
phenomenon, initiated during and (I will argue) as a result of the countryʼs rapidly 
expanding mobile phone networks. Chapter 5, examines the leagueʼs intentions with 
respect to mobile phones, with the phone as the primary  means through which teams 
reach out to fans. It also shows the ways that the “mobile world” the IPL has created is 
now an inescapable part of the leagueʼs identity  and experience. Chapter 6 explores the 
processes by which users interact with the IPL mobile network, with data collected 
during the 2013 playing season. That chapter includes direct observation of matches in 
nine different cities, mobile application usage, social media content, and surveys and 
interviews of users in the context of matches. Chapter 7 analyses the unexpected 
outcomes of the IPL: gambling and corruption via mobile phones. That chapter reflects 
on the darker elements of mobile networks; it also probes the unintended economic, 
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political and social effects of rapid mobile network expansion and second order network 
formation in India.
! In this three-part case study, I use the IPL as a lens to study the relationship 
between users and communication networks. I consider this case study an extension of 
the ʻepisodicʼ studies that James E. Katz (1999) used to uncover social and cultural 
patterns of mobile phone use. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show the ways in which mobile 
phones have become a part of social life in India, the practices and performativity of 
mobile phone usage among Indian users, and the contemporary social significance of 
mobile phones and networks. In this analysis, I build on the historical discussion of 
Chapter 4, which identified past examples of network expansion and second order 
networks; I also provide a test of Castellsʼ theory in a major non-Western country in 
which networks have figured prominently  in the formation of identity and the exercise of 
power. As Chapter 3 noted, I see special value in Castellsʼ concept of the space of 
flows. In his three-layer framework, Castells offers a useful way of studying the 
structural and social significance of networks. Chapter 5 identifies the network 
characteristics of the IPL, noting its circuits (the official and unofficial mobile apps, social 
media, and websites) hubs (the host cities for its teams) and the role and spatial 
arrangement of managerial elites (including IPL administrators, team owners, 
advertisers and other significant figures in the leagueʼs communications). Adding to this 
analysis in the space of flows, Chapter 6 focuses on the IPLʼs audiences and their roles 
as consumers of the leagueʼs mobile networks. Chapter 7 shows the roles audiences, 
league insiders, and criminal syndicates have in co-opting and altering the IPL mobile 
network. In these three chapters, I show the ways that mobile networks have allowed for 
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new flows of information and capital, for the formation of new alliances and 
organizations, and for a set of outcomes neither predicted nor desired by those in the 
IPL who eagerly promoted mobile phone use in relation to the league.
! In this three-part case study, I probe the structural and social changes at work in 
the IPL mobile network. Those changes include the effects of telephone connectivity 
and mobility in reinforcing communities and creating new communities; they  also 
include the practices and performativity  of mobile phone usage in a national context of 
commercial and cultural significance. Using interviews of IPL team officials, surveys and 
interviews of fans, observations of mobile usage at matches, and analysis of IPL-related 
social media platforms, I identify the ways that mobile networks illustrate and enable 
social change (for good and for ill). I also point out the limitations of mobile-led social 
change and the ways in which mobile phone adoption and use often follow pre-existing 
social divides in India.
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Chapter 5: Case Study Part I 
Mobile Intentions by the IPL
! This chapter offers a theoretical and empirical examination of the IPL as a 
communicative phenomenon. In Chapter 4, I discussed the history of Indiaʼs 
communication networks by examining the three layers Castells identifies: the circuits of 
exchanges that provide linkages in these networks, the hubs and nodes whose 
characteristics are determined by the functions of a network, and the spatial distribution 
of managerial elites. I treat the IPL mobile network as an example of a second order 
network that has grown atop the physical infrastructure (the satellites, towers, switches, 
cables and other hardware) that form Indiaʼs national mobile network. In this chapter, I 
focus on the leagueʼs intentions in creating the IPLʼs mobile applications, social media, 
and websites. I emphasize how the league has built much of its identity and fan 
relations on mobile phone networks, using a range of mobile apps (aimed at a variety of 
devices), social media and websites all intended for mobile devices. I examine the new 
spatial dynamics at work as a result of the leagueʼs mobile communication, noting the 
ways that mobile networks contain a mix of new possibilities and entrenched social 
relations. I also note the limitations of the IPL as a representative of a new, connected 




Elements of the Network: Internet, Mobile Apps and Social Media
! Since its inception in 2008, the Indian Premier League has presented itself as a 
participatory contribution to the cricketing world. Focusing on young fans in India and 
abroad, particularly members of the Indian diaspora, the IPL has emphasized 
communication devices and networks that allow fans to follow and interact with the 
league in real-time (Agur, 2013; Astill, 2013). To reach large national and international 
audiences, the IPL has produced official online, mobile, and social media content 
available free to anyone with access. In India, the most common way to access this 
content is via mobile phone. As Chapter 4 discussed in detail, the mobile phone is the 
primary medium of electric communication in India, with a significantly higher 
penetration level than that of the personal computer, for instance (TRAI, 2012b). To a 
greater extent than in industrialized countries, in India the mobile phone is the gateway 
to not only voice and text, but also to websites and social media content. For this 
reason, the IPL emphasizes the importance of the mobile phone. When users receive 
their tickets by courier, the envelope contains a letter encouraging them to “enter the 
world of IPL mobile communication” (Royal Challengers Bangalore, 2013).
! Mobile phone networks play a central role not only in IPL advertising, but also in 
the leagueʼs wider communicative strategy. In my interviews with team officials, I was 
struck by their matter-of-factness about the importance of mobile phones in reaching 
fans. As a senior official from the Delhi Daredevils told me:
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Most people in India donʼt have computers. But they  have mobile phones, so we 
have to reach them that way. Whatever we do, on social media or websites or 
whatever it next, it has to be accessible on mobiles. Five years from now, smart 
phones will be very common. Everybody  wants one, but they  are expensive. So we 
have to create platforms for different types of mobiles. Itʼs not easy, because the 
technology  keeps changing. We know we can focus on mobile phones. Itʼs just a 
question of how we use mobile technology. (Vecha, interview, 2012).
When I met with IPL team officials, we coordinated our meetings via mobile phone. 
When we met, we had mobile phones on the table. When we spoke about different 
communication platforms – mobile applications, social media, websites, or 
communication among fans at matches – my interviewees made clear that mobile 
phones were the device that delivered the content to fans. One team official told me, 
“We had to explain all of this to a consultant who flew in from New York. He didnʼt get it. 
He knew how to market to people using a desktop or laptop, following the match while 
they worked at the office. But he didnʼt know how to reach a mobile market like India. 
Here, if it doesnʼt work on a phone, itʼs basically worthless.” (Interview with team official 
for the Delhi Daredevils, 2013).
" The IPL actively promotes mobile phone usage in its advertising. Below are two 
images from the IPL official website in 2013, during Pepsiʼs first season as the leagueʼs 
leading sponsor. The first emphasizes the leagueʼs desire to reach all types of mobile 
phones. Shown here are a range of communication tools intended to reach different 
types of devices, with different capabilities and different types of users. The image 
shows several apps for smart phones (iPhone, Android and Windows), the IPL mobile 
site, and ʻfeature phoneʼ apps (intended for non-smart phones). The second image 
draws attention to text-based apps for basic phones without the full range of feature of 
smart phones. These ads show that the IPL has taken a multi-platform approach to its 
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mobile strategy, recognizing both the centrality of mobile phones and the diversity of 
devices on the market. What these images do not show is the order in which these 
possibilities came to exist. Initially, the IPL did not have such a wide range of apps. It 
began with an iPhone app (licensed by Apple and available via iTunes), then expanded 
to other types of smart phone app, then developed a text-based mobile app  designed to 
reach the most common type of phone on the market: a basic, inexpensive device 
capable of sending and receiving text but unable to connect to the Internet. In this 
sense, the IPLʼs mobile rollout began as an elite project and, over a period of years, 
extended to the great mass of mobile phones. The IPLʼs mobile apps are the result of 
outsourcing, both within India and internationally. The leagueʼs applications have been 
designed by DCI Studios in Chennai, with financing from Sigma Ventures in Singapore. 
DCI Studios is a private Indian company that has designed all of the IPL mobile apps 
and the mobile versions of its website; it has a long-term exclusive contract with the 
BCCI to produce all of the leagueʼs official mobile content and maintain a consistent 
ʻmobile brandʼ for the lPL (Interview with team official for the Delhi Daredevils, 2013).
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Figure 5.1: An App for Every Phone Type
Source: Indian Premier League (2013a).
Figure 5.2: Mobile Inclusivity
Source: Indian Premier League (2013b).
! Official mobile apps are one of several platforms on which users can access IPL-
related content. Figure 5.3 (below) shows the different ways users can access IPL 
content via their mobile devices. These include the largest social media networks in 
India (Twitter and Facebook), blogs and mobile apps. On each of these platforms, users 
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can choose between official sites and content (which the IPL has commissioned, 
sanctioned, and curated) and unofficial alternatives (built by  third parties including news 
organizations, specialty sites such as ESPNCricinfo, or users with programming skills).
Figure 5.3: IPL Social Media Presence
Platform Facts and Figures
Twitter • IPL Twitter feed
    – 16 000 tweets sent by the IPL as of the start of the 2013 playing season
    – 921 000 followers
    – following 57 other Twitter feeds (mostly IPL players)
• IPL team feeds
    – most: 98 000 followers (Chennai Super Kings)
    – least: 36 000 followers (Kings XI Punjab)
    – teams tend to follow only their own players or official IPL feeds
• IPL hashtag: #IPL
    – Twitter users sent 7.5 million #IPL tweets during 2012 playing season
Facebook • Official IPL Facebook page
    – 1.3 million Likes
    – daily updates, links to external articles, player profiles
    – curated content and moderated discussion
• Team Facebook pages:
    – average 1.2 million Likes
    – curated content and moderated discussion
• Official Facebook pages for individual players
• IPL Facebook fan pages (mostly English-language)
Blogs • Official IPL and team websites contain blogs by players, officials, owners, past 
cricketers, and fans
• IPL blog pages on ESPNCricinfo, Indian media sites, and other major places for 
cricket news
Mobile • Official IPL mobile apps for iPhone, Android and Windows devices.
• Copycat apps for iPhone, Android, Windows and other devices. The most popular 
include: Cricinfo, CricBuzz, Yahoo Cricket, IPL T-20 (by India Times), IPL live 
score, PlayUp, Cricket Calling, IPL DugOut, IPL Twenty12, IPL 2012, and NDTVʼs 
cricket app
Team officials I spoke to were quick to highlight the reach of the IPL on a variety  of 
platforms. A closer look at the above table raises questions about just how far that reach 
extends. The league has 921 000 Twitter followers and the team with the most followers has 
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fewer than 100 000; by contrast, the IPL player with the most followers, M.S. Dhoni, has 
nearly  3 million. The league has more Facebook Likes, but these are different conceptually 
from followers on Twitter. A  Like is a one-time action; it does not constitute a relationship the 
way  following a Twitter feed does. The league and its teams are happy  to have followers 
and Likes, but rarely  reciprocate by  following other accounts. The IPLʼs official Twitter 
account follows only a few dozen other accounts, nearly all of them players or team owners. 
When I pressed one team official about this, he said that the league uses the medium on its 
own terms:
Suppose we did make our Twitter presence more ʻconversational.ʼ  We would 
need a huge staff to manage the discussion. People would use our hashtag to 
promote all sorts of causes. Media are having problems with this. Groups 
bombard discussion pages with grievances and the conversation is all shouting. 
So yes, as you say, we are essentially  using social media to broadcast our 
message. But thatʼs what we want to do. When the conversation model works for 
us, we will use it (Interview with team official for the Delhi Daredevils, 2013).
As a result, on Facebook and on Twitter, the official IPL pages have a common brand and 
ʻfeelʼ from the user perspective. Content is highly  curated and focused on discussions of 
“on-field” activity  (the matches) rather than “off-field” politics. Similarly, the IPLʼs official 
mobile apps steer clear of controversy and have a professional, broadcast feel. I found it 
odd that no team official I spoke to could give me a figure for the number of mobile phone 
users who had downloaded the IPL apps; similarly, I received a polite “no comment” when I 
inquired at DCI Studios.
# What these media platforms have in common is the device that aggregates them 
and links them to IPL fans. The mobile phone allows users to access any of a rich set of 
options in any location where there is a connection. The centrality of the mobile phone 
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has been augmented by a proliferation of complementary media not controlled by  the 
IPL. As Chapter 6 will show, users distinguish between official and unofficial sites, but 
use them interchangeably on the same device. This mix of official and unofficial IPL-
related content reveals how mobile phone networks extend the leagueʼs broadcast and 
in-stadium experiences. As IPL ads emphasize, fans can do more than simply follow: in 
real-time, at a distance, they can contribute to discussions with their counterparts on the 
network (Indian Premier League, 2013a and 2013b). The mobile world of the IPL invites 
participation: fans can see and share clips of matches, discuss players and 
controversies, and speculate on upcoming matches.
! Through its use of new devices and new content platforms, the IPL has sought to 
make cricket a younger and more global game. Studies have shown that cricket suffers 
from an image as “boring, impossible to understand, too long, played during the week 
when people are at work,” and watched by an older crowd (Hopwood and Edwards,
2008: 262). The IPL has mandated that each team include at least six players under the 
age of 22 and encouraged these players to interact with fans via social media. Through 
these efforts, the IPL has sought to portray itself as a young league with young players 
and young fans. 
" To reach this young audience, the IPL has brought together elements of traditional 
sports broadcasting and Indiaʼs entertainment culture. Bollywood stars have stakes in three 
teams (see table below), and the communicative practices of a match are worthy  of a film 
scene: dressed in bright colors, players enter the field with music playing and fireworks 
exploding in the night sky, and run between pyrotechnic jets showering the pitch. If that 
seems odd for a cricket match, it is by design. As Nikita Bastian writes:
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A common charge levelled at the IPL is that it's not just cricket – but this works in 
the tournament's favour as far as the spread of its crowds goes... At the 
Wankhede in Mumbai, you could have your photo taken with life-size cardboard 
cutouts of cricketers. Matches in Mohali, home to Kings XI Punjab, are preceded 
by  performances by  popular local artistes. At Bangalore's Chinnaswamy  Stadium 
you just might spot a popular local actor driving around the periphery  of the 
boundary, like in a parade of floats. Then there are the cheer girls, the DJs, the 
fireworks… (Bastian, 2012: paragraph 5).
The IPL owes much of its success as a broadcast product to its embrace of exciting 
visuals, colors, and choreography; it is Bollywood meets sport and the basis of the IPL 
brand. It is also popular, profitably, and a template for future Indian broadcast and 
mobile spectacles. From a commercial and cultural perspective, the IPL is unique ... It is 
a tamasha – a grand spectacle, celebration, and a participatory way-in to the game for 
new fans. More specifically, it is a tamasha in which the mobile phone plays a crucial 
and irreplaceable role. One of my standard questions to team officials was what they 
wanted to achieve with their mobile strategy. One team official offered the following 
ambition:
Imagine a billion people with mobile phones. Weʼre close to that today. Now 
imagine that the biggest topic of discussion is the IPL. Thatʼs what we want. 
The IPL is not Test cricket – itʼs a spectacle, like a film. The idea is that people 
will enjoy  the drama like they  enjoy  Bollywood. The market is still young and 
the next five years are very  important. But basically  we want a billion people to 
use their phones to watch IPL, talk about IPL, follow  IPL (Interview with team 
official for the Chennai Super Kings, Chennai, 2013).
In this vision of the IPL, the mobile phone is the aggregating device for a range of 
communication types: websites, social media and mobile apps. And the mobile network 
is the means by which the IPL projects its notion of a contemporary tamasha for 
audiences in India, in diaspora communities, and in the worldʼs cricket-playing 
countries. Taken in isolation, the above quote may seem like marketing spin by 
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someone whose job  is to promote a team. It was a theme I encountered regularly  when 
speaking to officials, both on and off the record. Before the playing season began, I 
wondered if the IPL officials I interviewed had over-hyped the mobile phone. But my 
doubts were put to rest in the first match I watched live. As Chapter 6 discusses, users 
have a similarly  mobile-centric view of how to experience a cricket match. And as 
Chapter 7 shows, IPL team officials may have understated the role of mobile phone 
networks in fansʼ experiences of the league.
" In this sense, the IPL is drawing on the mobile phone as an indication of a new 
global connectivity  and of the ʻnew Indiaʼ: a confident, competitive, technologically 
savvy, and successful commercial player. To date, IPL-related media have brought 
together networks of English-speaking, connected cricket fans who follow cricket in 
India, in hubs of the Indian diaspora, and in the worldʼs major cricket-playing countries: 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the West Indies, 
Bangladesh and Zimbabwe. Since the leagueʼs official communication is in English, its 
website, mobile application, and social media offer ʻuniversalityʼ and ʻinclusionʼ in the 
cricket-playing world (Kaushik, interview 2013). To the outside observer, the IPL is 
Indian in terms of its team names, the bulk of its players and the time zone of its 
matches. Busers will not find Indian languages on IPL platforms; instead, the content is 
written in consistent international English. The IPL is thus an example of an Indian 
cosmopolitanism that has grown in the years since Indiaʼs economic liberalization 
(Gupta, 2004, 2010, and 2011; Rumford and Wagg, 2010). The following section will 
explore the IPL as representative of structural changes in Indian communication 
networks.
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The IPL and Structural Change in Indian Communication Networks
! The mobile phone plays an important symbolic and material role in the IPLʼs 
relationship  with its fans. It is the primary communicative device through which the IPL 
projects its image as a young, tech-savvy sports league and as an example of the ʻnew 
Indiaʼ. What is less clear is the extent to which these developments reveal fundamental 
changes in Indiaʼs communication networks. Building on the concepts and literature in 
Chapter 2, this section explores the question of structural change, noting how the IPLʼs 
mobile network relates to Indiaʼs telephone institutions and markets.
! The primary institution in the IPL mobile network is the BCCI, the governing body 
for cricket in India and the controller of the leagueʼs finances, brand, and broadcast 
rights. The BCCI has a long history as a broadcaster of cricket matches in India (Steen, 
2010). But Test and one-day matches are irregular and, in the case of overseas 
matches, often take place at inconvenient hours for broadcast in India. With the 
formation of the IPL, the BCCI gained a large number of matches taking place in India 
during prime-time broadcast hours. With a large national audience for these matches, 
the BCCI soon enjoyed new revenues from broadcasting licenses and became a major 
player in television advertising (Gupta, 2010). As Chapter 4 (Part III) discussed, Indiaʼs 
mobile network expansion has imposed new conditions on some legacy institutions (the 
Department of Telecommunications); allowed new entrants (privately owned service 
providers) to compete and, in some cases, thrive; and created a complex and evolving 
set of interactions among institutional actors. One of the unanticipated results of Indiaʼs 
mobile network expansion has been the arrival of the BCCI as a mobile player. Although 
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the BCCI does not build or own infrastructure, regulate service, or compete with any of 
the other major institutions, it is significant in its own ways: The IPL mobile network is 
responsible for significant data usage and voice traffic at matches, creating local 
concentrations of usage that can overwhelm an already-strained grid. The IPL is also 
the focal point of some of the most popular apps and social media accounts in the 
country, and a major source of spin-off content and sites. In this sense, the IPL reveals 
how non-traditional institutions have entered Indiaʼs telecommunications market and 
made their presence felt (Vetcha, interview, 2013)
" The IPL is also representative of another structural change in telephony: the 
mediating role mobile phones play in public spaces. Mobile phone users can put to use 
a variety of tools that suit their interests (see the table above). These tools encourage 
and reward participation from fans inside and outside the stadium and in electronic 
media between matches. This mediation is the result of several factors: it stems from 
the participatory nature of professional sports and the unique role cricket plays in India. 
It is also the result of a widespread and multifaceted new connectivity  in India: While 
internet penetration remains low (relative to industrialized countries and many 
developing countries as well) and disproportionately concentrated in upper income 
groups, mobile phones have proliferated across the country. A communications 
consultant I interviewed spoke about the generational shift he had witnessed, with 
young fans insisting on having their mobile phones to follow a match:
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Next time you are at a match, watch the youngest fans. They  donʼt know what 
life is like without mobile phones. To them, a match is something they 
experience on their mobile. Someone hits a four, they  check what 
[ESPNCricinfo] writes about the shot. Some of them gamble, so they  check the 
odds. Anything that happens on the field, they  like it more if they  are 
connected. Last week, my sonʼs phone died partway through the match. He 
didnʼt know how to watch a match without his phone. I had to go find a place to 
charge it. He had to have his phone! (Rao, interview, 2013).
For many such fans, the mobile phone is not just a means of accessing information. It 
plays a role in how fans experience live events, and (especially  for young fans) is an 
extension of their identity  as members of a tech-savvy generation. With communities of 
such users on a variety of platforms – the web, mobile applications, and social media 
feeds – the IPL has succeeded in creating a mediated individualism among its 
audiences (Axford and Huggins, 2010). Today, no other communication device links so 
many people, and no other device is used as publicly  as the mobile phone. As a result, 
across India, mobile phones are an inescapable feature of public spaces. Users 
integrate their mobile phones into face-to-face situations, bringing together the distant 
and the local in a new spatial arrangement (Kaushik, interview 2013).
! This mediated relationship with public spaces has become more significant with 
changes in Indiaʼs mobile phone market. One significant change the IPL helps us to 
understand is the increasingly nationwide nature of telephony in India. In its use of 
broadcast and mobile technology, the IPL has made use of devices and networks that 
dissolve distance. With the elimination of roaming fees across India in 2014, users can 
call, text, access the Internet, and use social media anywhere there is a signal. In an 
IPL context, fans can follow and contribute to real-time debates involving other fans 
across India, without the pricing barriers that discouraged inter-regional calling as 
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recently as two years ago. One team official argued that, though the league is not 
responsible for changes in telephone policy, it has made the most of the opportunities 
that exist:
We have wanted no roaming fees for years but we donʼt make policy. Itʼs 
frustrating, but thatʼs the telecom industry. All we can do is prepare for the 
moment when we get the policies we have been waiting for. When roaming 
fees disappear, that will be great. We will have more people across India 
texting and calling about IPL. There is so much calling across India, it makes 
no sense to have roaming (Interview with team official for the Chennai Super 
Kings, 2013).
A multifaceted set of IPL discussions in live broadcasts, and on blogs, Twitter streams, 
and mobile apps center on the mobile phone as an aggregator of national content and 
users. In a technical and economic context of declining barriers to communication, the 
primacy of the mobile phone faces no threat; instead, phones will take on new and more 
advanced communicative capabilities, and will bring even more content into a single 
device (Shankar, interview 2013). In this sense, the IPL is a bellwether for an ongoing 
structural change in Indian communications: the elimination of distance as a barrier in 
telephone connectivity and pricing (Gupta, interview 2013). By studying the IPLʼs 
communicative ambitions and outcomes, we can understand the extent to which mobile 
phone networks can overcome distance. At first glance, this development suggests that 
fan communication on nationwide networks can mitigate geographical distances in a 
country defined by them (Shankar, interview 2013). 
" Mobile networks also alter patterns of economic activity, and the IPL shows the 
ways that a now-ubiquitous device and national networks allow for new patterns in 
commerce. The mobile phone as an essential and defining element in the IPLʼs 
160
economic relationship  with its fans, via advertising, ticket sales, contests, and paid live-
streaming. This growth of digital production and consumption of information reveals a 
new informational structure that has emerged in India, and a corresponding new set of 
flows. These flows reveal more than just an increase in speed (although that is visible 
as well). The new flows of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks manifest themselves in the 
relationships Indian users have with commercial and cultural phenomena: in the case of 
the IPL, digital production and consumption are now integrated into live local events and 
national broadcasts. The IPL mobile network is a new structural addition to Indiaʼs 
mobile phone networks, and an example of the type of second order network that is now 
possible in the countryʼs telephone political economy.
Limitations: the IPL and Structural Continuity in Indiaʼs Mobile Networks
" Just as the IPL reveals aspects of structural change in Indiaʼs communication 
networks, so too does it reveal continuity. The IPL is more urban, more English-
speaking and more affluent than the country a a whole. This does not discount the 
possibility of structural change driven by mass participation in new media. But what it 
does suggest is that Indiaʼs communication networks remains firmly in the hands of a 
narrow strata of the population, and that Indiaʼs mobile phone networks still struggle 
with issues of economics, geography, connectivity  and language. This section explores 
each of these limitations.
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Economics
! The IPL is a for-profit enterprise, and its team owners are a sample of the new 
establishment that has risen to the top of Indian business and entertainment since 
Indiaʼs economic liberalization. In the changing cast of IPL owners, the largest industries 
have been infrastructure and construction (India Cements, GMR Group, UB Group), 
media (Sahara, the Deccan Chronicle, Sun Media), telecommunications (Reliance), and 
entertainment (Shahrukh Khan, Shilpa Shetty). These industries have produced the 
individuals capable of paying the high franchise costs associated with the IPL, and now 
provide the financial foundation for the league. This foundation is built on franchise fees, 
player salaries, stadium contracts, advertising and a set of pockets deep enough to 
sustain money-losing teams for several years. Since the teams are privately held, 
precise figures on profitability are hard to come by, but the bankruptcy  or buyout of 
several teams in the past three years suggests that profit margins have been slim (if 
they exist at all) among team owners. Team officials I interviewed conceded (off the 
record) that team finances had been volatile, assured me that their owner was 
committed to long-term profitability, and said that there are other benefits of owning a 
cricket team. No one was willing to elaborate on what that latter point meant, but I 
understood it to mean that there are opportunities for networking with other business 
and political elites, and for enhancing oneʼs public image.
! IPL team owners offer a collective snapshot of the winners of Indiaʼs new 
economy; at the same time, the murkiness of team ownership, evidenced by the 
frequent use of shell companies and complex paper trails, suggests that the old game of 
corruption has found a new playing field (Agur,2013; also see: Thakur, 2010). The table 
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below is based on publicly available information; the league has long endured rumors of 
unnamed owners, and a 2010 government report suggested that Lalit Modi, the former 
IPL chairman, held secret stakes in at least three different IPL franchises during his 
years as the leagueʼs public face (Singh and Sruthijith, 2010). Rather than usher in a 
new, more inclusive, or more accountable management body, the IPL has augmented 
the power of an already-dominant institution (the BCCI) with strong ties to Indiaʼs 
financial and political elite (Agur, 2013). The following chart lists each teamʼs owners, 
industries, and franchise costs.
Figure 5.4: IPL Team Ownership
Team Owner(s) Price paid for team 
in US dollars
Chennai Super Kings Wholly owned by Gurunath Meiyappan (Indian 
Cements)
$91 million (2008)
Delhi Daredevils Wholly owned by GMR $84 million (2008)
Kings XI Punjab Co-owned by three parties: Ness Wadia/Preity 
Zinta, Dabur, and Apeejay Surendera Group
$76 million (2008)
Kolkata Knight Riders Co-owned by three parties: Shahrukh Khan (Red 
Chillies Entertainment), and Juhi Chawla, Jay 
Mehta
$75 million (2008)
Mumbai Indians Wholly owned by Mukesh Ambani (Reliance 
Industries)
$112 million (2008)
Rajasthan Royals Co-owned by three parties: Lachlan Murdoch 




Wholly owned by Vijay Mallya (UB Group) $112 million (2008)
Sunrisers Hyderabad Wholly owned by the Sun Media $79 million (2012)
Pune Warriors Wholly owned by Subrato Roy Sahara $330 million (2010)
Sources: Brand Finance (2010 and 2012); ESPNCricinfo (2008).
The most obvious lessons from the chart are the scale of the IPL as a financial undertaking 
and the rise and fall of costs in franchise ownership. In advance of the inaugural season, 
the BCCI auctioned off eight franchises for a total of $724 million, an average of 
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approximately  $90 million per team (ESPNCricinfo, 2008). In the years that followed, as 
the IPL expanded to new cities, franchise costs increased dramatically: In 2009, Raj 
Kundra paid $15 million for an 11.7% stake in the Rajasthan Royals, suggesting a team 
valuation of $130 million – double the price paid for the team a year earlier. The 
following year saw the high-water mark for team valuations and expectations of profit. 
In 2010, Sahara bought the two year-old Pune Warriors for $370 million and 
Rendezvous Sports bought Kochi Tuskers Kerala for $330 million (Menon, 2012). That 
year was a high-water mark for team valuations; in subsequent years, the teams in 
Pune and Kochi declared insolvency, along with the Deccan Chargers; the latterʼs 
remnants were purchased for $80 million by Sun Media (Rao, 2012).
" Given its audience size and the investments its team owners have made, the IPL 
has drawn the attention of a new establishment of advertisers – the conglomerates that 
have profited most from Indiaʼs economic growth since 2000. The leagueʼs major 
sponsors have included DLF (Indiaʼs largest real estate developer) and Pepsi as 
naming sponsors, Hero Moto Corporation and Volkswagon (official motor sponsors), 
Pepsico (official beverage partner), Royal Challenge / Kingfisher (official umpires 
partner), Vodafone and Karbonn Mobiles (official telecom partners), and Citibank 
(official banking partner). These core sponsors have signed multi year deals worth 
between $10 million and $50 million. The IPL has sold broadcast rights for undisclosed 
sums to television networks in cricket-playing countries. The leagueʼs finances are 
murky, but the publicly available broadcast revenues exceed $1 billion, and if all 
contracts were counted, the total would likely be several times higher than that sum 
(Economist, 2011). This ambitious investment in the IPL suggests a shared belief by 
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advertisers that India is emerging as a sports broadcasting powerhouse, and that its mix 
of broadcast and mobile distribution will be worth the risk (Bhat and Kamath, 2012; 
Brand Finance, 2012; Chatterjee, 2012; Agur, 2013).
Geography and Language
! Whether the IPL represents structural change in communications depends on 
how effectively  it can bridge Indiaʼs internal divisions. While the IPL is purportedly a 
national league, it largely follows pre-existing geographical and linguistic divides in 
India. One of the more striking biases of the IPL is its urban-centrism; the populous 
states of Bihar, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh contain not a single team among them. 
Cultural historian Ramachandra Guha criticizes this aspect of the league, arguing that, 
“to leave out four of Indiaʼs largest states — all cricket-mad, and which collectively 
account for close to half the countryʼs population — must seriously  disqualify the 
Leagueʼs claim to be ʻIndianʼ” (Guha, 2012: paragraph 7). The IPL takes place in cities 
and emphasizes an India that is more urban and more cosmopolitan than the country as 
a whole. For Guha and other critics, the IPL emphasizes large and growing cities, and 
prioritizes broadcast dollars over inclusivity, as well as rich over poor. Its political 
economy, identity and communicative practices reinforce the idea that big cities 
represent Indiaʼs future. As a geographical snapshot of India, the IPL is 
unrepresentative: To audiences, it portrays an India that is big-city, cosmopolitan and 
affluent. More importantly, it reinforces an existing and growing divide between Indiaʼs 
urban and rural residents.
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! Perhaps the most unrepresentative and exclusive aspect of the IPLʼs identity  is 
its use of the English language to the exclusion of regional Indian languages. The BCCI 
could have seized the chance for a multilingual league, with each teamʼs 
communication available in English and Indiaʼs major languages. Instead it opted for a 
strictly-English approach: visitors to the IPL website, followers of the IPL Twitter feed, 
and users of the IPL mobile application could be forgiven for believing that English is 
Indiaʼs vernacular language. In a country with more Hindi speakers than English 
speakers, the IPL both serves the (largely affluent and urban) English-speaking 
segment of the population, and presents that segment of the population to the world as 
evidence of the ʻnew Indiaʼ. When I asked about the use of the English language, one 
team official emphasized the unity it allowed:
If you start picking Indian languages, where does it end? Everyone will agree to 
include Hindi, Tamil, Bengali, probably Urdu. Then we get into smaller languages. 
If we say  yes to one language and no to another, some people will get angry. 
Then we get divisions. And anyway, thereʼs a limit to the space on a mobile 
phone. How do you design an interface with 16 official languages? If we choose 
English, most people in India will accept that. Our biggest fans are young people, 
and they  like English. Itʼs a language of money. So maybe itʼs because of money, 
but itʼs not just that. Itʼs also that we want to appeal to as many  people as 
possible. Itʼs the Indian Premier League, not the Maharashtra Premier League 
(Interview with team official with the Delhi Daredevils, 2012).
The presence of English as the official language of communication shows the obvious 
commercial advantages of English (it is the language of cricket worldwide and the most 
profitable language for global sports broadcasts). It also reveals the cultural role English 
plays in India: because it is not symbolic of any one region or state and because it is a 
malleable language, English is the dominant language of national broadcasting. The 
team official quoted above argued that the IPLʼs exclusive use of English is 
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representative not only of an India that is emerging, but also of the leagueʼs intended 
audiences in India and abroad. But would it really have been so difficult to mix 
languages? The exclusion of Indian languages meant that within India, the IPL was 
cordoned off from the countryʼs ordinary  life and had a foreign feel. It was similar to the 
feeling of linguistic imposition that exists when non-English speaking countries host the 
Olympics or World Cup; while the intention is to bring that countryʼs people and culture 
to the world, the result is often a media event unintelligible to many of its own people.
Connectivity
" As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (above) show, the IPL sees the mobile phone as the 
primary device through which it can build its brand and form relationships with fans. 
Initially  the IPLʼs mobile strategy was limited to the iPhone, but in the past three years, 
the league has broadened its approach to include a mix of smart phone options (apps 
for Android and Windows phones) and text-based services for basic ʻfeature phoneʼ 
models. In doing so, the IPL has sought to reach as many  users as possible by working 
within the constraints of a market with highly differentiated devices and users. One team 
official spoke about the challenges and goals of the IPLʼs mobile strategy:
Itʼs still early. Three years ago, it was just the iPhone app. Now we have an app 
for all the major smart phones and even basic phones. It took a lot of work, but 
now the league has its platforms in place. The challenge is to make them more 
interactive for users and more attractive for advertisers. Weʼre big in India, one of 
the biggest players in mobile content. But we want to be bigger, and we want to 
have lots of fans in other countries (Kaushik, interview 2013).
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In other interviews, IPL team executives and marketing staff made similar remarks. They 
see mobile apps, mobile sites, and social media as the means by which the league can 
deepen relationships with existing fans and reach new fans in new, and increasingly 
distant locations (Vetcha, interview 2013; Rao, interview 2013).
! In their eyes, basic mobile telephony is a gateway for users to more advanced 
smart phone telephony. But this type of thinking neglects the economics of phone 
acquisition and service for low-income users, and the communicative divide that exists 
between basic and smart phone users. At the same time as they invite participation 
among the connected few, these technological add-ons limit the participation of many 
users. The IPLʼs official website as well as the networks of IPL-related blogs are 
available only to the small subset of Indians who have internet access (TRAI, 2012a). 
Mobile access is more widely distributed than internet access, but the IPL has placed 
much of its information on apps that require expensive smart phones and a data plan 
very  few Indian consumers have at present. Copycat IPL mobile applications (listed in 
the table above) have attempted to fill the gap, but most of these are aimed at owners of 
other smart phones, not at the massive market of users with basic mobile telephony. 
The team executives and marketing staff I spoke to seemed genuine in their belief that 
the mobile phone is the most effective way to reach fans, and their desire to connect to 
as many as possible. Off the record, they expressed frustration that the network is not 
more inclusive, that the infrastructure is strained and sometimes unreliable, and that the 
government is not doing more to stabilize mobile phone networks.
! These limitations – in economics, geography, language, and connectivity – show 
that the league can make only  a partial claim to be a harbinger of a ʻnew Indiaʼ in mobile 
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communications. On the one hand, the IPL has brought many Indians (especially  young 
people) together via a national network of broadcasting and a common language of 
communication. It has also illustrated some ways that new communication networks (in 
this case: mobile phones, websites, and social media) can greater participation in a 
national commercial and cultural phenomenon. On the other hand, the IPL is not as 
national as it claims: several of its core aspects (its elite-oriented political economy, its 
urban-centrism, its use of the English language, and its preference for high-end mobile 
technology) exclude much of the Indian population. Yet the IPL is representative of 
Indiaʼs national media in one respect: IPL owners come from a handful of industries in 
which they wield considerable power, and IPL advertisers represent Indiaʼs new 
commercial establishment. At this stage, the IPL is a cosy alliance of owners, 
advertisers, politicians, and media, and hardly  represents a challenge to Indiaʼs 
stratified power and wealth structure (Ali, 2012).
Conclusion
" This chapter has conceptualized the IPL as an example of a second order 
network in Indian mobile communications. Operating on top  of the physical 
infrastructure (the satellites, towers, switches, cables and other hardware) that forms 
Indiaʼs national mobile network, the IPL mobile network puts to use the capabilities of 
mobile technology and the massive number of users who have adopted mobile phones 
in the past decade. Second order networks are significant and unimagined 
consequences of policy  changes and network expansion. In the IPLʼs case, the 
consequences are evident in profits for a handful of actors (primarily  the BCCI), 
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excitement for a great many fans, and a shifting set of commercial and cultural 
possibilities on national mobile networks. A crucial element in these possibilities is the 
new space of flows that exists in contemporary India. In its circuits (official and unofficial 
mobile apps, social media, and websites) hubs (host cities for teams) and composition 
and spatial arrangement of managerial elites (IPL administrators, team owners, 
advertisers and other significant players), the IPL reveals the networked nature of its 
operations.
! This chapter has also explored empirical aspects of the IPL as a second order 
network in Indian mobile communications. It has explored the IPLʼs intentions and 
practices in a range of actions that rely  on the mobile phone and its network 
infrastructure. It has identified and described the features of the IPL mobile network 
(including its different mobile apps, websites, social media), and the scale of its reach to 
users. It has also discussed the political economy of the leagueʼs media and advertising 
and highlighted the ways that the IPL represents structural change in Indian telephony. 
This change is evident in the arrival of the IPL as a communicative institution and in the 
new market dynamics (especially  in mobile commerce and advertising) that the league 
has normalized in India. Of course, there are limits to the structural change brought 
about by mobile networks in India, and I have highlighted several such limitations: 
economics, geography, language, and connectivity. Together these limitations temper 
the argument of a ʻmobile revolutionʼ in India, but they do not entirely deflate that 
argument. The largest take-away from this chapter is that the IPL shows the new 
possibilities of a second order network on a large, national mobile network. The league 
makes active use of digital production and consumption of information; it also delivers a 
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set of goods and services that, formerly disparate, now exist in aggregation because of 
the scale and technical capabilities of mobile networks.
! This chapter has focused on the IPL as an addition to Indiaʼs communication 
networks. It has focused on the ways that the IPL reveals changes in Indiaʼs 
communication institutions and markets. The following chapter will shed further light on 
these structural questions and delve into the social aspects of the IPL mobile network. 
Chapter 6 will take my examination of mobile phone networks to the users of these 
networks, to explore the practices and social meanings of mobility.
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Chapter 6: Case Study Part II
Mobile Processes in the 2013 IPL Season
! Chapter 5 situated my case study in Castellsʼ (1996) network theory and 
explored the major components and limitations of the IPL mobile network. This chapter 
follows that discussion by examining the IPL network from usersʼ perspectives. In a 
theoretical sense, this chapter focuses on what Castells (1996) would call the circuits 
and the hubs and nodes of the IPL network. The circuits include the official and 
unofficial mobile apps, social media, and websites; the hubs include the host cities for 
IPL teams and, more specifically, the stadiums in which matches take place. By going to 
each of the hubs in the network and observing the functioning of the circuitry, I explore 
the practices and performativity of mobile phone usage in relation to the IPL. Using my 
experience as an observer and interpreter of communication patterns, I draw 
conclusions about audiences and their roles as consumers and shapers of the leagueʼs 
mobile networks. In this sense, I add to the tradition of ʻepisodicʼ studies undertaken by 
James E. Katz (1999) to uncover social and cultural patterns of mobile phone use.
 ! This chapter includes three types of data. First, at matches in each of the IPL 
host cities (Kolkata, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Pune, Mumbai, Delhi, Mohali, Jaipur and 
Chennai), I conducted participant observation in different parts of the stadium, to see 
how mobile phone owners used their devices in the context of a live professional 
sporting event. Second, at these matches I surveyed a total of 80 mobile phone users 
and interviewed approximately half of these users to learn more about the reasons for 
their habits and preferences in mobile usage. Third, I analyzed the IPLʼs mobile apps, 
website and social media presence, and noted the design and role of each of these 
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platforms in the IPL network. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the primacy of 
the mobile phone in Indian communications, the social integration of the mobile phone 
into live events, and the roles of practices and performativity in public mobile phone 
usage.
Observations at Matches
! Inside teeming, raucous cricket stadiums across India, I witnessed a second 
order network in action. IPL matches are hubs on this network and the sites of 
significant mobile phone activity. This section discusses several types of usage I 
witnessed, all in connection with the IPL. These include: texting and typing, social 
media, mobile apps, Internet, photography and recording. For each of these types of 
usage, I note the practices and performative elements of usage. Building on the work of 
Rutter (1987) and Tenhunen (2008), this chapter also discusses the rules (official and 
unofficial) and social cues that have emerged in response to the proliferation of mobile 
phones in the context of the IPL. Throughout this section, following Mackay and 
Gillespie (1992) and Reingold (2002), I emphasize fans as participants on networks, 
and show how mobile networks are multifaceted, dynamic communicative spaces 
because of this participation. I also show how the mobile phone is the defining device of 
the league and an essential element in contemporary live events in India.
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Texting and Typing
! One of the most common types of mobile phone usage I observed at matches 
involved coordinating times and places for in-person meetings, either during or after the 
match. In the stands, users tended to text more than they talked on their phones – not 
surprising, given the noisy environment of the match and (more importantly) the fact that 
that texting is free while calling costs money. In the concourse and outside the stadium, 
calling was very common. I observed only a few users talking on their phones in the 
stands and several times saw other fans ask these users to text instead of talking. 
When users spoke loudly, or for more than 30-60, seconds, other fans often gave the 
offending talker a suggestive look or a “shhh” sound. Just as there is a code that fans 
should sit unless the crowd as a whole rises for an exciting play, so too is there an 
apparent social code that it is inconsiderate to make and receive calls frequently  or 
loudly while seated in the stands. Texting was the most common activity. Users sent 
texts to their friends nearby (sometimes to relay a message they  did not want to 
vocalize) or elsewhere in the stadium, or to users at home following the match. Because 
bags were prohibited and writing instruments often confiscated by security guards37  at 
the stadium entrance, mobile phones also functioned as notepads for those recording 
details about the match, including those writing a dissertation on mobile phone use.
Social Media
! Throughout the stadiums I visited, I observed significant social media usage by 
fans using mobile phones. By far, the most popular social media were Facebook and 
Twitter; although the league also officially promotes itself on Google+, I did not see any 
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fans use it at the matches I attended. It was common for users to log into social media 
accounts at the start of the match and post updates regularly during the action, 
especially  during commercial breaks, time-outs, and the 20-minute innings break 
halfway through the match. Users sought to capture events (on the field and in the 
stands) as they happened, and post them to social media in real-time. I saw users 
uploading posts and photos to Facebook, Twitter and Instagram as the match 
progressed. On ticket stubs, on the big-screen televisions facing the stands, and in 
regular announcements broadcast during the match, fans are encouraged to use social 
media. At regular intervals, the IPL prominently displays its preferred hashtags on the 
big-screen TVs. It offers users incentives (in the form of draws and other contests) for 
using these hashtags and Liking certain Facebook pages.
! A common mobile phone practice is the trivia question or poll. While audiences 
watching on TV see commercials, the announcer at the stadium will read out a question 
(also displayed on the big-screen TVs) and ask fans to identify  the correct answer via 
Twitter, Facebook, or the IPL mobile app. At the end of the commercial break, the 
results are shown on the big-screen TVs. Sometimes these questions are part of a poll 
from the IPL mobile app  and website, in which case the results from the stadium poll are 
shown next to images of the mobile app and website. Sometimes the TV audience sees 
the end of the poll or trivia question, thus giving them a brief taste of the mobile 
experience for live audiences. Other times (usually for trivia questions), the exercise is 
limited to the stadium audience. At the matches I attended, mobile phone trivia and polls 
were very  popular. Since users had 30-60 seconds to answer a question, it was 
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possible for users to cheat by searching for the answer online. But I never saw users 
doing this.
Figure 6.1: Mobile Phone Trivia and Polls at Matches 
The questions below appeared on TV screens at matches I attended. In each case, users were 
offered four possible answers.
! Polls
! How many runs will RCB score in this match?
! Who will top score for Mumbai in this match?
! Which bowler will take the most wickets in this match?
! How many sixes38 will we see in this match?
! Which wicket partnership39 will give Delhi the most runs tonight?
! Trivia
! Who scored the most runs in IPL season 1 (2008)?
! Who is the all-time leader in IPL wickets?
! Which IPL team has the most Twitter followers?
! How many sixes did Chris Gayle hit in IPL season 5 (2012)?
! Which batsman has hit the most runs in IPL matches at Eden Gardens?
For each of these questions, users could select the answer of their choice by Tweeting it 
(using the #IPLt20 hashtag, Liking it on Facebook, or voting via any of the IPL mobile 
apps). Clocks on the big-screen TVs counted down the seconds. Each time the clock 
reached 10 seconds, the announcer would count down from 10 and encourage the 
audience to join in. This had the effect of making the poll or trivia question the 
unavoidable object of attention. Together, these temporal and spatial dimensions 
created a shared experience among users. Typically, after a trivia questionʼs correct 
answer was displayed on the TV screens, groups of fans would applaud if they  had the 
right answer.
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! By promoting these activities, the IPL seeks to not just normalize social media in 
Indian live events, but more importantly, to establish a set of norms that strengthen the 
IPL brand and enhance its value to advertisers. As more than one IPL team official 
would remind me, the IPL wants to see social media used, but on the IPLʼs terms. At the 
Delhi Daredevils office, a public relations staff member told me:
Fans like to be social with their phones. They like to show off what they know and 
what they  think. And we have some time blocks to fill. We have commercials, we 
have the innings break. So at these times, we give fans things to do, things to 
talk about. Itʼs been an experiment. When is the right moment to do social media 
stuff? Usually  at the end of the break. It gets peopleʼs attention and afterward we 
return to the match. How much is too much? I donʼt know. But we do more polls 
and trivia stuff every year and fans always like them (Kaushik, interview 2013).
From the leagueʼs perspective, the responsive nature of social media makes it useful for 
conversations the league wants to have (about players, teams, and upcoming matches) 
at times when it wants to have conversations (during breaks in the match). From the 
userʼs perspective, social media allow for participation in a brief, fun exercise involving 
several thousand people in a stadium. Trivia and polls have a temporal element (a clock 
on each big-screen TV counts down the seconds before the cut-off time) and a spatial 
element (a mass of users in a shared space answer a single question). Having 
developed these practoces over several playing seasons, the league has been an early-
mover in large-scale social media usage in India. As such, it wants to be seen as a 




! Official and unofficial mobile apps (listed in Chapter 5, figure 5.1) are popular 
with users of high-end phones, including the iPhone, Samsung Galaxy, and Windows 
phone. The most common cricket-related apps I saw were official apps developed by 
major institutions: the BCCI (the governing body of the IPL), Cricinfo, Cricbuzz, and 
Yahoo Cricket. When searching for information related to the match and the IPL, fans 
tended to use official apps and often sought specialized information on individual 
players. Many fans would reveal in surveys and interviews that they liked the fact that 
information on these apps had been verified prior to posting. This feature distinguished 
apps from social media, which provided up-to-the-minute discussion but often contained 
unconfirmed rumors and at times false information.
Internet
! Internet usage was less common than talk, text, social media, or apps. Several 
reasons explain the gap in usage. The most obvious was access. Many users had 
phones that did not allow for data connections. Another reason was the limit of the 
network. The concentration of users in stadiums slowed down connection time, often 
significantly. Network availability is a social leveler; with nearby towers overwhelmed by 
signal requests, many users relied on talk and text, since these were less likely to be 
affected by the slow speed of data transmission. This leads to a third reason: 
alternatives. Many users found that apps and social media gave them all the information 
they wanted about the match, and there was less of a need to use the Internet. One 
user in Kolkata told me he had left his iPhone at home and brought a basic phone to the 
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match because, “the network is always slow during the match and I donʼt need to use 
the Internet. I make my bets before the match, come here and watch. I donʼt need to be 
online. I text people when I need to, but thatʼs all I do” (Interview with mobile phone 
user, Kolkata, 2013). When I observed users viewing websites, it was frequently sports 
sites with information on that match or the other match for that day.40  Many users 
watched highlights of previous matches; at 8pm matches it was common before the 
start of play to see users watching highlights of the 4pm match, whose end many users 
would have missed while in a security line outside the stadium. As Chapter 7 will 
discuss, many users visited betting sites to check the odds (these change by the 
minute) for the match they were watching. A few fans accessed the official IPL site run 
by the BCCI, but it was much more common to see users visit third party  websites such 
as ESPNCricinfo or Yahoo Cricket, which offer independent analysis of the match. 
Photography and Video Recording
" Some activities were more or less common, according to age.41  More than any 
other age group, teenagers took photos and videos of the match. It was very common to 
see fans photographing or recording elements of the match, the cheerleaders, 
themselves, friends, other fans, or celebrities in attendance. In Kolkata, Shahrukh Khan, 
a film star and owner of the local team, entered the stands not far from where I was 
sitting. As he did so, nearby fans turned and held their phones up to take photos or 
record the moment. The presence of mobile phones in the air soon attracted attention, 
and in waves across a whole section of the stadium, many more fans tried to capture 
the moment, even before they  knew that Shahrukh Khan had entered the stands. Some 
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fans were so instinctive in their instincts to record events, they did so without even 
knowing what event they were capturing. In such situations, the crowd rose to its feet 
and fans had no hesitation about holding their phones high in the air to get a better shot. 
But in more ordinary  moments, such behavior was less socially acceptable. It was 
common to see fans standing up to take pictures or record the action and being told by 
other fans to sit down.
The Phone-Friendly IPL
! Despite the large number of security personnel surrounding the boundaries of the 
pitch and standing in every section of the stadium, I never saw a soldier, police officer or 
IPL official attempt to stop a fan from recording the match. On the contrary, some 
guards posed with fans in pictures taken on mobile phones. Others took pictures of 
groups of fans as they posed near the fence surrounding the pitch. At several matches I 
asked guards why the league seems to be so uninterested in limiting what users do with 
mobile phones at matches. Several guards told me that it is impossible to tell mobile 
phone users what they can and cannot do with their phones. The only options are to let 
phones in and accept the consequences or attempt ban them entirely. I asked team 
officials about their thoughts on fans photographing and recording the matches. They 
pointed out three facts that any policy  must acknowledge: mobile phones are becoming 
increasingly universal among IPL fans, they are shrinking in size (and are thus more 
difficult to keep out) and they are wildly popular accessories to live events (Rao, 
interview, 2013; Kaushik, interview, 2013). Given these facts, it would be a foolʼs errand 
to try to eliminate or restrict mobile phone use with formal rules. The IPLʼs laissez-faire 
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attitude toward mobile phone use also applies to users who try to record and live-stream 
matches on social media. When I asked one team official whether fans with mobile 
phones would undermine the leagueʼs broadcast deals, he laughed: 
Why  would we be worried? We have the best cameras in the best locations in 
the stadium. These arenʼt kids with phones. They  are professionals with proper 
cameras. Sure, some fans will film and live stream matches, but who wants to 
watch those videos? Most of them are terrible quality. People record them 
because itʼs a thrill: you get the experience of recording a match. But even if 
you put it online, few people will watch it. Most fans watch the league on TV. 
Even those who do post live streams of matches, we still profit: They  are 
promoting our brand. Some of these people are actually  doing us a favor 
(Interview with team official for the Chennai Super Kings, 2013).
In its policy on photography and video recording, the IPL has made a calculated 
gamble. It believes that fans will search for the best quality broadcast (i.e. the official 
IPL broadcast), and that users like the practice of recording the match more than they 
like the product of their recording efforts. More than a defeatist acceptance of “we have 
no choice but to accept the mobile phones,” the IPLʼs attitude reveals a sophisticated 
understanding of what experiences users want from their mobile phones and a clever 
embrace of communication technology to put users to work for the IPL brand. As one 
IPL official asked rhetorically, “why would we keep out something so useful to us? It 
angers everyone, especially the league, when the police try  to ban mobile phones from 
matches” (Rao, interview 2013).
" While the IPLʼs phone-friendliness has endeared it to many fans, it has done 
nothing to diminish the significance of television broadcasting. Fans I spoke to (even 
those who recorded the match) said they would likely watch the highlights on television, 
not on their mobile phone, when they returned home. No team official I spoke to was 
able or willing to provide figures on viewership, but one stated plainly that while “TV is 
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for money, the mobile stuff is for marketing.” During my fieldwork I also watched 
matches in bars, and noticed that those watching on TV used their phone to follow the 
match, communicate with friends (sometimes in the stadium, sometimes watching the 
match at home or at other bars). The phone has become an essential part of the 
experience of watching a match, but it has not displaced Indiaʼs broadcast model.
" The IPLʼs decision to indulge fans in their desire to photograph and record 
matches reveals another, larger aspect of usersʼ relationships with mobile phones. 
Today, users see mobile phone usage as an integral part of their experience at live 
events. They use mobile devices to communicate with friends seated nearby, elsewhere 
in the stadium, or at home. For groups seated in different areas, phones allow for the 
sharing of game-related content (e.g. betting odds), and allow group members to 
communicate in ways that would not be be possible otherwise. For groups seated 
together, mobile phone use allows new complexities. Text messages allow group 
members to communicate with selected others (inside and outside the group) in discreet 
ways, both reinforcing the existing group structure and allowing those not present to 
participate in that groupʼs collective experience from the outside.
" At the matches I attended, many fans paid less attention to the match than they 
did to other diversions. At a match in Pune, a group of software engineers had come as 
an office outing. Two seemed particularly busy on their phones. One told me, “This is 
terrible cricket but itʼs still fun. Weʼre sending jokes to each other” (Interview with mobile 
phone user, Pune, 2013). These users spent much of the three hours sending 
messages back and forth, and treated the match as background entertainment. Other 
users had come for a social experience with friends or family, and spent much of the 
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match using their phone as they might in other social situations, communicating 
simultaneously with people nearby (using face-to-face communication and text 
message) and far away, via talk, text, and social media. 
! The importance of mobile phones in usersʼ experiences of live events can be 
seen not only by  observation of usage, but also by how users react when they  cannot 
use mobile phones. While the IPL is firmly in favor of allowing users to integrate mobile 
phones into their match experiences, the league is beholden to host citiesʼ police 
commissioners, some of whom see mobile phones as a security threat. During the 2013 
IPL season, one city (Hyderabad) experienced a terrorist attack another (Mohali) faced 
threats of attacks from militant groups. These two citiesʼ police commissioners banned 
mobile phones from IPL matches. At the stadium, security personnel announced that 
they would refuse entry  to anyone carrying a mobile phone. If fans were caught using 
phones inside the stadium, they faced a choice of leaving and keeping their phones or 
staying and having their phones confiscated by security. The no-phones restriction had 
noticeable effects on fan behavior. Gone were the actions described above: texting and 
tweeting about the match, posing for group photos, and filming clips of players, 
cheerleaders and fireworks. Gone were the ads on the large TV screens in the stadium, 
encouraging fans to Like certain Facebook pages or add certain hashtags to their 
tweets. In Hyderabad, three fans in their late teens were seated near me. They had won 
their tickets a few weeks earlier, in a school raffle. That was before the bomb attack that 
prompted the police commissioner in Hyderabad to ban mobile phones at matches. 
They had looked forward to taking photos and sending updates to friends at home; 
instead they were isolated and disconnected from those they knew. One of them said 
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that by the time they get to school to tell people about the match, it will be old news and 
“no one will care.” Compared to crowds in every other city I visited, the crowds in 
Hyderabad and Mohali were more sedate; I saw fans who genuinely seemed bored with 
the match. Like the trio of teenaged fans I met in Hyderabad, many IPL fans have grown 
up  with mobile phones as a common fixture of life. Consequently, they have woven 
mobile devices and networks into live events such as matches. For an older generation, 
it would be like removing the large TV screens now standard at large stadiums. 
! Stripped of their mobile phones, users were forced to revert to a previous 
communicative reality, in which the stadium creates a major communications output via 
broadcast, but fans inside are separated from the outside world (with the exception of 
selected information, such as other match scores, posted on the TV screens). This 
isolation had measurable effects on social media activity. The matches in Hyderabad 
and Mohali had the usual outside-looking-in perspectives of social media users 
watching the broadcast, but lacked the perspectives of those inside the stadium and the 
interaction between inside and outside perspectives. When I spoke to security guards at 
the stadium in Hyderabad, they spoke of being frustrated at playing the role of the bad 
guy. When I later asked IPL team officials about the bans on mobile phones, they 
expressed anger about police “meddling” in important commercial activity (Rao, 
interview, 2013). These bans on mobile phones, wholly  unexpected when I planned my 
research, offered a reverse way of looking at mobile phone usage. We can understand 
the importance of a network by seeing how users behave when that network is disabled 
in a context where users have become accustomed to access. In the case of the IPL, 
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we see that users take for granted not only  the presence of the network but more 
importantly its centrality in the experience of watching a live event.
! My observations of IPL matches confirmed my hypothesis that the mobile phone 
is the communicative device that users find most practical and enjoyable. The leagueʼs 
ease in accepting fansʼ mobile phone activities is explained in large part by the youth of 
the league itself. The IPL came into existence in 2008, when India had more than 250 
million mobile phones (Agur, 2013). While there are competing types of phones, with 
varying capabilities, no other device rivals the mobile phone in its primacy of use or in 
its capacity  as an aggregator of different platforms of communication. The dominance of 
the mobile phone can be explained by two interrelated sets of forces. The first is the 
formal rules of the IPL. The league has allowed mobile phones while discouraging other 
devices. Laptops and tablets were not allowed past security  at any  of the matches I 
attended. There are exceptions for journalists in the press box (they enter via a special 
entrance), but for ticket-holders in the stands, devices larger than mobile phones are 
prohibited. The second set of forces is customer preferences. Fans I spoke to saw 
mobile phones as having the ideal size and communicative capacity. None expressed a 
desire to have a laptop or tablet at the stadium and several said that the presence of 
someone nearby typing on a laptop would be distracting. In my experience as an 
observer of matches across India, I found that the formal rules of the IPL followed the 
preferences of its fans; the league sees mobile phones as an extension of the action on 
the field, and as a way to add to the excitement of matches as media events. For now, 
the league and its fans are in general agreement about which devices should and 
should not be permitted into the stadium. Whether this will continue to be the case in 
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years to come will depend on the design features of mobile devices, the capacity  of 
networks, and the usage habits of mobile phone owners.
Interactions with Users
! In addition to observing user activity in the context of IPL matches, I also spoke 
to and surveyed users about their mobile phone habits and preferences. Chapter 3 
discusses in detail my approach and methods for user surveys. In my efforts to 
understand mobile usage in the context of the IPL, I spoke to a range of users (including 
different ages, genders, ticket prices, phones). I sought to understand their usage 
habits, preferences, and relationship with the device and network.
! The most striking fact about my engagement with mobile phone users in India 
was their openness about their mobile phone habits and preferences. The users I spoke 
to were happy to discuss the phones they own and have owned, how much they  spend 
on telephony, how they use their phones, the people they contact most, and what they 
want from their phones. My status as a solo researcher was most useful when I 
interviewed mobile phone users about their habits and preferences; I believe that if I 
had operated as a member of a group of observers or interviewers, users would not 
have have been as candid or detailed in their responses. I was surprised by the extent 
to which users opened up to me about what they do on mobile phone networks. Some 
readily discussed suspicious or even illegal activities and showed me how the network 
enabled these activities. They also showed the performative elements of mobile phone 
ownership, which in many cases included showing off their devices and demonstrating 
their expertise of pricing and device functionality. Many users derived a part of their 
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identity from their understanding of the technology and how they used it in public. Users 
distinguished themselves from friends based on their volume, type, and frequency of 
mobile usage. They also distinguished themselves from users of different ages and 
socio-economic groups by  their choice of mobile device and the way they used that 
device in public.
! The three tables below show the results of surveys I conducted in the stands of 
IPL matches, typically  during the 20-minute innings break. In addition to the surveys, I 
also engaged in conversations with respondents who showed an interest in the 
questions or particular knowledge about mobile devices and networks. This data is 
divided into tables about IPL-related usage (Figure 6.2), general usage (Figure 6.3) and 
economics of mobile usage (Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.2: Survey Questions on IPL-Related Mobile Phone Usage
Question Responses
1. Have you been following this 
match on your phone?
Yes: 39
No: 41
2. Have you followed other 
matches on your phone? If yes, 




Most common applications: IPL official apps, Cricinfo, Cricbuzz, Star 
Sports, Yahoo Cricket, Bet 365, NDTV
Most common: websites: YouTube, Cricinfo mobile site, IPLt20.com, 
IPL team sites, cricket-live.com, Times of India, sportstracker.com
3. How often do you use your 
phone during a match?
From 1 to 5 times: 26
From 5 to 10 times: 20
More than 10 times: 10
Continuously: 14
4. Where do you keep your 
phone during a match?
Most common: pocket (35), hand (20)
5. With whom do you 
communicate during a match?
Most common: Friends (in the stadium and elsewhere), family (in 
the stadium, at home and elsewhere), parents, partner
Other: bookies, office
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Figure 6.2 focuses on mobile phone usage in relation to the IPL. Users had a wide 
range of devices, with Samsung and Nokia as the most popular maker of fansʼ current 
phones. A surprising number of users owned more than one device. Several users 
asked me, “Which of my phones do you want me to talk about?”42 As Chapter 4 (Part III) 
discusses, India is home to some of the worldʼs lowest telephone service costs; as a 
result, many users disaggregate their communication by having different devices for 
different purposes. Several users were open about the purposes of their different 
phones. Among multiple-phone owners, most had one for business and one for 
personal use, but some had phones for gambling, “side businesses” or liaisons with 
women.43  Users showed little sense of loyalty to a brand or model, and several spoke 
about the fun of experimenting with new phone models. Users with multiple devices 
often had different phone models made by different manufacturers. When I asked 
whether this was to reduce the likelihood of confusing the “gambling” Samsung Galaxy 
for the “family” Samsung Galaxy, each said no; it was simply because they enjoyed 
having different phones. Despite the added complexity of different functionality  among 
devices, the users I spoke to choose variety when it is possible.
" In my questions about IPL-related habits, I sought to uncover not just what users 
do, but also, following Little (1991), their stated reasons for their preferences. When I 
asked why so many users kept their phones within reach, many said that they liked the 
feeling of “being connected” and having up-to-the-minute knowledge of what is 
happening in sports, pop  culture or hard news. Some indicated a preference for mobile 
apps; when I asked why, these users said they liked that the information had been 
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verified by a trusted source and preferred the clean interface of some apps to the 
“clutter” of social media. Other users (especially those under 18 years of age) indicated 
a preference for social media over apps, arguing that Twitter is searchable by hashtag, 
contains a richer set of viewpoints, and allows for more discussion.
Figure 6.3: Survey Questions on General Mobile Phone Usage
Question Responses
1. How much time do you spend 
talking on the phone on an 
average day?
30min or less: 16
30 to 1 hour: 15
1 to 2 hours: 19
More than 2 hours: 25
2. What times of day do you talk 
the most and least?
Most use:
     Morning: 13
     Noon: 1
     Afternoon: 14
     Evening: 20
     Night: 12
Least use: 
     Morning: 10
     Noon: 2
     Afternoon: 7
     Evening: 8
     Night: 12
3. How many texts do you send 
in an average day?
10 or fewer: 31
11 to 25: 11
26 to 50: 13
51 or more: 20
4. How many texts do you 
receive in an average day?
10 or fewer: 22
11 to 25: 17
26 to 50: 15
51 or more: 23
5. What kind of advertising do 
you receive on your phone? 
How do you respond to ads?
Most common: phone plans, real estate, health products, buy 
tickets online, travel offers
Other: caller tunes, taxis companies, business schools, internet 
broadband, personal loans, credit cards, cricket, alcohol
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Figure 6.3 shows how users responded to a series of questions about their general 
habits and preferences with mobile phones. I encountered a wide divergence in how, 
when, and how much mobile phone owners use their phones, but also found several 
notable consistencies. First, few respondents said they turned their phone off while at 
work; most said they relied on texting when they could not talk (for example, at the 
office) or made calls during breaks. Rather than eliminate mobile phone use in work or 
other contexts in which phone use is discouraged, users found ways to subtly integrate 
their mobile usage into the context. As one user put it, “the phones are easy to hide and 
there are too many of them for bosses to confiscate.” A  second (and related) 
consistency was a tendency for heavy users to use phones passively. When I asked 
users how many times they used their phones, some found this difficult to answer, 
because one “instance” might involve two calls and three texts. A third consistency 
concerned advertising. Users seemed baffled by the ads they received and 
overwhelmingly  said that they ignore mobile ads. Two of the more common descriptions 
users gave for mobile ads included “random” and “nonsense.” Despite their claims of 
annoyance, several users conceded that they read the ads and could remember their 
contents. During one conversation I had with a user, he received a text message for a 
calling plan with Aircel, a rival to his current provider. He said he received an Aircel 
message once or twice per week, and proceeded to give me a description of the prices 
Aircel offered versus his current provider (Interview with mobile phone user, Bangalore, 
2013). When I probed other users, they could recite the names of companeis that texted 
them most often. Several users (even a few of those who said they ignored ads) 
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conceded that they had clicked on links or made purchases based on the ads they 
received on their phones.
! In these three consistencies that I have described (in usage at work, using 
phones passively  and instinctively, and claiming to ignore ads while absorbing their 
messages) I found that users were rarely  away from their phones for long. They were 
the types of users that Sherry Turkle (2008) describes as “tethered” and “aways on.” 
Users wove their phone usage into the rhythms of their work day. They talked on the 
phone when circumstances made it possible (for example, during breaks), texted or 
used silent functions when work required silence (for example, when sitting at a desk), 
and hid their phone when a situation made phone use inappropriate (for example, 
during a meeting). In workplaces, usersʼ habits of usage frequently followed the 
structure of the workday and the rules of the workspace. At the same time, habits of 
phone usage also follow external events such as cricket matches. One user in Delhi told 
me with a laugh that: 
The bosses hate that there are IPL matches that start at 4pm. Once a match 
starts, people stop working. They  want to check to see will bat first, then they 
want to check to see the score after five overs, then ten... Maybe they  have a bet 
on the match, so they want to know what is happening. By 5pm, people are 
ready  to go watch the rest of the match. Theyʼve been following it on their phones 
for an hour. This happens every year when the IPL is on. We get nothing done! 
(Interview with mobile phone user, Delhi, 2013).
Here we see how the practices of IPL mobile phone usage extend beyond the match 
itself. In offices across India, workers follow the action from their desks, in the hallways, 
and (as one user told me) below the table during meetings. The expansion and 
improvement of IPL-related mobile applications has given users a wider range of 
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features. And the miniaturization of phones has made the devices easier to conceal. 
The result is that in many workplaces in India, mobile networks have taken on a 
disruptive role 
! The mobile phone users I observed and spoke to had a consistent set of 
assumptions about their devices and mobile phone networks. The first was that they 
have little expectation of privacy. It is very  common for users in India to make calls, send 
texts or use phones in other ways while in crowded spaces; in such situations, strangers 
can see the text on screens or hear the conversation taking place. Users also indicated 
several assumptions about network functionality. They expect cheap connectivity  and 
little to no cost for switching providers. They expect ever-increasing capabilities of 
devices and ever-faster networks. And they expect free information, in real-time, on 
social media, mobile apps and the Internet. Indiaʼs mobile network infrastructure may be 
fragile and strained, but its users have high expectations and little loyalty to the 
companies that provide service. This helps explain the difficulties telephone service 
providers and infrastructure firms have in turning profits (Gupta, interview 2013; Sethi, 
interview 2013; Shankar, interview 2013).
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Figure 6.4: Survey Questions on Usersʼ Economics of Mobile Phone Usage
Question Responses
1. For how long have you had a 
mobile phone?
Less than 5 years: 11
5 to 7 years: 16
8 to 9 years: 22
10 years or more: 20
2. What brands of phone have 
you owned?
Most common: iPhone, Nokia, Samsung, Blackberry
Other: Sony Ericsson, Motorola, NEC, Panasonic, LG, Dell, Sprint, 
Micromax, HTC, Note I, Note II, SI II, Symbian, Ace Plus




4. For those with prepaid plans: 
How much is your average bill 
per month?
Rs 300 or less (US$5.45 or less): 6
Rs 301 to 500 (US$5.46 to $9.10): 7
Rs 501 to 750 (US$9.11 to $13.64): 5
Rs 750 or more (US$13.65 or more): 7
5. For those with prepaid plans: 




6. For those with postpaid plans: 
How much is your average bill 
per month?
Rs 300 or less (US$5.45 or less): 0
Rs 301-500 (US$5.46 to $9.10): 0
Rs 501-750 (US$9.11 to $13.64): 1
Rs 750 or more (US$13.65 or more): 17
7. For those with postpaid plans: 




Figure 6.4 shows usersʼ economics of mobile phone usage. Most users had eight or 
more years of experience as mobile phone users, and had owned at least three phones 
during that period. For usersʼ current phones, the most common current brands were 
Nokia and Samsung. It was normal for users to try  different phones in succession; I 
never met a user who claimed to have used only one brand out of loyalty. Similarly, 
users switched service providers frequently, with “poor service” and “I wanted to try 
something new” as the most common reason for switching. A handful of users (mostly in 
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the 18 and under age group) had remained with a single service provider for their entire 
time as mobile phone users, but these were exceptions. 
! The most obvious difference between the economics of Indian mobile networks 
and their counterparts in much of the industrialized world is the prevalence of pay-as-
you-go (or, in Indian parlance, “prepaid”) calling. Mobile phone contracts (“postpaid”), 
with a fixed cost and monthly  allocation of minutes, texts and data, are less common 
nationally  than prepaid; the users I surveyed bifurcated roughly 50/50 as prepaid and 
postpaid customers. As the above figures show, users with prepaid calling tend to have 
much lower monthly bills than those with postpaid calling. But many prepaid callers 
complained about not knowing how much they would spend each month and said they 
frequently  had situations in which they ran out of credit on their phones. Postpaid users 
had much higher monthly bills; nearly all the postpaid users I spoke to said their bills 
were Rs 750 or more, and half of those were Rs 2000 or higher. Despite the high costs, 
postpaid users liked the predictable nature of their bills and the peace of mind that came 
from not needing to reload minutes. A minority said they would switch to prepaid when 
their current contract runs out. Several others said their postpaid account was paid for 
by their work, so the convenience of not having to reload minutes outweighs any cost 
savings. This divide between prepaid and postpaid customers had economic and 
cultural aspects. Postpaid users tended to be older, more willing (or able) to pay larger 
sums for their mobile phone bill, and more likely to use their phone for business. 
Prepaid users were younger, more active on social media and more conscious of the 
cost structure of their calling plan.
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! In my interactions with users in the context of IPL matches, I encountered a 
differentiated set of mobile phone owners and a range of experiences with respect to 
the IPL and mobile telephony. Some users kept their phones with them solely to 
communicate with friends and family, and did not follow the match, social media or news 
on the Internet. Even within this limited-use group, many kept their phones handy  and 
visible in case someone called. Another group  used their phones regularly throughout 
the match by checking in to friends inside and outside the stadium, participating in 
discussions on social media and searching for information on the Internet. A final group 
used their phones more or less continuously, with apps and social media open 
throughout the match. This last group, which represented about a third of the users I 
surveyed, spent more than three hours on their telephones each day and often much 
more. When I asked users to name places where they used their phones, several said 
“everywhere.” For these users, the mobile phone allows them to be connected anytime, 
anywhere, and in any context. These contexts included meetings, classes, live events 
and family  gatherings. In some cases the mobile network added richness to these 
contexts, by allowing users to integrate content on the network (in the form of apps, 
social media and websites) with live, real-time experiences. In other cases, the mobile 
network provided distraction and escape for users, giving them other things to look at or 
do when they were bored. More than one user told me that “the match really  isnʼt 
important” and that the more meaningful experience was socializing. In that sense, the 
mobile phone was an ideal complement.
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Observations Outside Matches
! While IPL matches are the largest physical hubs, the network reaches many 
more users via communication tools that share the mobile phone as their point of 
access for fans. This section examines the participatory aspects of YouTube, mobile 
apps, social media and websites dedicated to the IPL, as well as their limitations (see 
Chapter 5, figure 5.1 for a list of mobile apps, social media and websites). In different 
ways, these allow users to draw from and contribute to the IPL mobile network. As 
components of the IPLʼs communicative circuitry, they allow for analysis about the IPL 
as a second order network and as an indicator of social changes connected with mobile 
networks in India.
! YouTube plays a major role in the distribution of IPL matches. It is the principal 
medium of distribution for IPL matches outside India, with companies such as Willow 
(the sole distributor for the US), holding the rights in different countries. Users buy a 
pass for the season, the cost of which varies by country; they then log in and watch 
matches via the standard YouTube interface. By distributing live matches through 
YouTube, the IPL has avoided the traditional broadcast model of distribution, in which a 
league sells broadcast rights to national free-to-air networks (which recoup their 
investment in advertising) or uses a pay-per-view TV model. The IPLʼs broadcast model 
follows the pay-per-view model in a certain sense (users who want the official broadcast 
must pay up-front for a season pass), with three key differences. One is that the pass is 
transferrable: because it is based on a login, it is not tied to a specific device in the way 
that a traditional pay-per-view purchase is tied to a specific cable userʼs location. A 
second difference is that, because the distribution mechanism is a website, users can 
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watch the matches anywhere there is a signal strong enough to support live streaming. 
! In my fieldwork, I saw users watching matches on trains, in airports, and a wide 
range of other public locations. A third difference is that, unlike a traditional one-to-many 
television broadcast, YouTube is a social medium. Users can post content of their own 
and link up with other users. But this has limits: on the IPLʼs official YouTube channel, 
comments are disabled for all videos. Thus a ʻsocialʼ medium has the feel of an online 
streaming platform. YouTube is the ideal medium because it is designed to work on 
personal computers (the most common device of choice for Internet streaming in 
industrialized countries) and on mobile phones (which are more common in India and 
other developing countries). Pricing varies from country to country but tends to be 
relatively inexpensive (in the US, it was $39.99 plus tax for a season-long subscription 
in 2013). Low prices generate large audiences for advertising, decrease the savings for 
users who choose to watch illegal live-streaming sites, and normalize the practice of 
IPL fans watching via a familiar interface (Kaushik, interview 2013).
! Mobile apps also play a large role in the IPL network. It is noteworthy that the 
most popular apps tend to be the products of institutions that pre-date social media. 
While the costs of creating a mobile app are relatively low, it is difficult for upstarts to 
compete with the depth of reporting and data offered by traditional media (Shankar, 
interview, 2013). In terms of design, legacy media have the advantages of being able to 
produce or commission high-quality, user-tested apps with functionality that is difficult 
for startups to match with a small budget and small design team (Rao, interview, 2013). 
From a financial perspective, startups often struggle to turn a profit on apps: the major 
cricket apps tend to be free or cheap and rely on advertising. For these reasons, a 
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power law has emerged in mobile apps, with a handful of pre-mobile institutions running 
the most popular apps for users in India. The BCCI has an app  focused on the IPL, with 
information on the dayʼs matches, the season schedule, teams, players, league stats 
and trivia. ESPNCricinfo has an app  and separate mobile website that allow users to 
access the richest trove of publicly available cricket data. During the playing season, the 
IPL gets a special page and prominent space on the ESPNCricinfo app and website, 
with a Match Companion (see Figure 6.7 on page 25) that allows users to predict results 
and discuss the match with other users. Other popular apps include CricBuzz and 
Yahoo Cricket, which provide live updates, replays, analysis, and schedules of 
upcoming matches.
" Whereas mobile apps have a private element (allowing users to access and draw 
from the network without necessarily contributing), social media is much more public. As 
Chapter 5 discusses, the IPL has a significant presence on Twitter and Facebook. 
Compared to many other annual sports leagues, the IPL has a short (seven week) 
playing season, meaning that the league and its franchises effectively shut down from 
early summer until late fall. Accordingly, the IPL is a seasonal business, with short-term 
contracts for players, stadium rentals, travel arrangements and advertising, and the 
leagueʼs social media cycle reflects this seasonal model. Each year, the IPL gains a 
significant following on social media, only to lose some of that following in the months 
after the season ends (Kaushik, interview, 2013). In the months preceding the season, 
the IPL rebuilds its social media base and, as the season progresses, tries to improve 
on the previous yearʼs totals of followers and IPL-related posts. The overall result is an 
upward trend year-to-year, but as a team communications consultant put it, “social 
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media always involves a step back, then hopefully two steps forward the next 
year” (Rao, interview 2013). The IPL has focused most of its efforts on Twitter and 
Facebook; it made a half-hearted addition of Google+ to its mix list of official social 
media networks during the 2013 playing season, but no mobile phone users I spoke to 
followed the league on Google+. Figure 6.5 (below) shows the growth of the IPL Twitter 
and Facebook fan base during the 2013 playing season. 




In Figure 6.5 we see upward trends in Twitter followers and in Facebook Likes for the 
IPL official accounts, as well as the seasonal swings discussed above. From its annual 
low point in the winter preceding the season, the league gradually increased its number 
of followers. The Facebook graph (top) is cumulative, counting new Likes on top of old 
ones. Users tend not to erase their past Likes; instead, when the season ends, most 
cease to add new Likes; the result is a line that continues to rise, but with fewer and 
fewer new Likes to report each week. In the Twitter graph (bottom), we see a significant 
increase in activity  from the start of the playing season on April 4. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the number of followers peaked in mid-May, before the championship 
match. In the week following the end of the season, the graph shows the beginning of 
the leagueʼs attrition in Twitter followers.
Figure 6.6: Social Media as Broadcast
Source: Indian Premier League (2013c).
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Figure 6.6 shows the official Twitter profile of the Indian Premier League. The most 
striking feature of the page is the ratio of “following” to “followers” of the IPL. Of the 
nearly  1 million followers of the IPLʼs account, the league followed fewer than 90; this 
select group included the official Twitter accounts of each team, several dozen players, 
and a handful of media organizations. In interviews with team officials, I asked about the 
conversational nature of social media, but several stated that they saw the IPL and team 
sites as tools of dissemination rather than participation in conversations (Rao, interview, 
2013; Kaushik, interview, 2013). When I asked fans at matches if they had ever 
exchanged messages with or been re-tweeted by the IPL official accounts, many 
laughed at the suggestion. One young fan told me that “if you want the IPL to follow you, 
buy an IPL franchise.” 
Figure 6.7 IPL Social Buzz
Source: Indian Premier League (2013d).
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Figure 6.7 shows the Social Buzz box that enjoys a prominent place on the IPL website 
and is updated in real-time. The IPL places great emphasis on day-to-day metrics of 
social media usage and encourages users to promote their favorite teams in prescribed 
ways. From left to right, three options are visible. First, at left, users can click on the 
drop-down menu to select their team of choice, then either accept or alter a pre-written 
message in the data field below, and click Tweet to post the message. In the center, 
previous messages are grouped by hashtag, allowing users to click on the hashtag of 
their choice to see the discussion related to that team. Teams tend to get more 
discussion on days when they play. In this instance, the disparity in hashtags (with 
#CSK and #MI dominating the conversation) is the result of timing: it was the day of the 
championship final, with the Chennai Super Kings taking on the Mumbai Indians. At 
right is a third option for users, with the Twitter conversation organized chronologically 
so users can view the most current posts. The Social Buzz interface reminds users of 
the centralization of social media at the IPL. The league administers each of the team 
social media accounts and curates them so they are consistent with the IPL brand. As a 
result, the team social media accounts are largely indistinguishable from each other and 
have the same “broadcast” feel.
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Figure 6.8: ESPNCricinfo Match Companion
Source: ESPNCricinfo (2013a).
For more inclusive conversations, users must leave the IPL apps, website and social 
media, and explore some of the options created by third parties. Figure 6.8 shows the 
beta version of ESPNCricinfoʼs Match Companion, which debuted during the 2013 IPL 
season. Match Companion aggregates Facebook and Twitter activity  related to the IPL, 
and adds new pages for user involvement. These include a Social Commentary  page 
for users who create accounts and sign in, a Match Card, which shows the most recent 
action in the match, and a Predictor, in which users can make predictions on the 
outcome of the match or certain components (such as individual or team scores). The 
Predictor awards points to those who make the best guesses, and publishes a list of the 
winners on the page at the end of each match. ESPNCricinfo is able to draw users in 
large numbers because it is the largest online resource for cricket across the Test, one-
day and Twenty20 formats of the game.44  Since it covers all three formats of the game, 
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ESPNCricinfo understands that the Twenty20 format (and especially the IPL) cater to a 
young audience. It has therefore used the IPL to test its social interface. The users I 
spoke to saw ESPNCricinfo as a neutral arbitrar and viewed the Match Companion as a 
more conversational tool than anything the IPL had released. This neutrality was a 
critical element missing in the IPLʼs efforts. Whereas the discussions on ESPNCricinfo, 
CricBuzz, Yahoo Cricket, and other third-party sites focused on analysis, those on IPL 
platforms focused on promotion of the league and its interests, or (as on the official IPL 
YouTube channel) snuffed out discussion altogether.
" In the preceding pages I have discussed the components of the IPL mobile 
network beyond the stadium. By exploring the functionality  of the IPLʼs official mobile 
apps, website and social media, and competing third-party communication tools, this 
section has shown the ways that these different media relate to each other, with the 
mobile phone as the primary means of reaching fans. This analysis shows that different 
media serve different roles: for example, the users I spoke to saw mobile apps as tools 
for narrow, factual, officially-verified information from a trusted source. In contrast, many 
others were drawn to social media for its range of opinions, rumors, memes and jokes. 
Many users followed the IPL on Twitter and Facebook, but described official IPL 
information as one-way. The IPL decides what to post and when to post it, and 
encourages fans to pass on certain types of messages (generally  focusing on team 
loyalty). Following previous research I have done on social media in India (Belair-
Gagnon and Agur, 2013), this study shows that self-promotion is still a significant 
element in the “conversation” that takes place on Facebook and Twitter in that country. 
The IPL uses ʻsocialʼ media to broadcast its brand and its message, while limiting the 
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conversational aspects of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The exceptions to this rule 
include media by third parties that do not have the same vested interest in the league. 
ESPNCricinfo is the most obvious example, with a Match Companion that promotes 
discussion and avoids the broadcast approach and self-promotion of IPL media.
Conclusion
! This chapter has put to use three types of data to highlight different features of 
the IPL mobile network. By conducting observations at matches, I witnessed how mobile 
phone owners make use of their devices in a national commercial and cultural context 
of significance in mobile communications. I noted the behaviors of users with different 
devices and noted the ways that collectives of users have formed unwritten codes of 
conduct on usage. I also found, in a surprising addition to my fieldwork, that a lack of 
mobile phone availability is an effective way to study usersʼ relationship  with the 
network. It was only  once the network was unavailable that I understood its significance. 
The “born mobile” generation in India takes for granted that mobile phones are cheap, 
readily available, here to stay, and something that is natural to use in most contexts. 
When phones are prohibited, the effect is to transport users to a time and place that is 
very unfamiliar, especially to young users.
 ! In addition to participant observation, I conducted surveys and interviews with 
mobile phone users in the context of IPL matches. In these interactions, I learned more 
about user habits and preferences and their meanings. Users see mobile devices and 
networks as integrated elements in social occasions and in live events. Users enjoy 
variety in devices and service providers, and a surprising number of users had more 
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than one device, each with its own function (work, family, girlfriend, betting). My 
interactions with users revealed a paradox: while users also see the mobile phone as a 
device that aggregates functions, they also use multiple phones to disaggregate 
aspects of their lives that they wish to keep separate. My final data set in this chapter 
involved exploring major platforms connected to the IPL mobile network. These included 
the mobile apps, social media, and websites most popular among IPL fans I surveyed. 
By exploring the design and functionality of each of these platforms, I found that in 
mobile apps, social media and websites, a power law has emerged, with major 
institutions (many of which predate Indiaʼs mobile networks) providing the most popular 
tools. I also found that different users were drawn to each of these platforms for their 
own reasons: ease of access, reliability  of content for accuracy, range of opinions 
available, searchability, and specialization and exclusivity of information.
" My study of users and usage shows that the IPL network is a site for many of the 
social interactions of Indian mobile networks. The political economy of Indian telephony 
(with mass connectivity, cheap service and a wide variety  of devices and service 
providers) has made mobile networks both participatory and public. Users integrate 
mobile phones into many different aspects of their lives such as work, family, and social 
occasions. Users perceive mobile phone networks as extensions of in-person 
communication. With mobile phone use now ubiquitous, Indian users have developed 
practices and performativity  in their public use of devices. Some of the practices of 
usage follow the structure of matches and the communicative agenda of the IPL. At 
specific points in matches, users engage in a series of responsive actions (answering 
trivia questions and polls, visiting advertised websites, and posting updates for prizes). 
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Users have done more than just respond; they have generated collective mobile culture. 
This includes codes and rules on behavior in certain contexts, so that user behavior 
does not detract from othersʼ enjoyment of spectacles. It also includes a set of practices 
that extend beyond the stadium, to places of work, where the IPLʼs presence has a 
disruptive effect during matches. In overt and covert ways, Indian mobile phone users 
have made use of the features of phones (increasingly  powerful, and increasingly small 
and discreet) to be “always on” and connected in ways that satisfy their interests (in this 
case, in cricket). In this sense we can see the ways that mobile networks serve as both 
carriers and creators of culture in contemporary India. If the political economy of Indian 
telephony created the conditions for participatory  mass networks, it is users who have 
most profoundly shaped the second order network of the IPL. Today, users are 
producers and consumers of content on a variety of platforms linked by mobile phones. 
" These social interactions reveal some of the changes Castells identifies in his 
network theory. The first is a shift to virtual production and consumption. Second, the 
growth of new networks creates the potential for new flows of information. Third, these 
new flows allow for the formation of network enterprises that aggregate previously 
disparate services for commercial use. These changes illustrate what Castells means by 
the growth of ʻinformationalismʼ in a network society, with new flows of information 
altering and replacing existing structures. For Castells, informationalism involves a a 
series of Schumpeterian changes taking place in Indiaʼs communication networks. 
These include the the disruption of old flows (television broadcast), the formation of new 
flows based on a new set of network possibilities and the mass adoption of mobile 
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devices, and the growth of hybrid communications, with a mix of new and old (mobile 
networks in live events and social situations). 
! Interactions on the IPL mobile network also show the relevance of network 
design and policy-formation. Indiaʼs contemporary mobile networks are the byproducts 
of decisions in network design and political economy. Indiaʼs mobile phone policy-
making favored rapid network expansion, mass mobile phone usage, and a hyper-
competitive market with cheap  service. Today in India, mobile networks link a wide 
range of users nationwide and several platforms converge on mobile phones; the 
mobile phone is the device to access a wide range of content. The most popular usage 
of mobile phones in India is leisure, and mobile networks are now inescapable aspects 
of face-to-face communication. Telephone policy in the 1990s focused on telephony as 
a distinct medium, not as a form of communication integrated into live events or day-to-
day socialization. In the IPLʼs mobile network, we see an example of a second order 
network. This network includes, first, a new sense of ʻliveʼ events, with mobile devices 
and continuous connectivity now essential features for many fans. It also includes new 
spatial and temporal relationships emerging thanks to mass mobile phone access. Last, 
the IPL mobile network has a structural feature, with new circuits and hubs, and 
accompanying strains in Indiaʼs communication networks.
! The following chapter will examine some of these strains, as well as the dark side 
of mobile networks. Eager users have added to the IPL mobile network, not always in 
ways that the league intended. On new networks and in a different context from that 
discussed by D.R. Rutter (1987), Indian users have shown the power that users have 
on a “cueless” network (that is, one that does not contain its own intrinsic rules). The 
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expansion from elite to mass mobile phone networks in India has limited the ability of 
institutions (even those that created the platforms) to govern a second order network. 
While the IPL has created a set of platforms for users and developed practices of usage 
during matches, users have found ways to put mobile phones to use as they see fit. 
These uses include developing their own habits of usage during matches (inside and 
outside the stadium), as discussed in Chapter 6. Those uses reveal the limitations the 
IPL faces as an early shaper of the IPL mobile network. It can build the platforms and 
give institutional legitimacy to certain types of usage, but masses of users will find ways 
to use the network for their own uses. As Chapter 7 will discuss, some of these uses are 
very  worrying for the league. The same network that has given millions of fans an 
exciting extension of watching a match has also become home for significant levels of 
gambling and corruption. These unexpected outcomes reveal the ways that the space 
of flows does not necessarily favor legal or “legitimate” uses of mobile phones; some of 
the biggest winners are criminal syndicates that have taken advantage of the instant, 
global flows of information that are now possible. These new forces threaten the future 
of the league and raise questions about the governance of second order mobile 
networks.
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Chapter 7: Case Study Part III:
Outcomes of the IPL Second Order Network
! The previous chapter emphasized the ways in which users connect to and utilize 
mobile networks during matches. Much of that network activity follows the expectations 
of the league, telephone service providers and users, all of whom have something to 
gain from the addition of mobile telephony to the experience of following a cricket match 
in India. In this chapter, I explore two unintended effects of mobile phone networks. 
Gambling and corruption have long and interconnected histories in India, with 
communication networks playing a large role in the nature and scale of participation. 
Indiaʼs large and inclusive mobile phone networks have enabled significant new 
gambling and new corruption, by making rapid, discreet communication possible over 
distance. More importantly, the spatial possibilities of mobile networks have led to new 
organizational forms in gambling and corruption, with small-scale local activity 
increasingly supplanted by organized syndicates located in Mumbai and Dubai. Using 
interviews with mobile phone users and participants in betting rings, I find that there is 
much more to the story than the feel-good mobile-optimism promoted by the IPL. 
! This chapter shows that the IPL mobile network enables second order illicit 
activity  by making it easier to administer illegal action at a distance, and easier to 
escape detection in doing so. In contrast to the stated intentions of the IPL and the 
hopes of users, the outcomes (to date) suggest that mobile networks have opened up 
worrying communicative possibilities in Indiaʼs new space of flows. The first half of this 
chapter emphasizes three ways that mobile networks facilitate gambling. First, their 
functionality, portability and near-universality allow for new flows of information and 
210
capital among participants. Second, mobile networks allow for new scale and new 
organizational forms, allowing a shift from local bookies to national (and international) 
gambling syndicates. Third, mobile networks have dramatically enlarged the gambling 
sector in India, and arguably nowhere more than in sports gambling. These changes in 
mobile devices and networks have helped turn cricket gambling into a global industry 
with India at the center.
Gambling
! Gambling has a long history  as a popular pastime in India. Dice and card games 
and bets on horse-racing long predate the arrival of the British; the Mughal emperors 
prohibited these on the grounds that they violate maisir – the Islamic prohibition on 
monetary gains from games of chance or speculation. Despite these efforts to curtail 
gambling, it remained an ubiquitous feature of life in the Mughal period (Mukhia, 1969). 
Under the British Raj, gambling became intertwined with the colonial economy: Indian 
mercantile communities speculated on the prices of opium, gold, silver and cotton 
(Richards, 2002). With the introduction of direct telegraph service to and from England, 
land and undersea wires became long-distance conduits for increasingly sophisticated 
information, which local populations used for making and taking bets (Benegal. 2012). 
Within India, the expansion of the telegraph created new flows of information. Telegraph 
lines conveyed the day-to-day  (and even hour-to-hour) minutia of life in India. 
Scheduled updates of information prompted a thriving weather-betting market – for 
example, the amount of rainfall on a given day or pahar (three-hour period) in different 
cities (Hardgrove, 2002). Certain annual celebrations, such as Diwali (the festival of 
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lights, invoking Lakshmi, the Goddess of Wealth) and Janmashtami (Lord Krishnaʼs 
birthday) also emerged as occasions for gambling.
" The British Raj criminalized speculation on commodities as well as recreational 
gambling on games of chance (Birla, 2009). The Public Gambling Act of 1867 
distinguished between “gaming,” which involved skill, as in horse-racing, and “mere 
betting,” which involved games of chance (Indian Parliament, 1867). This made native 
gambling illegal but, (conveniently for colonial officials) allowed horse-racing to 
continue. And because horse-racing took place only at turf clubs with high membership 
dues, the law effectively reserved legal gambling to high-ranking British officers in India 
(Mahyera, 2012). The Public Gambling Act empowers federal, state, and local police to 
enter and search the premises of suspected gaming houses, arrest or fine those 
present in gaming houses (even if they are not found to be gambling), and arrest or fine 
those caught gambling in public (Indian Parliament, 1867). Another British Raj era piece 
of legislation sought to reduce the power of gambling. Section 30 of the Indian Contract 
Act of 1872 states in clear language that bets are unenforceable contracts: “Agreements 
by way of wager are void; and no suit shall be brought for recovering anything alleged to 
be won on any wager, or entrusted to any person to abide the result of any game or 
other uncertain event on which any wager is made” (Indian Parliament, 1872).
" Since independence, the Indian government has continued to ban gambling, with 
little effect. Although the Indian Constitution gives powers to individual states to regulate 
gambling, post-independence legislation and court decisions have tended to follow the 
letter of the Public Gambling Act of 1867 (Sharma, 2007). Horse racing, the card game 
rummy, and state lotteries are permissible across India, and two small states (Goa and 
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Sikkim) have legalized casinos (Benegal, 2012). While the Public Gambling Act of 1867 
has undergone these modifications, it has not been amended to deal with online or 
mobile phone gambling. Instead, the Indian government has preferred to work within the 
existing law, on the assumption that online gambling is simply a new form of an old, 
illegal activity. Federal investigators have monitored domestic online gambling rings and 
occasionally arrested those involved in the management of betting websites (Times of 
India, 2014). The far larger challenge is the massive and rapidly-growing online 
gambling market. With the Information Technology Act of 2011, the Indian government 
required Internet service providers to block overseas betting sites (Indian Parliament, 
2011). But with thousands of sites to monitor, ISPs face an impossible task. The number 
of overseas betting sites was too large to count when the law was passed. Today, it is 
exponentially higher and largely beyond the reach of Indian investigators. The legal 
onus is on ISPs to restrict access to online gambling sites; no law in India prohibits 
users from accessing sites outside the country.
! Indiaʼs near-prohibition on gambling sits at odds with two demonstrable facts: (a) 
that India has a long history of gambling, tied to its history, geography and culture, and 
(b) that in recent years India has become one of the worldʼs largest gambling markets, 
especially  in cricket. After two decades of economic liberalization, India has become the 
largest source of the $40-50 billion worth of bets on cricket worldwide each year 
(KPMG, 2010; Pandit, 2010; Sydenham, 2011; Waris, 2013). As the following pages will 
show, in the past decade, the Internet and mobile phone networks have become the 
primary carriers of betting related to cricket in India. 
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! Contemporary gambling on cricket is in some respects a continuation of past 
practices. Gambling on cricket in India developed later than gambling on commodities, 
rain, or festivals, and owes much to successive communication networks of the 20th 
and 21st centuries. The introduction of radio (1924) and television (1959) in India led to 
gatherings of cricket fans in bazaars and other public spaces, broadcast by 
shopkeepers who used cricket broadcasts to draw crowds (Cashman, 1980; Ugra, 
2005). These assemblies of fans became focal points not only for listening and watching 
matches, but also for gambling on the action. In the postwar period, with the expansion 
of broadcast radio and television, cricket audiences gathered in bazaars across India to 
follow their regional team in the Ranji Cup, or the national team in Test matches, most 
often against England or Pakistan. In such settings, bookies established odds, collected 
bets and enforced punishments for those unable to pay. In these large crowds, social 
relations determined trust; betters needed to know a bookie or be referred to a bookie 
by a friend who could vouch for the better.45 Since gambling was illegal, it took place via 
networks rather than via formal institutions (Hawkins, 2012).
! While the social nature of these gatherings played a role, the structure of the 
game makes cricket especially  susceptible to gambling. Cricket is a highly  ordered and 
segmented sport, with a standard feature of play (a delivery of the ball from bowler to 
batsman), a set number of balls per over (six), and a set number of wickets per team 
(ten). These features distinguish cricket from more fluid sports such as rugby, hockey 
and soccer/football, and create possibilities for betting that do not exist in more fluid 
sports. In a Twenty20 match, the fielding team seeks to take the wickets of ten batsmen 
in succession or, failing that, to restrict the batting team to as few runs as possible. 
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Bowlers deliver six balls in succession in a unit of play called an ʻoverʼ. When the over is 
complete, the batsmen remain in place, but the fielding team changes position so that 
the play proceeds from the opposite end, with a new bowler.
Figure 7.1: Cricket as a Structured Game
Source: ESPNCricinfo (2013b).
215
! The above figure shows a typical live feed of an IPL match. This is the 11th over 
of Bangaloreʼs innings, as indicated by  the decimal places on the left side. Bangalore 
are midway  through their chase of 146 runs needed to beat Delhiʼs score of 145. On the 
top half of the image we see the key players. There are two batsmen (one at either end 
of the 22-yard track at the center of the pitch), with the batsman facing the current ball 
highlighted in red. There are also two bowlers listed, with the bowler delivering the 
current over highlighted in red. The other bowler delivered the balls in the previous over 
and will return to bowl the following over. On the bottom half of the image, we see the 
play-by-play description for each of the six balls in the over. This particular over featured 
four singles (balls 2, 3, 5, and 6), a six (hit over the boundary, much like a home run in 
baseball), and a ʻdot ballʼ (no run). The play-by-play shows the structured nature of 
cricket. Each ball and each over present a multitude of betting options. Gamblers can 
bet on anything from how many runs were hit off a particular delivery (for example 1 run 
off ball 10.2) to whether there will be any sixes or wickets in an over (in this case there 
was one six and no wickets). The structure of cricket, with balls and overs as modular 
units of a teamʼs innings, makes spot-betting a natural element of the game. 
Importantly, in each ball, the central figure is the bowler. For that over, he chooses the 
pace and placement of six balls, and is therefore in a unique position to determine the 
course of play. In the Twenty20 format of cricket, teams face only 120 balls (20 overs), 
so each ball matters more than in longer formats (one-day and Test). This increases the 
chance that a match will turn on a single ball, and makes Twenty20 betting more 
exciting for participants and more volatile for bookies (Interviews with mobile phone 
users, Mumbai, Jaipur, Hyderabad and Chennai, 2013).
216
! Several features of contemporary  India have also driven growth in gambling 
since the arrival of the IPL. The first is the economics of India: It is a growing and 
urbanizing economy, with most of its gains concentrated among elites. This has 
enlarged the top-end of gambling and increased the ʻfrothʼ in the gambling market. 
Today, average bets are slightly  higher than they  were five years ago, but the largest 
bets are substantially higher, owing to the increased wealth of those at the top 
(Interview with bookie, Jaipur, 2013). Second, India has become the worldʼs largest 
market for cricket. In dollars spent on the game, it easily  surpasses all other cricket-
playing countries (Economist, 2008). Today, with a growing population and growing 
economy, India continues to widen the gap with rival cricket economies. By some 
estimates, India is responsible for more than 60% of all dollars spent worldwide on 
cricket (Gupta, 2010). As a result, India is the center of finance in the game and a 
natural home for betting syndicates (Hawkins, 2012; Mahyera, 2012). Third, India 
remains a society with significant informal and often untraceable economic flows and a 
history of weak rule of law. This makes India is an ideal economic environment for 
gambling. As one bookie told me: “Some friends of mine, they used to go to England or 
Australia to take bets, but they  have all come home. India is where the action is. There 
is less scrutiny here, unless you rip  off the wrong person, like a politician” (Interview with 
bookie, Jaipur, 2013). No gambler I spoke to seemed concerned about whether or not 
the law would protect his bet. When I pointed out the lack of legal recourse, gamblers 
would typically shrug and remark that part of the skill in betting is knowing who can be 
trusted with a bet.
217
! In addition to features of India itself, gambling on cricket in India is also 
influenced by a nearby  country whose recent economic growth owes much to its 
proximity to India. The United Arab  Emirates (UAE) is a hub of finance and cricket 
administration, with the International Cricket Council (ICC) headquarters located in 
Dubai. The ICC moved its headquarters from London to Dubai in 2005, to establish 
itself in a neutral (non-Test playing) country, to avoid a pending tax hike by the British 
government, and to to be closer to the growing financial hub  of Mumbai, which had 
become the largest source of investment in the game. Today, India has the richest and 
most powerful national governing body and is in the middle of an effort (with support 
from England and Australia) to create a ʻbig-threeʼ who would dominate the ICC (Ugra, 
2014). The ICC takes a firm stand against all forms of gambling on cricket. It conducts 
regular investigations and has fined, suspended, and banned players and officials who 
have engaged in insider betting. That said, the ICCʼs power is checked by national 
governing bodies; with the head of the BCCI set to become the next ICC chairman, 
Indiaʼs influence over ICC governance will continue to grow (The Hindu, 2014). As the 
global governing body, the ICC  sanctions nationally-administered leagues such as the 
IPL, but has little say in their day-to-day operations.
! Beyond the politics of the ICC, Dubai matters because it is a significant hub for 
Indian expatriates and for the Indian mafia. After a decade of rapid growth, Indian 
expatriates are the largest foreign group in the UAE and make up nearly 30% of the 
countryʼs residents (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). The growth of Dubai as a 
commercial center, a relaxing of visa restrictions on Indians entering the UAE, and the 
proliferation of flights between the two countries have all helped make the UAE the 
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largest hub outside India for gambling on cricket (Hawkins, 2012). One of the largest 
players in the UAE gambling underworld is D-Company, a notorious crime syndicate led 
by Dawood Kaskar, a Mumbai-born gangster. D-Company has used Dubai as a base, 
collecting data on teams, players, and matches in India and Pakistan, and making 
phone calls to bookies who take bets in cities around the region. Calls from D-Company 
come either from Dubai or from other cities (including Karachi, Delhi, Jaipur, Kolkata, 
and Ahmedabad), using Dubai numbers to create the appearance that calls originated 
from the city  (Unnikrishnan and Shekhar, 2013). Dubai is far enough to India for bookies 
to operate without fear of arrest or harassment by Indian authorities, yet close enough 
(three hoursʼ flying time to Mumbai) to keep an eye on local operations in India 
(Interview with team official for the Chennai Super Kings, Chennai, 2013).
" Betting syndicates distribute the odds for a match in real-time, via mobile phone. 
With these odds, bookies in different cities collect bets and send updates back to their 
superiors. In his book-length study of gambling in cricket, Ed Hawkins (2012) found that 
hierarchies of individual bookies exist within syndicates. The quality, granularity, and 
frequency of updates via mobile phone depends on whether a bookie enjoys first, 
second, or third tier status within the organization. A dozen bookies might work for the 
same organization in one city, but the internal politics of the organization determine 
which bookies get the most valuable updates. I encountered hints of these hierarchies 
when I spoke to bookies. When I asked about an upcoming match, one told me: “There 
is information out there, but I donʼt have it. Maybe next week. Iʼm down the food 
chain.” (Interview with bookie, Chennai, 2013). In the networks of participants involved 
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in cricket betting in India, mobile phones are not a leveler; they allow for organizational 
hierarchies and differentiated speed and quality of information flows.
! Several features of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks facilitate transactions for 
betting participants. The most obvious of these is the utility of basic phones. A  text 
messages can convey all the information that the parties involved need to place a bet, 
and that information can easily be coded so that the message fits on a single line of 
text. The following figure shows examples of real bets I witnessed being placed via text 
message on mobile phones. In each case I asked the user what the code meant, and 
have indicated the meaning to the right of the code.
Figure 7.2: Coding Bets in Text Messages
Code! ! ! Meaning
CSKtossbat! ! If Chennai win the coin toss, captain M.S. Dhoni will elect to bat
7-1-nb !! ! In the 7th over, the 1st ball will be a no-ball (illegal delivery)
11:05 W ! ! In the 11th over, the 5th ball will be a wicket
19o3b 6! ! In the 19th over, the 3rd ball will be hit for 6 runs
Malinga 0.3w ! ! Lasith Malingaʼs 3rd delivery of the match will be a wide
Kallis-W-lbw! ! Jacques Kallis will be out leg-before-wicket
The betters I spoke to used a fairly standard set (and order) of codes to indicate the 
conditions for a bet. In the case of spot-bets (those placed on a specific moment in the 
match, as opposed to the result of the entire match), betters tended to indicate first the 
over, then the ball, then the action. In the case of non-time specific actions (such as an 
action by  a specific bowler who might begin bowling at any  point in the match or the 
method by which a batsman will get out), betters tended to name the player or team 
first, followed by the action on which the bet is based. Betters often used colons or 
dashes to separate components of the code. For example, in the second example 
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above, the better used dashes to separate 7 (the 7th over), 1 (the 1st ball of the over) 
and nb  (a prediction that the delivery will be a no-ball); and in the third example above, 
the better used a colon to separate 11 (the 11th over) from 05 (the fifth ball of the over). 
What these codes have in common is ease of transmission. Participants require only a 
handset with text message capabilities, and an agreement on message formatting. I 
often asked if users gambled on the match without using their phones; more than one 
user replied, “how else would I place a bet?”
! While basic phones are all that is necessary for users to communicate with 
bookies, those with more advanced phones can access gambling apps and software 
that assist gamblers in making bets. Examples include onlinegambling.co.in, bet365, 
cricbet, betfair, indiabet, bettingmobile, and mobilesportsbetting. These tools give users 
a wider range of options on the type and size of bets they can make, and allow for more 
fluid and complex betting (including futures and other derivatives), by updating odds in 
real time and allowing users to make bets as the game evolves. Some of these tools 
offer features that predict match or spot-bet outcomes based on current data. 
Importantly, very few of these tools are wide-open. At a minimum, they require 
registration; while users may (and often do) use false names and details, the 
registration requirement allows administrators to track user behavior, identify 
problematic users and (at least temporarily) remove users who create trouble. Many 
sites are accessible only by invitation. This has a two-fold accountability: (a) would-be 
users must gain the support of an existing user to register, and (b) those who invite new 
users can be held responsible for the behavior of those they bring into the community. 
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Thus these sites build on pre-existing social relationships, often involving family 
members, friends, or members of the same cricket clubs. 
! The IPL prohibits players and team staff from engaging in gambling (Indian 
Premier League, 2014) and takes a firm line against gambling at matches, and those 
who attempt to take bets inside the stadium risk being ejected. I never saw anyone 
making bets in person at a match; all of the gambling I witnessed took place on mobile 
phones. While the IPL itself has chosen not to integrate gambling options into its official 
platforms, many of the most popular websites and apps have soft-betting options, in 
which users compete for points and rankings.
Figure 7.3: Soft-Betting or ʻFantasyʼ Platforms
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Source: Yahoo (2014).
The above figure shows the team composition for the top-ranked fantasy team on 
Yahoo Cricket. In this simulator, fans “buy” and “sell” players (using non-transferrable 
currency) based on past performance and expectations for the future. Like the players 
and teams they follow, fans on these sites can move up and down the rankings over the 
course of the IPL season. The more popular platforms, such as those run by the IPL, 
ESPNCricinfo, and Yahoo, are interactive and allow fans to communicate with each 
other, and display their rankings in real-time on a public website (giving bragging rights 
to those who perform well). What these platforms have in common is their use of a non-
transferable currency. Apart from giving users a sense of accomplishment, the points 
have no value, and cannot be turned into fungible assets. For mainstream cricket media 
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such as ESPNCricinfo, these platforms allow user interaction and advertising revenue. 
For those who like the excitement of gambling but cannot afford to bet, these platforms 
offer an alternative without the risk.
! Despite the availability of alternatives such as soft betting, IPL officials are aware 
that there is no practical way to curb  gambling for money. Team officials freely admit that 
gambling is part of the excitement, and part of what sets the IPL apart from other 
leagues and other formats of cricket. That said, two team officials told me that they 
worried about the extent of gambling and thought the leagueʼs image would soon begin 
to suffer if the league could not do a better job of separating gambling from players and 
management (Interviews with team officials for the Delhi Daredevils and Chennai Super 
Kings, Delhi, 2012 and Chennai, 2013).
! Indiaʼs mobile networks are an essential means of communication for bookies 
and betters. Mobile networks grow out of pre-existing social networks based on 
language, culture, village, school, religion or family ties. When I asked users about their 
gambling habits, most indicated that they had started with a known and trusted bookie 
who had been recommended by a friend. After users had gained experience making 
small, simple bets with a trusted bookie, many moved on to more sophisticated and 
often larger betting. One user in his late 20s told me that: 
My uncle and brother introduced me to someone who took bets. He only 
accepted small bets from us. After some time, I got impatient with small bets. I 
started making larger bets with people I met through work. When you place a bet 
with someone who is a family  friend, itʼs fun. When itʼs someone who is a friend 
of a friend, or just a business relationship, itʼs different. You get nervous 
sometimes. Will the person pay  if he loses? What will he do if you lose and are 
slow paying? (Interview with mobile phone user, Mumbai, 2013).
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Bookies pointed out that mobile networks allow bookies to maintain a spatial distance 
with the league: far enough away to avoid attracting unwanted attention from police or 
rivals, yet close enough to the action to have a sense of the market and rival players 
(Interview with bookie, Chennai, 2013). No one I spoke to used the word ʻflowsʼ to 
describe the movement of information, capital and technology inherent in mobile 
gambling, but several made reference to the ways that the network allows for 
participation at a distance. During my conversations with gamblers and bookies, 
interviewees referred routinely to certain places as hubs: Delhi, Mumbai and Dubai were 
the most commonly mentioned. From these hubs, bosses seek to create new patterns 
of interaction, in which they control the activities of local operatives and the flows of 
information that sustain the organization.
# Fans I spoke to (especially bookies) also spoke about security. In the years since 
the Mumbai terrorist attack, the Indian government has put in place increasingly 
stringent processes of identification for users who wish to purchase SIM cards. These 
include a registration process, a requirement that users provide photo ID (which is 
photocopied by  the merchant), and a fingerprinting program that has been announced 
but not yet implemented. To circumvent these rules, gamblers pointed to two common 
methods: (a) having contacts in mobile service providers and obtaining SIM cards 
before they reach the market, or (b) stealing previously sold SIM cards. Sophisticated 
gamblers know the importance of using non-traceable mobile communications; the large 
supply  of contraband SIM cards in India creates opportunities for fans to communicate 
with little chance of being caught. In my interviews with participants in gambling 
networks, this point – maintaining anonymity – came up  frequently. While online betting 
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is largely  impossible to police, gambling rings  within India still face scrutiny, 
harassment, and occasional arrests. As one mobile phone user I spoke to in Jaipur told 
me, “Iʼm such a small operator, the police probable donʼt care. But if I make it easy for 
police to prove that I make bets, they might ask me for bribes. You donʼt want to have 
that problem, because it never goes away” (Interview with mobile phone user, Jaipur, 
2013). The gamblers I spoke to had a detailed understanding of the network hardware 
and realized the essential role registered SIM cards play in identifying users. These tips 
from users made clear both the reasons why the Indian government wants to make 
registered SIM cards the norm, and the difficulty the government faces from gamblers 
who seek to circumvent any such effort.
"  Today, the mobile phone is the device for several essential aspects of cricket 
gambling. In addition to linking the parties involved in the bet, mobile networks create a 
shared digital record of bets. As numerous users told (and showed) me, it is relatively 
easy to code bets to abbreviate the text (so it fits onto a single line) or so that its 
meaning is not immediately obvious to those other than the two parties. In Figure 7.2, 
the codes are relatively straightforward; those with experience in IPL betting, who know 
the most common cricket metrics and the leagueʼs teams and players, can decode 
these and other simple codes. The goal with simple codes is “to prevent the guy beside 
you from seeing your bets and identifying you if sees your phone. He could be police. 
He could work for the IPL.” (Interview with mobile phone user, Bangalore, 2013). In 
cases of bets based on inside tips, the participants tend to know and trust each other 
and it is important to hide the meaning of the message from anyone who might be 
monitoring the participantsʼ phones for suspicious activity. This creates a new challenge: 
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The meanings of codes must be unambiguously clear to the participants, but not to third 
parties. One better told me that “the best way to hide the meaning of a bet is to make it 
look like an ordinary text message” (Interview with mobile phone user, Chennai, 2013). 
That user showed me a message saying that “M. Singh wants to wait for dinner.” This 
meant that Chennai Super Kings captain Mahindra Singh Dhoni would opt to bowl first if 
he won the toss. The user had altered Dhoniʼs name to M. Singh (which is his middle 
name and a common surname in the north of India). The user had also added the detail 
about dinner, which was code for batting. Through this type of practice, users with a 
mutually  understood set of codes can transmit information that conceals its meaning 
even if intercepted by third parties such as rivals or police. To avoid confusion, users 
must have a clear sense of the meanings of the codes and trust each other to convey a 
precise set of letters and numbers in the correct sequence. This typically requires that 
they know each other well (Interview with bookie, Chennai, 2013).
" One of the most valuable aspect of mobile phone networks is the way they allow 
users to monitor changing odds in real-time, anywhere on the network. For IPL 
matches, the odds change by the minute, meaning that large sums can be made or lost 
rapidly. If users are able to follow the odds as they change (i.e. with each ball in the 
match), users can engage in more sophisticated forms of betting, including derivative 
bets; they can also cut losses and offload losing bets to those with a higher appetite for 
risk (Interviews with mobile phone users, Mumbai and Chennai, 2013). The arrival of 
mobile networks has made cricket gambling more fluid, with a large and rapidly  evolving 
stream of bets related to each match. This fluidity  has enabled greater speed, scale and 
sophistication in cricket gambling; these changes have made gambling networks more 
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difficult for the league and police to monitor (Interview with team official for the Delhi 
Daredevils, Delhi, 2013)
Figure 7.4: Monitoring Odds in Real-Time
Source: PaddyPower (2013).
The above figure shows the interface for a major real-time betting site (PaddyPower, 
based in Dublin) during a typical IPL match. In this instance, Rajasthan posted a total of 
152 runs (a below-average score) in 20 overs and Kolkata must score 153 to win. The 
top image shows the odds for the match outcome, updated after each ball. After a slow 
start, Kolkata have narrowed the odds, as demonstrated by the red on that teamʼs odds 
versus the blue on Rajasthanʼs odds. The second image shows the odds for forecasting 
which quarter of Kolkataʼs batting innings will be most productive for the team. Teams 
tend not to have high totals for the first five overs, and the 90/1 odds in this instance are 
not substantially higher than the norm. The reason betters might take such a bet is the 
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high payoff on the rare occasion that it does happen – for example, if a bowler has a 
weak start to the match. Normally, teams save their most aggressive play for the second 
half of their batting innings. If they have a solid number of runs on the board and if they 
still have wickets in hand (i.e. players still to bat), teams will increase the run rate and 
give audiences an exciting finish. Of course, not all matches last 20 overs; if a team is 
chasing a target and reaches the total, the match is over. So its most productive five-
over period could well be overs 11-15. For these reasons, the odds for overs 11-15 and 
16-20 are more favorable than the odds for overs 1-5 and 6-10. These images show 
how betters can take advantage of rapidly-evolving odds. A pair of good shots by  the 
batsman or bowler or a couple of quick wickets by the fielding team can radically alter 
the odds and give betters a large reward for a few seconds of attentiveness with a 
mobile phone. Thus the odds in real-time betting are often volatile, and betters are 
vulnerable to rapid changes in the match.
! This type of betting has been wildly popular in India, especially in the two most 
recent seasons of the IPL. The league is aware of the popularity  of real-time betting but 
has few tools at its disposal to regulate or curtail fansʼ behavior. A team official in Delhi 
told me, “The IPL has a code of conduct for all of us who work for the league, so we 
canʼt make bets. But we canʼt stop  millions of fans – the people who fill the stands and 
buy our merchandise – from going to websites outside India and betting on matches. 
And weʼre totally  powerless when it comes to micro-bets. That stuff canʼt be controlled. 
All we can do is scrutinize [players and team staff] and hope we donʼt have a 
problem” (Interview with team official for the Delhi Daredevils, Delhi, 2013).!
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! As a result of their utility in gambling, mobile phone networks have transformed 
and dramatically enlarged the gambling sector in India. Mobile networks allow not only 
for new economies of scale and scope for bookies but also, and more worryingly, for the 
formation of national and international networks that can evade criminal justice systems. 
Interviewees with memories of gambling before mobile phones and the IPL told me that 
a sea-change has taken place in recent years: India has graduated from localized 
networks of bookies to large-scale multi-layered organizations with much wider reach as 
a result of new communication networks and the arrival of the IPL as a betting bonanza 
(Interviews with bookies, Chennai and Jaipur, 2013). 
! Bookies inside and outside India can reach many more customers than in the 
pre-mobile and pre-IPL period. While most users spoke to me about minor bets 
involving small sums and (at most) a few people, some also described illegal betting 
syndicates that have grown around the IPL. The largest of these organizations have 
operational advantages (e.g. access to extra SIM cards) and, as a result, the ability  to 
switch phone identities rapidly; they also have connections in the league (from 
groundskeepers who can give tips on the condition of the pitch, to players, who can 
pass on information from dressing room discussions). Repeatedly, betters and bookies 
alike made the point that mobile phone networks had changed the business of gambling 
on cricket in India. Betters liked the range of options at their disposal and the fluidity of 
betting (with odds evolving as the game progressed); bookies told me they were able 
expand their business without needing to be physically present in one particular 
location. For all participants, the spatial dynamics of mobile phone networks had made 
gambling an invisible and omnipresent aspect of the game. Participating in IPL betting 
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involves face-to-face interactions with those who take bets and settle accounts, and an 
awareness that these local operatives work for bosses in other cities, who may have 
high-level contacts in the state and local police, and in the league.
! For a betting syndicate to thrive, it requires a mix of bookies in a given locale and 
bosses who keep  a safe distance. Bookies take bets, enforce payment, and monitor the 
betting scene in a city or neighborhood. Unlike their bosses in the syndicate, they have 
personal connections with individual betters, with businesses (bars and restaurants are 
common places for bookies to arrange meetings), and with individual police officers. 
Bosses take a cut of bookiesʼ earnings, but are in a position to offer new contacts, 
expanded markets, and police protection at higher levels. Though there is a natural 
tension between bookies and bosses, they need each other; both are essential for the 
success of a syndicate. Without a boss and his network, a bookie is a solo operator who 
may be squeezed out by the competition. Without bookies, a boss has no one to 
translate a business plan into action. One bookie in Chennai told me:
Am I more or less powerful than ten years ago? Well, I have more money  now. 
And I supervise people now. But ten years ago, it was more of a hobby for me. 
Now itʼs a business like any  other. I have a boss who comes to Chennai once a 
month. He wants things done this way, that way. And he has a boss somewhere. 
So I guess weʼre all richer now, but I donʼt feel more powerful. Now my job is to 
keep certain people happy. Keep the money  coming in, donʼt make mistakes 
(Interview with bookie, Chennai, 2013).
Mobile networks link bookies to bosses and add to the complexity of their relationship. 
On the one hand, bookies can be more confident because they have immediate access 
to those who can provide them with valuable information or offer protection. On the 
other hand, bookies must be careful with their mobile phones because they are sources 
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of evidence in police investigations. The longer a bookie-boss relationship endures, the 
more friendly  they are likely to become, the greater the likelihood that they become 
careless with text messages or calling records. This creates an incentive for bosses and 
bookies to maintain short, profitable relationships and then part ways.
! Gambling syndicates are based on network features and profit from network 
effects. But just as mobile networks have strengthened new gambling syndicates, these 
same networks are also a source of weakness. One of the challenges for these 
networks is a high turnover of the main communication technology used to link its 
participants. Users in India change phones very frequently and often use multiple 
phones. None of the users I interviewed admitted to discarding or “burning” phones 
deliberately to avoid detection, but several pointed out how useful this practice is for 
those seeking to limit their digital trail and avoid legal scrutiny (Interviews with bookies 
in Jaipur and Chennai, 2013).
! Another weakness in any gambling network is the uncertainty  of payment. The 
bookies and betters I spoke to said that local operatives rarely  make bets to strangers 
unless they are recommended (and guaranteed) by a trusted third party. When I asked 
a bookie in Jaipur about his screening process, he replied: “Would I take a bet from 
anyone? Like you? Maybe you, since youʼre a foreigner and I could probably find you. 
Foreigners all stay at the same hotels. I bet youʼre at Rambagh or Jai Mahal. But most 
people I havenʼt met before, no I would not take a bet from them” (Interview with bookie, 
Jaipur, 2013). The ʻenforcerʼ status of bookies has continued in the mobile age, and a 
syndicateʼs ability to collect depends on the quality  and number of its local operatives. 
At the same time, the very existence of a syndicate makes betters wary of Welshing on 
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bets by hiding out in another city. The largest syndicates have contacts across India and 
are adept at chasing debtors across state lines. These syndicates profit from network 
effects, which create not only  economies of scale and scope, but also an enforcement 
capacity that smaller, localized gambling rings cannot match.
! One of the unanticipated results of my fieldwork was the significance users 
placed on the mobile phone for gambling. On a variety  of platforms, mobile phones are 
essential components in gambling on IPL matches. Mobile phones are especially useful 
gambling tools because they enable users to follow not only the match itself, but also an 
ever-changing set of odds on the match and components of the match, down to 
individual plays. Figure 6.2 in Chapter 6 shows that roughly a quarter of the users I 
surveyed kept their phones in their hand or visible at all times during a match; nearly 
three-quarters used their phones at some point during the match. Among these users, 
one recurring reason was the need to see the odds. One user told me, “I know the 
score. What I need to know is what that means for the odds. They change by the 
minute” (Interview with mobile phone user, Kolkata, 2013). Numerous users showed me 
mobile-oriented websites and apps, designed to be accessed during matches as odds 
evolve. Some even changed bets as we spoke.
Corruption
! A thin line separates gambling from corruption. My fieldwork led me to and 
beyond that line. As the year progressed, I read, was told about, and witnessed many 
acts of corruption related to mobile phone usage. I categorized these into two broad 
types: corruption of the institutions that serve and regulate the mobile market, and 
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corruption that spreads via mobile networks. As in the proliferation of gambling that has 
resulted from growth in mobile phone networks, I found that mobile networks facilitate 
new flows of information and capital, and allow for new organizational forms. Together, 
these structural and spatial changes have allowed for worrying levels of corruption to 
develop in India. In Chapter 4 (Part III) I discussed the corruption that has grown in the 
institutions that manage Indiaʼs mobile telephone networks. In the pages that follow, I 
discuss second order corruption in institutions (such as the IPL) that rely on telephone 
networks. 
" The IPL and mobile networks arrived in a country  with a long history of 
institutionalized corruption (Transparency International, 2011). Weak rule of law and 
collusion at the top  have contributed to Indiaʼs institutional corruption. Informal 
economics and a cash-based economy have created challenges for police and judicial 
investigations. Communication networks have also played a role in the development of 
corruption. India has a history of elite-centric networks, including the early telegraph and 
the telephone until the growth of mass mobile telephony. The early telegraph and 
telephone linked elites in nearby and distant locales, and further separated these elites 
from the general population. The telegraph and telephone were (at least initially) used 
by different sets of elites; while the telegraph was a military network used primarily by 
British officers for colonial governance, the landline telephone was a tool of Indian 
commerce and government, put to use by Indian elites in a newly independent former 
colony (see: Chapter 4, Parts I and II). These communication networks allowed 
participants to share information without meeting in person. With the telegraph, the 
landline telephone, and now the mobile phone, a recurring pattern has emerged: the 
234
development of new communication networks has allowed for corruption in the 
institutions that manage the networks and provide service to users, and in businesses 
and other institutions that rely on the networks.
! Today, the IPL is an example of such an institution: it is the responsible for a 
second order mobile network that spans the country, and relies on mobile phone 
communication for its internal planning and engagement with fans. It is important to note 
that not all IPL corruption is the result of mobile phones or mobile networks. Some of 
this corruption is the result of institutionsʼ internal characteristics, including their senior 
management. But I contend, with evidence from interviews and observation, that mobile 
networks have been the primary communicative means for corruption in the IPL, and 
that the expansion of mobile networks has led to a corresponding expansion in the 
scale of corruption in the league.
! Perhaps the largest challenge in policing corruption in the IPL is that money is 
the main motivator for players, team staff, and officials in the IPL. In seven weeks, each 
of these groups earns more than they could in any other cricket league, and many times 
more than they would playing for their national teams. Even teams acknowledge that 
the players are there for the money, not for pride or prestige (Interviews with team 
officials for the Delhi Daredevils, Delhi, 2012 and 2013). IPL franchises are not based 
on traditional loyalties of nation or region; they are short-term and contractual in nature, 
with players who often do not know each other coming together to play  for professional 
clubs, then dispersing at the end of their contracts. Although each team makes a point 
of basing its advertising around a handful of international marquee players, the IPL is 
composed mostly of young Indian players yet to make a name for themselves and yet to 
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make their fortune. Most will not have long or profitable careers as professional 
cricketers. For many of them, this is their one chance to make their mark as a cricketer 
or, failing that, earn a financial windfall while influencing a play that may or may not 
affect the result of the match. Especially  when high-ranking teams lose unexpectedly  or 
rapidly to low-ranking teams, the payoffs can be very  handsome for those who predict 
the outcome (Hawkins, 2012).
! Fixing the results of entire matches is likely to attract attention, so those in a 
position to shape the outcome of matches tend to use spot-fixes. These involve pre-
determined outcomes on individual balls for small or medium-sized gains at low risk. For 
example, players (especially bowlers and captains) can make money on the side by 
engineering certain events at agreed-upon moments in the match (for example: in the 
3rd over, the 1st ball will be a certain type of delivery). To the trained eye, certain 
tendencies (for example, an excessive number of illegal deliveries by a bowler or too 
many easy balls left alone by a batsman) encourage suspicion, but it is difficult to prove 
that players are complicit in illegal gambling. For young players with single-season 
contracts and no endorsement deals, inside spot-betting offers an additional stream of 
revenue that helps to satisfy the requests for cash from friends and family and helps 
fund a more glamorous lifestyle. On their own, a few bad plays and inside bets do not 
alter matches, but they allow criminal syndicates to associate themselves with the IPL 
and, accordingly, they undermine the legitimacy of the league. But spot betting is only 
part of the problem with inside gambling. The larger problem is match-fixing: the 
tendency for matches to end in the final over (and in many cases, on the final ball) 
makes it tempting for players and bookies to make deals.
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! Since the inception of the IPL in 2008, there have been frequent whispers and 
allegations of inside betting, mostly involving junior players and relatively small stakes. 
Under former chairman Lalit Modi the IPL flourished, but its finances had troubling 
features: the IPL became a home to fast money (much of it moving in cash form), a 
murky ownership structure, and collusion and conflicts of interest among league elites 
(see: Ali, 2012; Singh and Sruthijith, 2010; Thakur, 2010; Vij-Aurora, 2012). Journalistic 
and criminal investigations eventually found evidence of fraud and embezzlement, and 
Modi was jailed for his involvement in embezzlement and misuse of funds (Gollapudi, 
2013). In the years since Modiʼs departure from the league, the IPL has endured 
allegations of inside betting and match-fixing, but not on the scale of the Modi years.
! Those who believed that the IPL had cleaned up  its act were shocked in 2013 
when a new corruption scandal involved the management of multiple teams and the 
head of the BCCI. In May 2013, in the lead-up  to the IPL playoffs, Delhi police arrested 
three players from the Rajasthan Royals and 11 bookies for spot betting and match-
fixing (ESPNCricinfo 2013c). The allegations concerned three matches in Jaipur, in 
which bowlers from Rajasthan allowed the batting team to hit pre-determined run totals 
during certain overs, enabling bookies to profit on pre-match and real-time betting. A 
second and related corruption case became news the following week, as the league 
prepared for its championship  match in Kolkata. Gurunath Meiyappan46  of the Chennai 
Super Kings, was summoned to Mumbai by police for questioning about his 
participation in inside betting (ESPNCricinfo 2013d). Using calling records and 
intercepted mobile phone conversations, police found that Meiyappan had been in 
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regular contact with bookies, and had made predictions on several of Chennaiʼs 
matches (Mudgal Report 2014). "
" I happened to be in attendance at one of the matches in question, in Jaipur on 
May 12, 2013. Despite the small, fast pitch and the fact that the team had three (Dhoni, 
Hussey, and Raina) prolific scorers of sixes, Chennai did not score a single six during its 
innings, and the team posted a puzzlingly  low total of 141. Rajasthan easily chased 
down the target and won the match. In the stands, I had conversations with betters as 
they watched the odds evolve via their phones. Some were confused by the gameʼs 
progression; others were delighted, since they had profited from the outcome. 
" The IPLʼs championship  match (in which Chennai played and lost) took place 
against a backdrop of scandal and police investigations about gambling and corruption 
(Ugra, 2013). The Chennai Super Kings insisted that Meiyappan was merely an 
ʻenthusiastʼ and not the team owner or manager. N. Srinivasan insisted that his dual 
roles (as head of the BCCI and managing director of the company that owned a team in 
the middle of a corruption scandal) posed no threat to the leagueʼs credibility 
(ESPNCricinfo, 2013e). In the ensuing months, N. Srinivasan was forced to resign from 
the BCCI governing board and a retired Supreme Court justice established an 
investigation into the league. Dozens of players and officials, past and present, were 
compelled to testify  before the committee; several prominent figures, including 
Meiyappan, were jailed based on evidence from telephone surveillance and calling 
records (Mudgal Report, 2014). The initial investigation by former justice Mukul Mudgal 
has concluded, and Mudkal has called for a larger investigation into the league, with 
involvement from the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). With support from Indiaʼs 
238
Supreme Court, Mudgal will continue his investigation into IPL corruption. He has 
announced that he will pursue criminal charges against Srinivasan and 12 other Indian 
cricket figures whose names remain sealed in an envelope, along with the charges 
against them (ESPNCricinfo, 2014a and 2014b).
! In this ongoing saga and in previous instances, the IPL has had difficulty 
eliminating inside betting because the league is an ideal environment for the practice to 
develop. The Twenty20 format is particularly well suited to spot-betting: a match is a 
modular, rather than fluid design, with 120 balls delivered by each team, over a total of 
20 overs. Like longer forms of cricket, Twenty20 contains a standard set of regular, 
predictable moments in the match. The difference is that the matches are shorter, so 
each ball means significantly more than it would in a one-day match with 50 overs (300 
balls in total) or a Test match with an unclear total number of balls over its 3-5 day 
duration. The tight, predictable structure of Twenty20 creates a standard set of 
permutations. The large number of matches (76 in seven weeks)47  makes for an 
impossible number of stats, odds, betters and websites to monitor. The best that the 
league and law enforcement can do is scrutinize players, officials and those with 
proximity to teams, and look for warning signs such as statistically low totals or outlier 
figures in matches (Interview with team official for the Delhi Daredevils, Delhi, 2013). 
Justice Mudgalʼs commission relied on estimates from the Delhi police that more than 
$30 million is gambled on the average IPL match, and considerably more on playoff 
matches (Mudgal Report, 2014).
! In the blur of hotels, flights and matches that is the seven-week IPL season, 
mobile networks are the only practical way for those making inside bets to coordinate 
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the participants. They are the means by which teams, journalists, and others 
communicate with players. While veteran players guard their phone numbers with great 
caution (or hire personal assistants to manage all calls), junior players sometimes give 
away their number to journalists and others, in the hope of landing an interview or 
making other useful connections (Interview with member of the Madras Cricket Club). 
Hotel lobbies are too closely monitored for in-person meetings to discuss illegal activity, 
and it is difficult for bookies to reserve rooms in the same hotels as the players they 
want to meet with (team administrators routinely book entire hotels precisely to avoid 
having undesirable or distracting neighbors) (Interview with team official for the Chennai 
Super Kings, Chennai, 2013). Thus the mobile phone is the essential link for all parties 
involved. Bookies told me that, faced with a high degree of scrutiny  by media and 
police, players tend to trust only bookies they know personally, or who have been 
referred by someone close to them (Interviews with bookies, Jaipur and Chennai, 2013). 
Inside betting networks thus tend to follow existing social relations; over time, they allow 
new social relations among participants. The high turnover of devices makes for fragile, 
ephemeral and fleeting connections among participants. Rather than forming lasting 
organizations, mobile networks in India encourage one-off, “disposable” connections for 
specific purposes (Interviews with mobile phone users, Mumbai and Delhi, 2013).
! In the IPL, mobile networks facilitate corruption by acting as conduits for illegal 
activity  among spatially-dispersed participants. In the IPL, the evidence suggests that 
mobile networks have allowed for significant new flows of information and capital, and 
that mobile networks have created the conditions for powerful new networks and 
criminal syndicates, based in Mumbai and Dubai (The Hindu, 2013). Given this 
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changing set of possibilities for corruption, a major question is: to what extent have 
police been able to keep up with criminal syndicates in their use of mobile phones for 
illegal activity? The participants I spoke to were nearly unanimous: significant amounts 
of mostly subtle corruption exist in the league, and mobile networks provide the 
essential link in much of this corruption.
Conclusion
! In a study of communication networks and professional sports, it is telling that the 
most profitable and popular types of network activity  are illegal. Gambling and 
corruption had not been part of my initial research questions, but evolved into central 
topics in my user interviews. From the beginning of my study, interview subjects spoke 
openly about gambling. Despite the fact that gambling on cricket is against the law, I 
had no difficulty  getting users to speak about their experiences and show me how to 
use certain websites, contact bookies or make bets. And as my year in India progressed 
and I gained the trust of one bookie in particular, I received tips on upcoming matches 
and offers of inside bets (which I politely declined).
! Gambling and corruption are interrelated communicative phenomena, with 
mobile networks linking participants within the country and internationally. Seven years 
into the IPL experiment, total dollars spent on above-board media (broadcasts, IPL-
related websites social media) represent a small fraction of the tens of billions of dollars 
spent on gambling. These massive and mostly illegal flows reveal the new spatial 
dynamics at work in Indiaʼs mobile phone networks; so too do they show how India, 
despite being a low-income country, has made use of virtual production and 
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consumption of information over distance. Of course, location still matters. Users 
reminded me that they usually trusted other users only after they had met in person or 
been referred by a known third party. And the space of flows in Indiaʼs gambling and 
corruption are dominated by a handful of physical communicative hubs on the network. 
These include the leagueʼs host cities (which are themselves the richest cities in India) 
and the hubs of finance (Mumbai), politics (Delhi), and illegal activity (UAE) that are now 
inescapable elements of the IPL mobile network.
" The flows within and between these hubs involve a complex set of interactions 
directed from afar, conducted in face-to-face meetings, and coordinated by the 
sophisticated use of mobile networks. Indiaʼs new mobile flows have developed in part 
because of the countryʼs tradition of informal economic activity, in part because of weak 
rule of law, and in part because of the functional advantages of mobile phones for 
relaying specific information such as bets or tips to other users on the network. The 
users I spoke to agreed that mobile networks offer enormous advantages to those who 
are able to master their functionality and make the right contacts. Some of the same 
users also willingly conceded that the scale of illegal activity could pose a serious threat 
to the IPLʼs credibility and ability to operate in India. Here we see the ways that a 
second order network, once on a certain scale, is beyond the control of its creators. The 
IPL spent years, considerable effort, and vast sums of money to integrate mobile 
phones into the leagueʼs branding and fan interactions. The goal of the IPL mobile 
network was to make the IPL a global spectacle that fans could watch and follow on 
their mobile phones. But once the playing season began, I saw another side of the 
network. The functionality  of mobile phones, the structure of a Twenty20 match, the low 
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cost of handsets and phone usage, and the ease of maintaining anonymity have 
together generated network effects and fostered second order gambling and corruption. 
These outcomes show the difficulty of controlling large-scale communication networks, 
especially  those that cross jurisdictional boundaries, and that allow relative ease for 
those who wish to communicate anonymously. When Indiaʼs telephone networks 
involved a small number of (usually geographically clustered) elites in a handful of 
cities, they did not present a threat to the social order of India. But today, with mobile 
devices in the hands of roughly  two-thirds of the countryʼs population, disposable 
phones readily available, and a thriving black market of SIM cards, Indiaʼs mobile phone 
network has become both an indispensable element in a host of criminal activities, and 
a major challenge for organizations seeking to curtail gangsterism and corruption.
" More than any other aspect of my study, the illegal movement of capital and 
information via mobile phone illustrated the utility of Castellsʼ space of flows concept. 
Localized betting on cricket, which developed in bazaars during the early  days of radio 
and television, has been supplanted by syndicates (based mostly in Dubai and Mumbai, 
with operations across India) that rely on flows of information among participants. These 
flows involve interactions among betters, bookies, and bosses, each with a function in a 
spatially dispersed, hierarchical network. In these interactions, international criminal 
syndicates use shared functions and meanings on electronic circuits (the Internet and 
mobile phone networks). In this sense, they personify the type of organization Castells 
predicts will thrive in the space of flows (Castells, 2001). The spatial distribution of 
syndicates gives betting syndicates power, since they cross jurisdictional boundaries 
and are more nimble than the institutional actors that pursue them. Mobile networks are 
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essential tools in betting, since they provide the critical links among participants and 
allow syndicates to retain a light physical footprint in their areas of operations. Mobile 
networks also offer new efficiencies and economies of scale and scope, since they 
allow for new aggregation of information. But just as they offer advantages to those able 
to make use of the space of flows, mobile networks are imperfect tools. They are 
subject to surveillance and seizure, and distant bosses must rely on local operatives to 
make personal contacts and enforce the terms of agreements. Thus we see the limits of 
the space of flows. No organization is entirely divorced from spatial constraints; the fact 
that criminal syndicates have set up  in locations (the UAE and Pakistan) close to India 
is a reminder of the perennial function of space in social networks.
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Dissertation Conclusion
! This dissertation explored the space of flows and second order network formation 
on Indiaʼs mobile phone networks, which rank among the largest and most rapidly 
expanding telephone networks on earth. In this study, I explored the history, intentions, 
processes, and outcomes of particular second order network – the Indian Premier 
League (IPL) mobile network. I analyzed the significance of the shift from elite to mass 
participation in communication networks, the roles of planners and users in the 
formation and evolution of a second order network, and the ways that networks grow in 
ways both imagined and unimagined by their creators.
! This study examined the vast literature on Indiaʼs mobile phone networks and 
identified opportunities to contribute to the discussion. First, while empirical studies 
abound in the literature on Indiaʼs ʻmobile revolutionʼ, many of these studies have been 
reliant on textual data rather than in-depth engagement with users (Desai, 2006; Singh, 
2008; Saxena, 2009; Gupta, 2012) Those that have involved users in significant ways 
have often been local or regional in scope, and thus offer often very thoughtful analyses 
with limited generalizability (Jensen, 2007; Nadeem, 2011; Tenhunen, 2008 and 2011). 
One exception to this limitation is the recent book-length study by Jeffrey and Doron 
(2013), which includes in-depth interviews and interactions with a wide range of 
subjects across India. The Great Indian Phone Book is an essential read for any student 
of contemporary Indian telephony. If the book has a fault, it is its tendency for 
description over meanings of communication, another common feature of the literature. 
In my exploration of existing studies on Indian mobile phone usage, I found that the 
literature offers answers to quantitative questions about connectivity, and also offers 
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answers to legislative questions about policy changes. Where there is room for work is 
in two areas: (a) on qualitative and ethnographic questions, of how creators and users 
of a network interact with that network; and (b) in theorizing Indiaʼs mobile phone 
networks in terms of the information society and network theory.
Summary of my Inquiry and Findings
" Three research questions have driven this research: Historically, what second 
order networks resulted from the development of Indiaʼs communication networks and 
the shift from elite to mass usage? In the context of a contemporary national case study 
(the second order mobile network that has grown out of the IPL), what have been the 
intentions, processes, and outcomes of mass mobile phone adoption? And what does 
the case of the Indian Premier League reveal about the second-order networks that 
have resulted from mass mobile phone usage in contemporary India? In this section I 
summarizes my findings.
1. Historically, what second order networks resulted from the development of Indiaʼs 
communication networks and the shift from elite to mass usage?
" In its colonial communication networks (the telegraph and railroad), India was the 
site of a major shift from elite to mass usage. Network expansion was driven by Britainʼs 
colonial objectives: resource extraction, military and political control, and a desire for 
further expansion beyond India (Bayly, 1996; Headrick, 1988; Lahiri-Choudhury, 2010; 
Wenzlhuemer, 2012). During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the telegraph and 
railroad became large-scale projects, and took new sets of material and cultural 
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meanings. For example, they became the means by which Indians traveled to visit 
family, undertake religious pilgrimages, and enjoy  vacations (Ellis, 1939: 792-94; Miller, 
2006). These networks also employed a growing number of Indians and served as the 
circuits that linked a diffuse and differentiated set of peoples (Westwood, 1974).
! The shift from elite to mass usage on the telegraph and railroad created the 
conditions for second order network formation. The spread of news via the telegraph 
and the distributive capacity  of the railroads led to the formation of movements such as 
Swadeshi and printed publications such as Harijan, Young India, and Navajivan. 
(Hofmeyr, 2013) In English and in vernacular languages, these publications allowed for 
prominent writers (M.K. Gandhi among them) to reach audiences of literate Indians. By 
the 1920s, India had a press that was too large for Britain to control, with hundreds of 
publications in existence, many of them increasingly  defiant of laws prohibiting criticism 
of the colonial administration (Ghose, 1952; Gopal, 1990)
! The development of second order networks on Indiaʼs colonial networks 
undermined the original intentions of the telegraph and railroad. The flows of 
information, people, and capital on these first order networks allowed Indians to form 
second order networks based on social or religious ties, or mutual interests. Editors 
used the telegraph wires to keep  abreast of news and the railroads to distribute their 
publications. Resistance leaders traveling in third class compartments developed 
followings of supporters who spread the word in their villages and towns (Headrick, 
2010). These interactions via colonial communication networks generated a set of 
national communicative practices that bound Indians closer together and fostered 
cooperation among previously isolated groups (Bear, 2007).
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! Over time, Indiaʼs colonial-era second order networks contributed significantly to 
the formation of national sentiment, and to the nationalist movement. Indiaʼs resistance 
leaders applied a new set of uses to the telegraph and railroads. Gandhi may  have 
been hostile to machines, but he was very  adept with networks. He used the telegraph 
to create audiences for rallies, and in turn used his rallies to generate print stories in 
newspapers (Patil, 1984). This combined usage of colonial communication networks 
and print media allowed Gandhi and other nationalist leaders to build support across the 
country. The British had built networks linking disparate communities of Indians; the 
nationalist movement used these same networks to forge a national consciousness 
united in its opposition to British rule (Headrick, 2010).
! More recently, India has been the site of mobile network development on a 
national scale. Since the policy  shift of the 1990s, mobile telephony has flourished in 
India, creating a market that now includes 900 million mobile phones. As in the colonial 
networks that criss-crossed India during the 19th and early 20th century, todayʼs mobile 
network developed out of a set of intentions by policymakers and firms in the private 
sector. Although in historical terms, Indiaʼs mobile phone networks are still young, it is 
already possible to identify second order (software) networks that have formed on top  of 
the first order (hardware) networks that connect the country. This dissertation has 
focused on one such second order network, that of the Indian Premier League.
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2. In the context of a contemporary national case study (the second order mobile 
network that has grown out of the IPL), what have been the intentions, processes, 
and outcomes of mass mobile phone adoption? 
! League administrators created or commissioned the major components of the 
IPL mobile network, with the intention of branding the league as part of the ʻnew Indiaʼ. 
As a start-up league that came into existence with 250 million mobile phones already in 
use in India, the IPL sought to make its mark as a mobile-oriented spectacle. On mobile 
applications, social media, and websites for the league and its teams, the IPL has 
branded itself as urban, high-tech, English-speaking, and cosmopolitan-Indian.
! The Indian Premier League has sought to make use of mobile networks on the 
leagueʼs terms, by imposing a ʻbroadcastʼ model on ʻsocialʼ networks. On social media 
platforms, the league has encouraged Likes and followers, maintained highly curated 
pages, and limited the topics of discussion. Where possible, as on YouTube, the IPL 
disables comments, effectively turning a medium for sharing videos into an online 
broadcast portal that shows only what the league wants shown.
! The IPL mobile network has thrived in part because of mass connectivity  that 
crosses many (but not all) divisions in India (see Chapter 5). Public spaces in India are 
filled with the sights and sounds of mass mobile connectivity. Mobile phones are more 
common among the urban, the rich, and the educated, but they are very common even 
outside these groups. The IPL mobile network allows for access by a differentiated set 
of users across the country and internationally.
! The IPL mobile network has also grown because it involves participatory 
practices that integrate mobile technology with the live experience of attending a match 
(see Chapter 6). IPL matches are punctuated by opportunities for fans to respond to 
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trivia or polls via their mobile phone. These are sometimes for prizes and sometimes 
just for fun, and they are very  popular. Some fans choose not to participate in the mobile 
activity, but I noticed that they  nevertheless watch what others do. They also wait with 
equal anticipation for the big-screen TVs to show the poll results or answer to the trivia 
question. These staged practices show the ways that the IPL has succeeded in 
integrating mobile phones into the live experience of a match.
! The largest factor in the growth of the IPL mobile network is the flows of 
information and capital the network enables. Users kept their phones handy  during 
matches because they sought the most updated and relevant information. The IPLʼs 
mobile apps and social media platforms create a non-stop stream of data about the 
match and other league news. Other platforms on the network (third-party applications, 
social media, and websites) add to this data stream by offering flows that the IPL 
platforms do not offer. The most important of these flows involve betting odds.
! In terms of branding and user engagement, the IPL mobile network has been a 
success story of the ʻnew Indiaʼ. Twenty  years ago, India was a telephone laggard only 
starting to dismantle a state-owned monopoly. Today the country has more than 900 
million phones, a big-money cricket league that has made the mobile phone a central 
part of its identity, and a second order network that has developed in relation to that 
league. In the IPL, Indians can see their country as a confident and technologically 
savvy actor on the world stage.
! Despite the intentions of the league, the IPL mobile network has become the host 
for significant amounts of illicit activity. The IPL created the platforms that started the 
IPL mobile network, but in second order network formation, creators do not get the final 
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word on content. Users have brought mobile phones into their IPL consumption not only 
to follow the activities encouraged by the IPL, but also to take part in activities of their 
own choosing. These include checking their phones after each wicket or boundary shot, 
to see if the odds have changed and exchanging messages with bookies. Criminal 
syndicates have also taken advantage of the IPL mobile network, using its new spatial 
possibilities to increase their scale and scope of operations, and to evade detection.
! Alongside the heroic narrative of policy  change, market growth and social 
benefits, we need to acknowledge an inconvenient truth: mobile networks in India have 
allowed increasingly large criminal syndicates to benefit from global flows of information 
and capital. While users enjoy new connectivity and tools and merchants enjoy  new 
efficiencies, larger, more powerful and socially pernicious actors have benefited most. 
The continued growth of illegal and destructive elements of the IPL mobile network 
threatens to undermine the original intentions of the network. The IPL has become a 
target not only for massive amounts of gambling, but also for acts of corruption by 
insiders with the ability to alter the outcomes of matches. This problem has developed 
because of three features of the IPL: the structure of Twenty20 cricket, the informal 
economics and power structures that are common in India, and the widespread 
availability of cheap  telephony with pay-as-you-go billing. These network features have 
strengthened Indiaʼs criminal underworld and weakened the legitimacy of the league.
3. What does the case of the Indian Premier League reveal about the second-order 
networks that have resulted from mass mobile phone usage in contemporary India? 
! Mobile phone networks have given space for new informal economics and power 
structures to develop. With a cash-based economy and weak rule of law, India is an 
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ideal environment for enterprises (e.g. businesses, social movements, or religious 
sects) with a small legal and financial footprint. The addition of mass mobile phone 
networks builds on the pre-existing social and financial networks by adding a spatial 
dimension. Informal organizations have a local element, drawing on pre-existing social 
relations; with mobile phones, these same organizations can extend their reach beyond 
the immediate community, to other locations with similar social or economic conditions.
! Mass mobile phone usage has generated widespread connectivity, but 
concentrated the largest gains among Indiaʼs elites. Mobile networks allow for new flows 
of information and capital that favor elites with privileged access to the network and 
certain devices. The IPL is itself an example of elite power: its live audiences are those 
who can afford to buy tickets and who have the time to attend the match. Similarly, the 
fans who are able to engage most with the IPL mobile network are those who own smart 
phones, and who have the time and telephone budget necessary to use the network 
throughout the day. In addition to these new flows, mobile networks allow for new 
organizational forms, with a mixture of new and old institutions as beneficiaries. Here 
we see the continued importance of institutions, both as direct players in 
telecommunications and as byproducts of the commercial possibilities communication 
networks provide.
! Certain features of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks are conducive not only to 
commerce, but also to illicit behavior. These include: cheap  phones, pay-as-you-go 
billing, and relative ease in maintaining anonymity. This ease of access has allowed 
hundreds of millions of Indians to buy a phone and integrate it into their work and 
leisure. At the same time, the ease with which one can replace phones and SIM cards 
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makes it easy for criminals to avoid scrutiny. In recent years, the Indian government has 
put in place increasingly stringent measures to link users to their SIM cards. But 
criminals have developed ways of circumventing the rules (by stealing SIM cards or 
using previously  owned cards linked to other individuals), and are often able to operate 
anonymously.
! Mobile phone networks have created new spatial and jurisdictional challenges for 
law enforcement in India (see Chapter 7). The disposability of mobile phones and SIM 
cards makes it difficult for police to pin down criminals using mobile phone activity. 
These difficulties are compounded by the availability of tools that hide the origin of calls 
and create false appearances of location. While criminals cannot escape surveillance 
forever, they  can often evade detection long enough to make their call or text a code to 
the receiving party, at which point they can dispose of the SIM card or phone. And by 
operating outside the jurisdictions of countries where they conduct illicit business, 
criminal syndicates can significantly slow down efforts to catch them.
Theoretical Implications
1. Understanding and Applying the Space of Flows
! By using Castellsʼ three-layer approach in historical analysis, we can add to our 
understanding of network origins and evolution. Castells intended his space of flows 
concept (and the wider network theory of which it is a part) to conceptualize a series of 
structural changes that have taken place since the 1970s. These changes have 
included an organizational shift from institutions to networks, and a concomitant shift 
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from industrial to informational production. I use the three-layers Castells proposes – 
the circuits, hubs and nodes, and spatial arrangement of elites – for two reasons. First, I 
draw attention to the long history of communication networks in India and the ways the 
expansion of these networks allowed for second order network formation. Second, by 
using the same three-layer approach for past and present networks, I show the ways 
that contemporary mobile phone networks are structurally and socially  different from 
antecedent networks.
! The space of flows concept is also useful in explaining structural changes taking 
place as a result of Indiaʼs mobile phone networks. Today, the circuitry of telephony is 
widely accessible, national, and mobile. A handful of communicative hubs (Mumbai, 
Delhi, and to a lesser extent Bangalore) dominate the network and are home to a 
disproportionate number of the countryʼs telephone elites. Indiaʼs mobile phone 
networks now include a sufficient mass of users and range of services that ʻlocationʼ 
matters less than proximity to flows of information and capital over the network.
! Although the space of flows is useful as a theoretical and empirical concept, it 
has limitations. One of the lessons from this study  is that despite the importance of 
flows in determining center and periphery in a network, location still matters. In my 
examination of gambling and corruption (Chapter 7), I found that local bookies are 
essential actors in criminal syndicates, and that enforcement continues to be a matter of 
physical presence in a locality. Distant bosses are thus dependent on local operatives to 
make personal contacts and enforce the terms of agreements. In the space of flows,  no 
organization is fully divorced from spatial constraints. 
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! Although I enjoyed the challenge of applying the often-abstract space of flows 
theory to an empirical case study, I found that Castellsʼ tidy three-layer division 
sometimes created ambiguities. While I was able to understand and identify the circuitry 
of communication in Indian networks, I found that some actors (for example, telephone 
service providers, infrastructure firms, and software developers) are part of both the 
ʻhubs and nodesʼ and ʻspatial organization of managerial elitesʼ that Castells discusses. 
In a phenomenon as large as complex as Indian mobile telephony, there will inevitably 
be organizations that defy categorization. But my sense at the end of this project is that 
other researchers in other contexts would encounter this same problem.
2. Understanding and Applying Second Order Networks
! By thinking in terms of first and second order (and beyond) effects, we can 
understand the transformative power of networks. The shift from elite to mass 
communication on a network is a critical element in the formation of second order 
networks. Institutions create networks for an intended set of users and purposes. As the 
number of users on a network expands and the network grows beyond its original 
purpose, it can become the host for second order networks. The expansion of second 
order networks poses challenges for the institutions that create and seek to keep control 
of networks. The larger a second order network, the more hubs it has, and the more 
spatially dispersed its participants, the more difficult it is to govern.
! Second order networks flourish in contexts of mass communication, informal 
economics, and informal power structures. In contexts in which legacy institutions are 
weak or incomplete, networks are a natural form of governance. For this reason, 
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developing countries are especially  useful sites in which to study  second order network 
formation. This study has shown how the conditions specific to India have produced a 
bourgeoning second order network – indeed a network so ʻsuccessfulʼ that it threatens 
to usurp the league that created it. In India as in other developing countries, the 
weakness of legacy institutions makes users more willing to use and trust the network. 
And that same weakness allows for second order networks to form, grow, and deepen, 
without the institutional interference (good or bad) that takes place in societies with 
stronger institutions of governance. Importantly, second order network effects are value-
neutral; they do not favor the good guys or the bad guys. They are simply new 
possibilities that can be put to use by actors who see and know how to use “the new 
social morphology” (Castells, 1996: 469).#
Limitations
# This study has described a major second order mobile network in India, and 
analyzed that network using the space of flows theory of Castells. The research for this 
study took place in cities across India, using participant observation, surveys, and 
interviews of a range of participants in the IPL mobile network. This research 
necessarily encountered a set of limitations.
# As an outsider with a minimal command of Indiaʼs vernacular languages, I was 
restricted to communication in English. This presented no problems in my efforts to 
locate and analyze legislation, reports, or other textual sources of data. Nor did the 
language barrier affect my interviews with industry executives or IPL team officials. But I 
did notice the language issue in my day-to-day interactions and efforts to understand 
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the context of communication. As any visitor to India will attest, social life in that country 
involves a mix of languages, often in the same sentence. And as all veteran India 
travelers know, communication in that country is often subtle and complex. At matches 
and in other situations when I sought to understand mobile usage, I recorded my 
observations and discussed them with Indians and foreigners I knew in the country. But 
due to the barriers of language and culture, I undoubtedly missed out on some 
meanings. I see this as a reason to return and build on what I have learned in this study.
! While mine is a national study, it necessarily neglects geographical and socio-
economic segments of the country. My research sites, survey/interview subjects, and 
resulting data set are urban-centric and thus unrepresentative of the whole of India. 
Similarly, the Indian Premier League is a middle class (and above) diversion and thus 
my usersʼ telephone models and usage habits are those of relatively affluent Indians.
! Another limitation of my study came from a finding I had not anticipated in my 
original research proposal. The role of mobile networks in gambling and corruption was 
difficult to research because of its illegality and my status as an outsider. I felt 
comfortable speaking to betters and bookies (while respecting their requests to remain 
unnamed). I felt less comfortable with the idea of participating in spot-betting rings to 
gain a more thorough understanding of the process. With illegal activity, I walked up to 
what I thought was an acceptable line, asked what I thought were the right questions, 
and observed and interpreted what I witnessed.
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Recommendations for Future Research
! This study has provided me not only with answers to my research questions, but 
also with new possibilities for the years to come. Below are a few recommendations 
based on my experience in this dissertation.
! We learn a great deal from ʻepisodicʼ studies of mobile usage in a variety of 
contexts. Such studies create portraits of collective usage, with individual users using 
their phones to interact with other users and pursue personal interests or profit. Such 
portraits reveal the social and cultural aspects of mobile usage in a given context, as 
well as the economic forces at work on the network. The more episodic studies 
researchers undertake, the more we will understand what unites and divides mobile 
users in different parts of the world.
! Professional sports offer a useful context in which to study how people interact 
with communication technologies. Despite my preparation for the IPL season, nothing 
could have prepared me for the moment when Brett Lee took a wicket on the first ball of 
the first match, and users around me reached for their phones to check the change in 
the betting odds. In that moment I learned more than I had reading any dozen reports 
on tele-density statistics. Using sports as a context enriched my understanding of what 
mobile phone networks mean for India, and the significance of second order networks. I 
encourage future researchers to take to the stadiums of the developing world and watch 
how people use their phones in sporting contests.
! Cities represent the future for most of humanity. Across Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, mega-cities are teeming with migrants from the countryside. Thanks in large 
part to these migrants, urban networks have the densest concentrations of users, the 
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highest growth rates, and complex and dynamic social forces. For these reasons, urban 
mobile phone networks deserve special attention from network theorists and 
ethnographers of telephony.
Concluding Thought
! In this dissertation I have explored some of Indiaʼs long history of communication 
networks to show the ways that networks can be co-opted, undermined, and overrun by 
users who establish new priorities and new uses for the network. Second order 
networks are not easy to pin down as objects of study, but the effort is worthwhile. I 
believe that the concept of second order networks has validity and utility, especially in 
societies with a tradition of weak institutions and strong, informal social networks. 
Mobile networks are here to stay, and as they proliferate and deepen, we would do well 
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2004/02/pdf/brune.pdf.
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ntp_1999.aspx. Also see: Anuparma Dokeniya (1999), “Re-forming the State: Telecom Liberalization in 
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play a critical role in network growth. At the same time, the government will continue to be actively 
involved in regulation and the provision of service: “Additional resources required to achieve the revised 
targets would be well over Rs. 23,000 crores. Clearly this is beyond the capacity of Government funding 
and internal generation of resources. Private investment and association of the private sector would be 
needed in a big way to bridge the resource gap. Private initiative would be used to complement the 
Departmental efforts to raise additional resources.” Indian Parliament (1999), New Telecom Policy, p. 2.
30 See: B.P. Singh (1995), “Basic Services: Clever Moves and Clear Goals,” Voice and Data, November 
1995; J.P. Singh (1999), Leapfrogging Development: The Political Economy of Telecommunications 
Restructuring, Albany: State University of New York Press, p.188; Rafiq Dossani (2002), 
Telecommunications Reform in India, London: Quorum Books, pp. 43-46.
31 Government of India, Lok Sabha, Amendment to the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India 
Act, 2000. Available at: www.dot.gov.in/uas.
32 China is the worldʼs largest market by number of users; the United States is largest by market value.
33 In a speech to India Telecom 2012, Anne Bouverot, Director-General of the Global System for Mobile 
Communication Association (GSMA), stated that the number of phones available in India paint an 
inaccurate picture of actual ownership. She stated that only 25 percent of Indian citizens (including 
children) have a telephone, and that the average telephone owner has 2.2 phones. See: “Leveraging 
Telecom for Connecting India.” Text available at: www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
Anne-Bouverot-India-Telecom-2012.pdf.
34 For the most part, privately sector Indian telephone and IT companies have located their head offices in 
suburban areas. Many of these offices (especially those in Bangalore and Hyderabad) follow the campus 
or “pastoral capitalist” tradition of corporate architecture favored by American tech giants. See: Louise 
Mozingo (2011), Pastoral Capitalism: A History of Suburban Corporate Landscapes. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
35 This was a common theme during interviews. Several interview subjects spoke off the record about not 
just large-scale scams (such as the 2G spectrum scandal) that make headlines, but also of regular 
payoffs to low- and mid-level employees. It is difficult to judge the extent of corruption in Indian telephony. 
One intervieweeʼs words were instructive: “today it is probably more subtle than it was 5-10 years ago. If 
the Telecom Minister is blatantly stealing, he will get caught. Other politicians, the police, the courts, lots 
of people will be happy to call him out. But corruption is a fact of life for anyone who works in telecom. 
Anyone who says otherwise is lying.”
36 Prior to the telecom reforms of the 1990s, per-minute telephone charges ran up to Rs. 18 per minute; 
by 2002, the per-minute charge had dropped to Rs. 1 per minute. See: Saxena, Connecting India, p. 26. 
Today, the average tariff per minute is Rs. per minute. See: Cellular Operators Association of India 
(2013a), National Telecom Statistics. Available at: www.coai.com/Statistics/Telecom-Statistics/National/
National.
37 Security is a visible element of any IPL match. On their way to their seats, fans are certain to walk 
through at least one metal detector and pass by several dozen soldiers. Surrounding the pitch is a 6-8 
foot high iron fence, with soldiers on both sides. But security varies by city and by class of ticket. The 
highest categories of ticket (typically the Membersʼ Clubs) often have discreet entrances; once a fan finds 
these entrances and shows the correct type of ticket, security is light-handed. The heaviest security I 
encountered was at Mumbaiʼs Wankhede Stadium (a 45min line-up, three metal detectors and two pat-
downs) and Jaipurʼs Sawai Mansingh Stadium (two metal detectors and confiscation of all coins). The 
lightest security I encountered was at Chennaiʼs M A Chidambaram Stadium (no metal detector, no pat 
down, and only three ticket checks).
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38 A batsman earns six runs when he hits the ball and it flies over the boundary without touching the 
ground.
39 A partnership refers to the two batsmen on the pitch. When one of them is out, the partnership is 
broken and a new batsman replaces him. For example, the first wicket partnership might last for 50 runs, 
at which point one of the batsmen is out. Then the second wicket partnership begins. Partnerships are a 
common measurement of team performance and a common statistic used in bets.
40 The IPL schedules an 8pm match every day; most days there is also a 4pm match.
41 I sought a range of ages in respondents and asked them to indicate their ages on the survey forms I 
collected. I had roughly equal distribution across four age groups: 18 and under, 19-30 years, 31-40 
years, and 41 years and older. 
42 In those cases, I asked respondents to focus on the phone they use most frequently.
43 Three users told me that they had a phone that their wives did not know about.
44 ESPNCricinfo is itself worthy of a study in media formation. It originated in 1993 as the personal project 
of a British researcher in Minneapolis, using a text-only box to show ball-by-ball updates for matches 
around the world. Cricinfo used live-blogging well before the term came to exist. The site was later 
purchased by ESPN, which has since expanded the site significantly. 
45 Bookies and betters are not mutually exclusive; often bookies place bets and betters take bets from 
others.
46 The team is owned by India Cements, whose managing director is N. Srinivasan. He was until recently 
the president of the BCCI, and thus the official who oversees the IPL. To avoid conflict-of-interest 
questions, Srinivasan handed operational control of the team to his son-in-law, Gurunath Meiyappan.
Srinivasan has been removed from the BCCI governing council while the Indian Supreme Court hears 
evidence in a corruption case against him. Meanwhile, Srinivasan is set to become the next head of the 
International Cricket Council, the body that oversees cricket worldwide.
47 The 2014 season has been reduced to 60 matches, in large part because the first half of the season 
was moved to the U.A.E.
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Appendix: Key Terms
Circuits: the physical components of a network.
Elite: a subgroup of people who exercise the major share of economic and social 
authority of a larger group.
First order network: the material network of infrastructure connecting people or things.
Hub: a focal point of a network (could also be the center).
Information society: a society in which the production and dissemination of information 
is a significant component of economics, politics, and culture.
Network: an interconnected group or system linking people or things.
Network society: a society in which networks are the most important social structures.
Node: an intersection of two or more links on a network.
Second Order Network: social networks of users that have grown on top of the 
material network of infrastructure.
Space of Flows: a conceptualization of space based on proximity to flows of 
information and capital.
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